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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Quasi-experiments in Competition and Public Policy: Evidence from Chilean Economic History
by
Felipe B. Carrera Galleguillos
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Simon Adrian Board, Chair
Compared to other disciplines, one of the distinctive features of Economics is the impossibility
of doing experiments to study empirically relevant questions. In this dissertation, I use two episodes
from the past where the unique features of the institutional environment created quasi-experiments
that help us understand relevant issues relate to cartels and neighborhood effects. In the fist two
chapters, I use the Chilean nitrate industry between the War of the Pacific and the start of the
First World War (1880-1914) to shed light on the effects of entry for cartels and the importance
of learning for effective cartel organization. The Chilean nitrate industry was very important at
the time: Chilean nitrate was the main commercial fertilizer used in the world. Also, it was the
main industry of Chile, the only country where it is found, where it represented 70% of exports
and 45% of government revenues. Importantly, there was no antitrust legislation and no domestic
consumer surplus to protect in Chile. Thus, cartels could be freely formed by nitrate producers.
Moreover, these cartels were completely public: Their decisions were publicly discussed by the press
and the public and they would be formed by the signature of a public contract. I collected from
handwritten archival records an original data set of monthly output and inputs that covers 35 years
ii
of this industry, period over which 5 cartels were organized. In the third chapter, I introduce a novel
new dataset to study neighborhood effects that uses a massive program of forced-displacement of
population within the city of Santiago in the context of the Chilean dictatorship in the early 1980s.
Chapter 1 studies the effect of cartels on entry, and the long-term effect of cartel-induced entry
for the evolution of industry productivity. Intuitively, as cartels artificially increase prices entry
becomes more attractive and less productive firms may decide to enter. Because of data limitations,
previous researchers have not quantified the extensive margin mechanism. My analysis has 3 steps.
First, I evaluate if nitrate cartels caused more entry of new firms. I find that cartels generated
an additional entry of 4 plants per year or about 5% of the initial number of plants in my main
period of interest. Second, I estimate the productivity of all the plants in the industry to analyze
if firms that entered during cartel periods where less productive. I find that there is a sizable gap
in average productivity between entrants during competition and cartel periods: If the median-
sized plant in the industry had received this productivity gap its revenue would have increases by
one-third. Third, I conduct two counterfactual simulations. The first, studies the effect of entry
on cartel profits by estimating incumbent cartel members counterfactual profits if they had been
able to prevent any additional entry. I find their counterfactual profits would have been 40% larger
had there been no entry. The second counterfactual studies the effect of having a cartel on entry.
Specifically, what would the number of new firms and their productivity have been, if during the
Fourth and Fifth Cartels there had been competition? I find that 18% of the plants that entered
in the data would have not entered. This translates into an increase on mean plant productivity of
3%.
Chapter 2 studies the degree to which experience helps firms to organize successful cartels.
Unlike in most of the previous literature on cartels, in the nitrate cartels issues related to monitoring
and enforcement were of secondary importance with respect to the challenge of allocating the
collusive surplus among the colluding firms. I document that cartel contracts gradually became
more complete, generated a smoother transition from competition to collusion, and that producers
eventually discarded inefficient methods of market share allocation, associated to larger production
costs, in favor of better alternatives. In particular, I am able to estimate that the time method
used during the Second Cartel directly caused higher production costs of about 10%, while the trial
method implemented during the Third Cartel caused higher costs of approximately 20%.
iii
Finally, Chapter 3 describes a novel large dataset that combines archival records and adminis-
trative data to study a natural experiment that occurred during the Chilean dictatorship between
1979 and 1985, when the government mandated the relocation of a large number of slums in the
city of Santiago, Chile. Some features of the program’s implementation make it of unique interest
to study the broad effects of neighborhoods on social mobility and inequality: the unit of treat-
ment was the slum, participation was mandatory and compliance was very high, since the policy
was implemented during a highly repressive dictatorial government. In addition, and only some of
the slums were removed from their original location creating two groups of families: movers and
non-movers, which allows me to identify a causal displacement effect. The dataset comprises data
for more than 26,000 households that were part of this program (out of a total of 40,000 house-
holds) and more than 58,000 of their children, providing the potential for causal estimation of the
long-term and inter-generational effects of moving to a high-poverty neighborhood on education,
mortality, income, and crime.
iv
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Chapter 1
Cartels, Entry, and Productivity:
Evidence from the Chilean Nitrate
Cartels
This paper studies the effect of cartels on the quantity and quality of new firms in an industry with
low barriers to entry. Intuitively, since cartels generate artificially high profits, low-productivity
firms may enter and erode the industry’s productivity, raise dispersion, and reduce total surplus.
To quantify these effects, we analyze Chile’s nitrate cartel in the early 20th Century, an industry
that dominated Chile’s economy at the time. We show that during cartel periods, entry was higher
(by 4 plants per year) and that these entrants had substantially lower productivity (by roughly
one-third of the mean TFP). We show that low barriers to entry reduced the profits of incumbent
cartel members by 40%. Moreover, we simulate each firm’s entry decision and show that, had
prices been determined competitively, 25% of the new plants would have postponed or canceled
their entry to the industry.
1
1.1 Introduction
Cartels are a common feature in most economies. For instance, in the period 2015-19, the European
Commission imposed fines in excess of €8.3 billion in 27 cartel cases.1 Moreover, it is likely they
are present in even greater numbers in nations with weaker antitrust systems than those of the EU
or the United States.
As is well understood, cartels impose costs to society by increasing prices, and thereby reducing
consumer surplus (e.g., Harberger (1954)). In addition, recent papers have shown that cartels reduce
productive efficiency by misallocating output to less efficient cartel members (e.g., Asker, Collard-
Wexler, and De Loecker (2019)). This paper considers a new channel through which cartels lead to
productive inefficiency: By artificially making entry more attractive, they induce less productive
inefficient firms to enter the industry.
We quantify the effect of cartels on entry by studying the Chilean nitrate cartel in the early
20th Century. This industry is attractive because the cartel was legally enforceable, entry barriers
were low, and, over 35 years, the industry switched between cartel and perfect competition multiple
times. Using a newly collected dataset, we show that during cartel periods, average entry increased
from 5 to 9 plants per year. Moreover, entrants during cartel periods were less productive by
one-third of the mean TFP. We conduct two counterfactuals. First, using detailed accounts from
historical records about these cartels’ inner workings, together with our structural estimates, we
show that low barriers to entry lowered incumbent profits by 40%. Second, we estimate a model of
firm dynamics and show that had the cartel not existed, 25% of plants would have postponed or
cancel their entry.
These findings are important from a historical and present day perspective. At the time,
Chile’s nitrate industry dominated Chile’s economy, accounting for 65% of exports and 45% of
government revenues. The excess entry lowered the mean productivity of the industry by 3%
and had a measurable effect on tax revenue and GDP. This poses important lessons for other
developing countries that are dominated by extractive industries. Moreover, the paper speaks to
the literature on productivity dispersion (e.g., Syverson (2004)) by showing that market power
caused by coordinated action by otherwise independent firms can generate inefficient entry.
1European Commision, Directorate-General for Competition (2019).
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Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we obtain reduced-form evidence about the effect
of cartels on entry. Second, we estimate the productivity of the nitrate-producing plants. Third,
combining the distribution of productivity in the industry with additional cost data, we compute
plant-level continuation values. Fourth, we perform counterfactual estimations.
The Chilean nitrate industry between 1880 and 1914 is well suited to answer our research
question. The industry had low concentration, a large number of firms and potential entrants, and
low barriers to entry. In this period, nitrate producers periodically formed quantity-setting cartels
with the goal of raising prices. These cartels were completely public, and produced abrupt shifts
between perfect competition and cartel settings. Moreover, these shifts were exogenous from the
point of view of potential entrants. We focus our analysis on two incarnations of the nitrate cartel,
which are regarded as the most efficiently organized according to historical records and for which
we have extensive data.2 Finally, all producers used the same technology of production, which
remained unchanged throughout this period.
We collect new plant-level and industry-level data from several archival sources in Chile: plant-
level inputs and outputs; plant characteristics; industry-level output, exports, and consumption;
market prices; and contracts used to implement each cartel. These rich data allow us to estimate
the production function for each plant in the industry, and to study their entry problem.
We first explore the relationship between a competitive regime and the amount of entry and
exit. The cartel generated an increase in prices by reducing aggregate output. We show that
cartels, even controlling for contemporaneous price, generated a significant additional entry of new
plants of more than 2 plants per year (4 plants per year for the cartels that are our main focus of
analysis). Moreover, a competitive regime was not significantly related to plant exit.
In order to compare the productivity of firms that entered in periods of cartel and competition,
we estimate the productivity of the plants in the industry. We implement a control function
method based on Olly and Pakes (1996) to generate consistent productivity estimates. We find
the productivity distribution of entrants to be significantly different depending on the competitive
regime at the moment of entry. The average productivity of plants that entered during cartel
periods was smaller than that of plants that entered during competition by about one-third of the
mean TFP. This difference in productivity is economically significant: A median-sized plant would
2The organization of nitrate cartels is explained in detail in a complementary paper, Carrera and Titov (2020).
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increase revenue by one-third, or $400k in current dollars, if it increased its productivity by the
average productivity difference between entrants in competition and cartel periods.
We then compute continuation values for the plants in the industry in order to perform counter-
factual simulations. To do this, we use our productivity estimates to develop a simple model that
combines empirically expected levels of output with a Markov model that regulates the transition
across prices and competition regimes and a plant-specific cost function. Median plant value at
moment of entry is estimated at approximately $25m (in current dollars), although there is signif-
icant dispersion. Once entry costs are incorporated, estimates are consistent with observed entry
behavior.
We use two counterfactuals to further explore the relationship between cartels, productivity,
and entry. First, we evaluate the effect of low barriers to entry on cartel profits by computing
counterfactual profits for incumbent cartel members, assuming they are able to prevent entry.
We estimate that aggregate profits for those firms would have been 39% larger than observed,
demonstrating that low barriers to entry are quite costly for cartels.
In the second counterfactual, we estimate how industry composition would have changed if two
cartel episodes, between 1901 and 1909, had not occurred. We find that 18% of observed new plants
would have not entered, and an additional 6% would have postponed their entry in the absence of
the cartel. Plants that would not have entered in the counterfactual case had lower productivity,
which translates into a 3% decrease, over 8 years, in mean industry productivity.
Our main results indicate that cartels have a substantial positive effect on the number of entrants
to an industry and a negative effect on their productivity—eroding industry’s productivity and
reducing total surplus in the long run. Low barriers to entry are also shown to be costly to
incumbent cartel members, as entry induced by cartel profits will significantly reduce their initial
market shares.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the industry, emphasizing relevant features
for identification and modeling decisions presented later in the paper. Section 4 introduces our
datasets and summary statistics for the plants in the industry. In Section 5, we perform a reduced-
form analysis of the effect of cartels on entry. In Section 6, we estimate plant-level productivity
and compute the effect of cartels on mean productivity of entrants. In Section 7, we introduce a
simple model of plant entry decision and we estimate plant-level continuation values. Finally, in
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Section 8 we describe our counterfactual simulations. The appendix presents additional industry
background, tables, and figures that complement the main text.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper studies the welfare consequences of cartels through their effect on productivity—unlike
most of the literature, which has focused on surplus losses due to output restrictions and higher
prices. Our work is closely related to a broader literature on the welfare costs of monopolies
that dates to Harberger (1954), who understood the potential distorting effect of market power on
resource allocation. Modern examples include applications on settings with cartels (e.g., Bridgman,
Qi, and Schmitz Jr (2015)) and trade liberalization (e.g., Schmitz Jr (2005), Pavcnik (2002) and
Dunne, Klimek, and Schmitz (2010)).3
Our paper is most closely related to Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker (2019), who study
the misallocation of output in the global oil industry due to OPEC’s market power. The focus of
each paper is different, since our paper deals with extensive margin productive inefficiency while
theirs studies the inefficiency caused by the suboptimal timing of oil field exploitation. Moreover,
there are two significant differences in the setting of each paper. First, productivity dispersion in
the nitrate industry is more representative of a typical industry, with a TFP ratio between a firm
in the 90th decile of the productivity distribution and a firm in the 10th decile (90-10 TFP ratio)
of 2.67. This value is on the same order of magnitude of the average 90-10 TFP ratio in the U.S.
manufacturing sector of 1.92 (Syverson, 2004).4 In contrast, the oil industry presents a much larger
90-10 TFP ratio of 9 (Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker, 2019). Second, the OPEC is an
international permanent cartel formed by national governments and dominated by members with
a permanent and large cost advantage. These characteristics distinguish OPEC from a standard
intranational cartel.
So far, works dealing with the relationship between cartels and productivity have used settings
with important barriers to entry. Bridgman, Qi, and Schmitz Jr (2015) and Rucker, Thurman, and
Sumner (1995) analyze deadweight losses in industries in which incumbent producers cannot trans-
3See Holmes and Schmitz Jr (2010) for a short survey.
4In developing countries, productivity dispersion seems to be larger. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find
an average 90-10 TFP ratios of about 5 for China and India.
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fer their production quotas outside a limited geographic area. Monke, Pearson, and Silva-Carvalho
(1987) analyze the outcomes of a flour-milling cartel in Portugal, and find large productivity losses
from both misallocation of production and capacity restrictions imposed by the cartel together with
the government. Similarly, in the case of the Norwegian cement industry analyzed by Ro¨ller and
Steen (2006), industry productivity suffered as incumbent firms raced to expand capacity, given
the quota allocation rules of the cartel, before merging to form a monopoly.
Some studies take a cross-industry or aggregate approach. Cole and Ohanian (2004) study the
economy-wide effect of New Deal cartels, and show that they negatively affected economic activity.
Symeonidis (2008) does a reduced-form analysis of the effects of competition on productivity and
wages in a large sample of manufacturing sectors in the United Kingdom during the 1960s, taking
advantage of passage of the Restrictive Practices Act in 1956 as a natural experiment. In contrast,
we choose to study a single industry to understand fundamentals behind productivity and costs,
which allow us to conduct counterfactual simulations.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature that studies cartel organization (an extensive
survey is provided by Levenstein and Suslow (2006)) by being the first to quantify the effect of
cartels on the amount of entry in a low-barriers-to-entry industry. This literature has identified four
key challenges cartels must address in order to succeed (McAfee and McMillan, 1992): bargain-
ing, monitoring, entry, and resistance from authorities. However, because of the demanding data
requirements to study entry, this aspect of cartel organization has thus far been largely overlooked.
1.3 Industry Background
This section describes some important institutional details of the nitrate of soda industry, with a
focus on the Chilean Nitrate Age (1884-1914). In particular, it presents industry characteristics
important for identification and for understanding the modeling decisions implemented later. For
additional details on the Chilean nitrate industry, please go to Section 1.A of the Appendix.
1.3.1 Historical development and expansion
The period between the War of the Pacific (1879-84) and the outbreak of the First World War
is often referred to as the Chilean Nitrate Age. During this period, nitrate of soda was the main
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Table 1.1: Evolution of the Nitrate Industry
Year Plants (number) Output (thous. of tons) Workers (thous.)
1882 43 492 7.1
1887 57 713 7.2
1892 NA 804 13.5
1897 42 1,187 16.7
1901 66 1,329 20.3
1906 96 1,822 NA
1910 102 2,465 43,5
1914 137 2,463 44,0
Sources: Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991), Semper et al. (1908), and Godoy
Orellana (2016).
commercial fertilizer used in the world. For instance, by 1900, nitrate of soda represented two-thirds
of the world’s total supply of commercial fertilizers (Wisniak and Garces, 2001). At the same time,
the entirety of the industry was, for the first time, located in a single nation.
Nitrate of soda is a natural fertilizer used to transfer nitrogen to the soil. The only commercially
viable deposits are found in two provinces of the Chilean Atacama Desert (Vicun˜a, 1931).5 It is
an homogeneous product, since it was only sold in two versions6 without any differentiation across
producers. The closest available substitute during this period was sulphate of ammonia. Besides
its use as a fertilizer, which accounted for roughly three-quarters of consumption, it had some
alternative uses, the most important of which was as an input in the manufacture of explosives.
Nitrate was produced by private firms in purpose-built plants located on the desert. Figure
2.2.1 shows La Patria nitrate plant as a representative example. The basic configuration of a
nitrate plant consisted of a central refining facility in the midst of the nitrate-bearing grounds that
would feed it.7 Packaged nitrate would then be dried and stored near the refining facility before
being transported by railroad to the nearest port. In a standard transaction, producers would sell
ready-for-export nitrate at the port. Traders would then transport it by boat to the consuming
markets of Western Europe and the United States.
The nitrate industry featured a large number of firms and experienced constant expansion
5The two provinces were Tarapaca (previously owned by Peru) and Antofagasta (shared by Bolivia and Chile
before the war).
6The two versions were ordinary (95% purity) and refined (98% purity), with ordinary constituting almost all of
output.
7The only exception to this configuration was the Antofagasta Company before 1907, which instead used a central
refining facility in the port of the same name.
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Figure 1.1: Nitrate Plant Example: La Patria Plant
Sources: Boudat (1889).
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during the Nitrate Age. Table 2.2.1 presents basic statistics regarding the industry’s evolution
during our period of interest. As a consequence of the large number of firms,8 the industry had
persistently low levels of concentration. For instance, in 1901 the largest firm had a market share
of 6.4%, while in 1907 the largest market share was 7.6%. Firms were owned mostly by British,
German, and Chilean entrepreneurs.
A distinct industry characteristic is that demand and prices were very volatile. This came as
a result of three market characteristics (Bertrand, 1910). First, most nitrate was used during the
European harvest season, between March and June of each year, which corresponded to about
90% of the agricultural consumption of nitrate. Second, the European demand had high variance,
depending on the current year’s weather shocks. Third, the large distance between Europe and
Chile meant that nitrate producers were not able to react to same-year demand shocks,9 since
nitrate production, due to economies of scale, was bound to be year-round. These patterns are
summarized in Figure 2.2.2. This situation was reinforced by the fact that nitrate intermediaries
provided only minimal storage, because of the financial risks associated with its wide fluctuations
in price.
The Chilean government implemented a nitrate policy based on two pillars: private ownership
of the industry with low regulation, inspired by laissez faire principles, and heavy taxation using
a per-unit export tax of approximately 2.54 pounds sterling per ton exported (this corresponds to
about $400 per ton in current dollars) (Brown, 1963).10 Nitrate of soda rapidly became the most
important export of Chile, accounting for approximately 65% of exports.11 At the same time, the
nitrate export tax became the most important source of government revenues and explained, on
average, 45% of total tax revenues between 1885 and 1914 (Chilean Ministry of Finance, 1925).
The First World War fundamentally changed the market for nitrate of soda,12 as Chile lost its
monopoly on nitrate of soda due to the invention of the Haber-Bosch method for production of
8Some firms owned more than one plant. Most of the firms that entered during our main period of interest were
single-firm plants.
9Semper et al. (1908) estimate average times of travel of 90 to 100 days for sailboats and 45 to 65 days for
steamboats.
10Figures regarding the nitrate export tax also include the export tax collected on iodine exports. Iodine is a
by-product of the elaboration of nitrate of soda.
11Computed from Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991, p. 139), as the average of nitrate participation on exports
in years ending in 0 or 5 during the Nitrate Age.
12The outbreak of the war also greatly disrupted the industry, as the blockade of the Central Powers closed some
of the most important export markets overnight at the same time as the industry experienced a positive demand
shock, driven by sales to the Allied powers.
9
Figure 1.2: Industry Output and Consumption
Notes: Monthly industry-level output (dashed line) and consumption (solid line) between the years 1905 and 1908.
synthetic nitrate. The effects of this event for the Chilean nitrate industry were devastating; it
never recovered its previous levels of profitability.
1.3.2 Public cartels in the Chilean nitrate industry
Nitrate of soda producers formed cartels on five separate occasions (see Table 2.3.1). These car-
tels lasted from a minimum of 17 months to a maximum of 5 years, and had almost unanimous
participation by nitrate firms.13
Historical records show that producers formed cartels to take advantage of their joint market
power in the global fertilizer market. For instance, during a competitive period, a nitrate producers’
publication states:14
Currently, it can be said the industry is producing as much as it is allowed by the potency
of the elements at its disposal . . . On the other hand, it is the conviction of every and
each producer that today they deliver their valuable product . . . depressed by at least a
shilling in the price consumers can still pay at great advantage for their economy . . . The
13Collusive agreements generally required the participation of at least 95% of industry output for the cartel to
become operative.
14NPA Quarterly Circular, Number 18, May 25, 1899, p. 6.
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Table 1.2: List of Nitrate Cartels
Cartel Start Date End Date Early termination
First 1884-August 1886-December No
Second 1891-March 1894-March No
Third 1896-April 1897-October Yes
Fourth 1901-April 1906-March No
Fifth 1906-April 1909-March No
Notes: Early termination indicates whether the End Date corresponds to
the original termination date agreed on in the collusive contract or if an
early termination clause of the collusive contract was invoked. Source:
Brown (1963).
result, therefore, of sound advice and mere commercial foresight would be to agree on
a formula under which all [producers] consulted their interests and marched together in
pursuit of own and general welfare.
Before the start of each cartel, a collusive contract would be signed by all participating produc-
ers. Among the aspects regulated by these contracts were cartel duration, allocation of collusive
quotas, dispute resolution mechanisms, rules regarding a potential early dissolution of the cartel,
and norms for inclusion of new producers. Day-to-day operations of the cartel were managed by
an elected board of producers, who were supported by the permanent staff of the trade association
of nitrate producers (called the “Nitrate Propaganda Association,” or NPA henceforth) after its
creation in 1894.
A distinctive feature of these cartels is that they were completely public, including their collusive
contracts. This was the result of the absence of any antitrust legislation in Chile at the time.
Cartel duration was explicitly agreed upon in the collusive contracts.15 In the case of the
first two cartels, duration was initially set for a short period of time (1 or 2 years), under the
understanding that the cartel would, at the expiration date, be renewed under the same basic
collusive contract. After the Third Cartel, duration of the contract became longer (3 or 5 years),
and to extend collusion after that date, a whole new contract would have to be agreed upon by
producers, allowing for a more complete renegotiation of the terms.
Regarding the effects of nitrate cartels, as an illustration, Figure 2.3.1 shows the industry yearly
15After the Second Cartel, a specific procedure to trigger an early dissolution of the cartel was also included in the
contracts. This procedure required the agreement of a super-majority of producers as a fraction of industry output.
Only in the case of the Third Cartel was an early dissolution discussed and approved.
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Figure 1.3: Industry yearly output (tons)
Notes: Yearly industry output shown as circles (triangles) for competition (cartel) years. The dashed line presents
a nonparametric trend, computed only using industry output observed during years in competition. Cartel and War
of Pacific periods are shaded. Each cartel’s number by chronological order is written on its respective period.
output, together with a trend that considers only years with free competition, showing that output
during cartel years was always below what could be expected given the previous trend of output
during competition.
Table 2.3.2 summarizes the effect of cartels on industry output. In this table, the dependent
variable is monthly industry-level output, while the main independent variables of interest are
individual cartel dummies. The regression also includes dummies related to high-and-low-demand
seasons and a time trend. The main result of Table 2.3.2 is that going from competition to cartel
was correlated with an industry output reduction of around 18%. Cartels had heterogeneous results,
which is consistent with contemporaneous descriptions.16
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Unlike most industries in the developing world at the time, producers and government agencies that
were related to the nitrate industry placed great importance on the collection of detailed statistics.
16Sources emphasize how the use of different contractual rules led to disparate degrees of success. In particular,
Cartels Fourth and Fifth had a significant effect on aggregate output. Cartel rules are explained in detail in a
complementary paper, Carrera and Titov (2020).
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Table 1.3: Cartel Effects Regressions
Dependent variable:
log(Nitrate Output)
(1) (2)
Cartel −0.187∗∗∗
(0.031)
Cartel 1 −0.549∗∗∗
(0.084)
Cartel 2 −0.045
(0.053)
Cartel 3 −0.019
(0.095)
Cartel 4 −0.137∗∗∗
(0.022)
Cartel 5 −0.167∗∗∗
(0.029)
Time 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001)
Constant 16.426∗∗∗ 16.184∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.145)
Observations 404 404
Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.818 0.841
Adjusted R2 0.817 0.838
Notes: Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Observations correspond to
months at the industry level. Cartel
takes the value 1 if any cartel was ac-
tive and 0 otherwise. Cartel 1 takes
the value 1 if First Cartel was active
and 0 otherwise. Additional indicator
variables for individual cartels follow the
same logic. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Meticulous record-keeping was also helped by the isolated nature of the industry’s environment,
where it was the solely economic activity of importance.
The main dataset is a panel describing plant-level output and input decisions with a monthly
frequency. This dataset, put together for the first time, was compiled from two main contempora-
neous sources. The first corresponds to monthly plant-level industry reports compiled in the form
of handwritten spreadsheets by the Nitrate Agency, which cover the period 1883 to 1909.17 The
second source is plant-level output and export monthly reports produced by the NPA, which mostly
cover the period 1900-1914.
For the complete sample of months and plants, the data contained in the Nitrate Agency
spreadsheets include nitrate output, exports, and stocks; iodine output, exports, and stocks; number
and nationality of workers; and number and type of animals. There was also a partial collection of
statistics on days worked and energy inputs. In total, we were able to collect spreadsheets for 228
months over this period, with 15, 804 observations at the plant-month level The dataset generated
using Nitrate Agency data was complemented by monthly plant-level output data from the NPA
monthly output reports (our second source). In this case, records are available for 21 months before
1900 and for every month after that year, for a total of 23, 518 observations. The merged dataset,
once redundant observations were removed, contains a total of 32, 623 plant-month observations.18
Constructing the main dataset proved challenging at times. Both of our main sources come from
physical archives and had never before been assembled into a single dataset. Spreadsheets produced
by the Nitrate Agency were scattered in several archives located in Santiago and the Nitrate Re-
gion.19 Moreover, these spreadsheets are original internal reports, produced to be sent from the
agency’s local office in the Nitrate Region to the Ministry of Finance in Santiago, which means that
they are handwritten. Additional archival work took place in order to gather complementary data:
Supplementary spreadsheets were gathered from reprints of the Official Journal of the Republic of
Chile and local newspapers from the Nitrate Region, and NPA monthly output and exports reports
were available in physical format at the Chilean National Library. Furthermore, data processing
imposed additional challenges. For instance, several plants shared the same name (e.g., there were
17For an example of a typical spreadsheets, see Figure 1.B.5 in Appendix 1.B.
18A summary of the coverage of both primary sources can be seen in Figure 1.B.1 in Appendix 1.B.
19Specifically, from the Ministry of Finance Section of both the National Historical Archives and the National
Archives of the Administration in Santiago, Chile; and the Tarapaca Regional Archives in Iquique, Chile.
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Table 1.4: Summary of Data Sources
Data Sources
Prices UK The Economist, Chemical Trade Journal
Prices Chile Nitrate Agency, NPA
Cost parameters Semper et al. (1908)
Plant characteristics Narro (several issues), Boudat (1889)
1st Cartel contract Comite´ Salitrero (1884)
2nd Cartel contract National Notarial Archive. Iquique Notaries. Volume 132.
3rd Cartel contract National Notarial Archive. Iquique Notaries. Volume 141.
4th Cartel contract NPA (1900)
5th Cartel contract Semper et al. (1908, p. 321)
five plants named “Sacramento” and seven named “Rosario”). To distinguish between them, the
Nitrate Agency and the NPA used naming conventions, such as adding a geographical or ownership
reference to the name, which were not always consistent. Finally, industry sources did not use a
standard set of units to produce their reports. Hence, each reporting agency would use a different
units convention.
The main dataset was complemented by data from several other sources, which are summarized
on Table 2.4.1.20 From sources in the National Notarial Archive and the National Library, we
collected the five collusive agreements signed by the nitrate producers between 1884 and 1909. UK
price data, for nitrate of soda and related products, was obtained from The Economist and The
Chemical Trade Journal. Chilean prices were gathered from the Annual Report of the Nitrate
Agency and the “Estad´ıstica Comparada de An˜os Salitreros,” which is a compendium of aggregate
statistics published by the NPA. Extensive historical evidence from nitrate producers’ internal
discussions was obtained from the Quarterly Circulars published by the NPA and the nitrate
producers’ meeting minutes (NPA, 1909). Additional qualitative evidence comes from the internal
correspondence of one of the main nitrate firms, the Antofagasta Company.
Some limitations remain regarding our data. First, before 1890, Nitrate Agency spreadsheets
included only the Tarapaca Province (which, at that time, corresponded to around 90% of industry
output). Second, there are 22 months between March 1883 and February 1897 for which we do
not possess output plant-level data. Third, our inputs data ends in 1909 which means that we
can’t estimate productivity for plants that entered after that year. Finally, one company (the
20Additional details are found in Appendix 1.B.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics: Nitrate Plants
Statistic Workers Animals Capacity (tons) Avg. output (tons)
N 176 178 200 200
Mean 289 103 3,494 1,703
St. Dev. 179 64 2,861 1,239
Min 5 2 30 18
Pctl(25) 167 57 1,610.2 932
Median 245 89 2,663.7 1,337
Pctl(75) 383 139 4,267.1 2,161
Max 1,038 309 15,647 6,721
Notes: Capacity estimated as maximum monthly observed output in moving period
of five years (observations from year 1896 were dropped). Workers, animals, capac-
ity, and average output correspond to mean monthly values, excluding zero output
observations. Sources: Authors’ calculations using main dataset.
Antofagasta Company) refused to report its output before 1895 (however, they did report their
inputs).
Table 2.4.2 shows summary statistics for the 200 plants in our main dataset. The median nitrate
plant had 245 workers and 89 animals, although there was a significant dispersion. Column 3 shows
capacity, which was estimated as the maximum plant-level monthly output observed in any month
of a moving 5-year interval.21 Column 4 presents the average monthly output, conditional on plants
being active. The industry presents a large amount of excess capacity, with average output doubling
the average monthly output. Figure 1.5 complements Table 2.4.2 by illustrating the relationship
between industry capacity and monthly output.
1.5 Reduced-form Evidence on Entry
The first step in the analysis explores the relationship between cartel episodes and the entry and
exit of plants. Extensive narrative historical evidence documents a relationship between cartels
and entry in this industry. For instance, the testimony of H.H. Gibbs, cited earlier, includes the
following exchange:22
—Now you said, with respect to your nitrate of soda, that it is a bit of a monopoly?
21For the estimation of capacity, we did not consider observations from the year 1896, since the rules of the Third
Cartel induced abnormal levels of output in that year.
22Gold and Silver Commission (1887, p. 157).
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Figure 1.4: New Plants per Year
Notes: Number of nitrate plants that started operating each year. Competition (cartel) years are shown in black
(gray).
—A monopoly of the province, you may say the whole of that part of Chili. Well, the
effect of this stimulus given to that production is that a multitude of producers turn
up.
Table 1.6 summarizes entry and exit patterns for the industry between 1885 and 1914, and
shows that cartel periods are associated with a significant increase in the entry of new plants. The
dependent variable in these regressions is the number of entering and exiting plants per period.
We identify the entry date of each plant as the first month in which it had a positive output (the
yearly entry of plants is summarized in Figure 1.4). Observations have been grouped in periods of
6 months, which are then classified as competitive or cartel periods.
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.6 suggest that even after controlling for contempo-
raneous nitrate price level, cartels have a significant effect on the entry of new plants,23 and this
effect has a large magnitude with respect to industry size. In a specification that uses a dummy to
account for all cartels together, the effect is roughly 2 new plants per year. On the other hand, in
a specification considering only the Fourth and Fifth Cartels (which are the focus of our analysis),
23For a visual illustration, see Figure 1.4.1 in Appendix 1.4.
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Table 1.6: Entry Regressions
Dependent variable:
Entrants per period
(1) (2)
Cartel 1.069∗∗
(0.516)
Cartels 4th & 5th 2.212∗∗∗
(0.591)
log(Price) 7.079∗∗∗ 6.437∗∗∗
(2.211) (2.026)
Time 0.002 -0.019
(0.016) (0.015)
Constant -13.863∗∗∗ -11.809∗∗∗
(4.800) (4.339)
Observations 60 60
R2 0.228 0.328
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.292
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Periods correspond to 6 months. Cartel
takes the value 1 if any cartel was active and
0 otherwise. Cartels 4th & 5th takes the value
1 if Fourth or Fifth Cartels were active and 0
otherwise. Price is contemporaneous nitrate
of soda price in UK. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
the magnitude increases further to more than 4 plants per year.
Exit patterns in our data are observed with more noise than entry patterns because of the
presence of a large number of shutdowns. Particularly, it is likely that what we observe as exits in
the data, near the end of our database, were instead originally intended to be temporary shutdowns
that became permanent after the start of World War One. The main factor that explains observed
plant exits in this industry is obsolescence. For example, approximately 30% of all exiting plants
are units that were never updated to the Shanks refining method.24
Identification of the effect of cartels on entry relies on the fact that the competitive regime of
the industry was public, and that both the competitive regime of the industry and nitrate price
were exogenous from the point of view of a potential entrant. The competitive regime of the in-
dustry was exogenous because, if the current competitive regime was collusion, cartel rules implied
24This refining method was the industry standard during the Nitrate Age, and was introduced only a few years
before the start of our dataset.
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that entry would be accommodated and the new producers incorporated into the cartel.25 On the
other hand, if the current competitive regime was competition, forming a new cartel required the
approval of a large majority of producers. Since market shares in the industry were very low, it
was highly improbable that the entry of a single new producer would affect the existence of such a
majority. Thus, potential entrants knew that their individual entry decision was unlikely to affect
the collective decision about the industry’s competitive regime. Nitrate price was exogenous given
the extremely low concentration of the nitrate industry, which meant that firms had a behavior con-
sistent with perfect competition. Finally, the competitive regime was public since cartel contracts,
once signed, were public and had a known fixed term.
The previous argument does not imply that incumbent producers were unaware of the fact that
the existence of a cartel changed entry patterns. For instance, during the failed negotiations to
form a cartel in 1909, the manager of the NPA stated:26
Regarding the reduction of the [cartel] duration from 5 to 3 years, it is true that with
a 5 years [contract] there is the risk that new plants will be built, since it offers a wider
base for the investment of capitals . . . On the other hand, a 3 year [contract] generates
another challenge, which is that one year before that period is completed the market
becomes unstable, due to the uncertainty about whether a new collusive contract will
be signed or not.
The nitrate industry had low barriers to entry.27 To install a new nitrate firm, an entrepreneur
needed two things: to obtain the rights to nitrate-bearing land and to install a refining facility.
With respect to the refining facility, all new nitrate plants in the Nitrate Age used the Shanks
Method, which was not patent protected.
Nitrate rights in private hands was abundant. An official report of the Nitrate Agency estimated
in 1908 that nitrate reserves owned by private producers were more than three times larger than
the total industry output in its first century.28 Ownership of nitrate lands was very atomized,
which made it impossible for incumbent producers to prevent entry by restricting access to nitrate
25For an example of a cartel contract see Appendix ??.
26NPA (1909), minutes from the meeting on March 23, 1909, p. 3.
27Low barriers to entry, defined here simply as the fact that any firm willing to pay an entry cost could become
active in the industry.
28Bertrand (1910).
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Figure 1.5: Industry Capacity and Monthly Output
Notes: Estimated industry capacity (dashed line) and monthly industry output. Capacity computed by adding
estimated individual plant capacity. Individual plant capacity, estimated as the largest observed output in 5-year
intervals (the year 1896 is not considered in computation, due to exceptional output levels caused by Third Cartel
rules). Cartel and War of Pacific periods are shaded. Each cartel’s number by chronological order is written on its
respective period.
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rights.29 H.H. Gibbs stated about the availability of nitrate land: “. . . the land is of no value at all,
it is prairie value really until you put up a manufactory. Well, the fear of having to invest capital
in that manufactory . . . deters people.”30
Contemporaneous narrative evidence shows that nitrate producers would hold on to their nitrate
land, waiting for the right moment to purchase the necessary equipment to start producing:31
Owners [of nitrate lands] limit themselves to keep their property waiting that more
prosperous years for the industry would allow them to start obtaining commercial profits
from their immobilized capital . . . These legitimate aspirations have finally materialized,
sheltered by the prosperity brought to the industry, thanks to the combination formed
by those same owners.
Nitrate land holdings by the Chilean state were even more extensive. By 1925, the Ministry
of Finance claimed that nitrate land owned by the government and still unmeasured, in terms of
surface, was almost five times larger than that already in private hands.32
The Chilean government periodically auctioned nitrate lands in its possession (see Table 1.7).
This could potentially be a threat to our identification, if the entry of new plants was induced by
Chilean government auctions and land auctions coincided with cartel periods. Table 1.7 summarizes
all nitrate land auctions conducted by the Chilean government during the study period. Only 3 out
of 12 auctions occurred during cartels. Moreover, the amount of nitrate content transferred in those
auctions was equivalent to only 6% of the reserves already in private hands (Semper et al., 1908).33
In addition, the auctions in the period 1894-95 (competition years) were the only ones directly
motivated by a desire to induce entry (Brown, 1963). Finally, from a directory that encompasses
all Chilean nitrate firms in 1907 (Nitrate Credit Association, 1909), we know that out of 28 new
plants built by these firms, only one can be traced directly to a recent land auction.
29Patterns of nitrate land ownership across different districts are explained in Appendix 1.A.
30Gold and Silver Commission (1887, p. 157).
31NPA Quarterly Circular, Number 27, April 21, 1902, p. 4.
32Detailed statistics can be seen in Table 1.A.2 of Appendix 1.A. Estimation based on the minimum nitrate content
required by the Shanks refining method, which was 12%.
33Estimation in the Nitrate Agency’s annual report for 1900, p. 53. This annual report has yet to be obtained by
us.
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Table 1.7: Summary of Nitrate Land Auctions
Year Auction no. Competitive regime Nitrate reserves (tons) Price (£/ton)
1882 First Competition 30,144,060 0.21
1894 Second & Third Competition 43,640,414 0.24
1895 Fourth Competition 5,000,000 0.20
1897 Fifth Cartel 1,842,000 0.16
1901 Sixth Cartel 11,144,368 0.17
1903 Seventh Cartel 12,559,413 0.25
1912 Eighth Competition 8,203,185 0.50
1917 Ninth Competition 27,686,184 0.19
1917 Tenth Competition 30,786,675 0.33
1918 Eleventh Competition 6,668,953 0.23
1924 Twelfth Competition 38,046,630 0.36
Sources: Chilean Ministry of Finance (1925), p. 53.
1.6 Productivity Estimation and Dispersion
Using our detailed output and input plant-level database, we estimate the productivity of each plant in the
industry. The estimated productivity distribution exhibits a large cross-sectional dispersion. We also show
that plants that entered the industry during cartels had significantly lower productivity.
The production of nitrate consisted of two distinct main stages: extraction and refining. The extraction
stage was the labor-intensive process by which the raw material,34 which would later be refined into nitrate of
soda, was extracted from the desert soil and transported to the nitrate plant’s refining facility. The refining
stage refers to the leaching process by which the nitrate of soda was separated from the other materials
present in the raw material, such as diverse salts and sulfites.
In line with the previous description, we model the overall production process using a Leontief production
function. At the same time, each of the main stages of production is separately assumed to follow a Cobb-
Douglas production function. In the extraction stage, the relevant inputs are workers and animals used to
transport the raw material. Meanwhile, on the refining stage, the relevant input is the energy used to heat
the raw material during the leaching process. Finally, since most of the energy used in the extraction stage
corresponds to animal traction, and the refining stage was energy intensive, it is realistic to assume that the
observed energy input was only used in the refining stage. For plant i in period t, its output will be given by
qit = min{φiLαitAβitε1it︸ ︷︷ ︸
extraction
stage
, θφδiE
γ
itε2it︸ ︷︷ ︸
refining
stage
} (1.1)
34Raw material was denominated “caliche” in Spanish.
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s.t. qit ≤ kit︸︷︷︸
refining
capacity
,
where qit is nitrate output, φi is a time-invariant TFP term, Ait are animals, Lit are workers, and Cit are
energy (coal) units. In addition, θ is a common scaling factor and εjit are lognormal iid shocks to output with
zero mean. Similarly, kit corresponds to the maximum refining capacity of the plant, which is unobserved
but which we can infer from the monthly output data. Notice that we observe the output of nitrate plants
in physical units (tons), not in sales.
The term φi is present in both stages of the production process. Intuitively, φi is related to the geological
properties of the raw material; in particular, to its nitrate grade, which should affect both stages of the
production process. To illustrate, suppose one plant has a value of φ that is twice as large as that of a second
plant. Then, the first (high-productivity plant), to produce each unit of final product, will have to extract,
transport, and apply the leaching process to only half as much raw material as the second (low-productivity)
plant.
During the period studied there was no significant technological change, since the Shanks method to
leach nitrate, introduced in the late 1870s, remained the industry standard until the 1920s. Moreover, all
new plants built during the Nitrate Age were based on this technology. At the same time, the extraction
stage did not experience significant improvements (Reyes, 1994).35
There is ample evidence that costs—and therefore productivity—were heterogeneous across nitrate
plants. The main driver of productivity differences, as the technology used by all firms was the same,
was the geological characteristics of the nitrate-bearing grounds where each plant was located. Contempo-
raneous sources support this claim; for instance, Semper et al. (1908) state, “the cost of production varies
widely depending on numerous factors. Mainly the nitrate grade, the hardness, and the specific type of raw
material.”36
We estimate the parameters of equation 1.1 in two steps. Our main dataset includes workers, animals,
and nitrate output for all plants. In the first step, we use these variables to estimate the parameters from
the extraction stage. We will take the following expression in log-form to the data:
log(qit) = log(φi) + αlog(Lit) + βlog(Ait) + log(ε1it). (1.2)
In the second step, we use the productivity estimated in the first step as an input to estimate the
parameters in the refining stage, using the subsample of observations that include the energy variable, which
corresponds to approximately 15% of the observations in the full sample.
35In particular, mechanization of the extraction stage would only occur in the 1920s, with introduction of the
Guggenheim method of production.
36Semper et al. (1908, p. 71).
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1.6.1 Extraction-stage Estimates
To obtain consistent estimators in the first step, we must address two potential main concerns: simultaneity
and selection. Simultaneity arises if the productivity shock ε1it is observed by the firm before it makes
its input decisions. Selection refers to the fact that plants choose whether to operate or not, causing the
observed set of active plants to be not a random sample from the population of plants.
Notice that for simultaneity to be a problem after including fixed effects in the extraction stage, firms
should be able to predict the sign and direction of the deviations from the mean and then be able to adjust
the number of workers and animals accordingly.
We believe that simultaneity in this particular case is not an issue for two reasons. First, there is evidence
that productivity shocks were hard to predict. Second, it was hard for firms to adjust their relevant inputs
to short-term productivity shocks. In the nitrate industry, shocks to productivity correspond to deviations
from the plant mean level in raw material quality.
First, because of the nature of the technology and the production process, it is unlikely that firms were
able to predict deviations from mean productivity before the end of the leaching process. Historical evidence
supporting this claim is found in the Antofagasta Company archives,37 particularly in the periodic reports
sent by plant managers to central headquarters. In February 1892, for example, the manager states that “last
month production was only 45,890 quintals . . . the result is unsatisfactory . . . The first days of the month were
very productive and we expected to reach a production of 55,000 quintals, but then [productivity] diminished
because of the presence of sulfate and boric acid . . . which prevented the cristalization of nitrate.”38 Similarly,
in May 1893, the plant manager reports that “output in April was only 42,300 quintals. This reduced amount
was due to the small number of leaching tanks [available], and the poor quality of the raw material whose
high concentration of sodium sulfate forced us to repeat the crystallization process.”39
Second, nitrate firms faced severe frictions in the input markets for workers and animals, which makes
it less likely that they adjusted their level of inputs as a function of monthly productivity shocks even if
they were able to perceive them. Since the industry was located in a previously uninhabited desert, mules
had to be imported from Argentina and workers had to be brought from other regions of Chile or Bolivia.
The industry suffered periodic labor shortages, which motivated the NPA to organize joint labor recruitment
efforts in Central and Southern Chile. The reports of the Antofagasta Company manager illustrate the great
lengths companies had to go to recruit labor:40
By telegram, I was informed 247 males, 128 women, and 30 children embarked in [the province
37This company was one of the largest in the industry, and company archives are preserved in the Historical
National Archives of Chile.
38Report number 87, February 2, 1892, p. 4.
39Report number 224, May 2, 1893, p. 1.
40Report number 225, May 5, 1893, p. 1.
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Figure 1.6: Plants in Shutdown
Notes: Plants in shutdown are defined as plants with zero observed current output and that have at least one positive
output period later in time. Cartel and War of Pacific periods are shaded. Each cartel’s number by chronological
order is written on its respective period.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on official publications.
of] Coquimbo bound to Pampa Central [plant].
To ensure the success of this important recruitment effort I took the following measures: The
railroad will have a special service on Sunday, day of their arrival, waiting on the docks . . . Five
boats will be ready to transport them to the company warehouse, . . . and the Governor will send
all available police to prevent any contact with locals.
The selection problem arises in this case because there is censoring on the observed distribution of
active plants. In the particular case of the nitrate industry, this problem would arise because of the large
number of shutdown plants we observe in the data (see Figure 1.6).41 Intuitively, plants that have already
invested in accumulating workers and animals may decide to remain in operation, even if they have a lower
productivity than a second plant that had not made those investments in the past, which introduces a bias
in our estimates. To address this issue, we use the method proposed by Olly and Pakes (1996), who use a
control function approach.
In this case, we augment equation 1.5 by adding a nonparametric function λ(·) of the propensity score
of shutdown to control for the differential probabilities a plant had of being active given its observables.
Intuitively, under mild conditions, there is a one-to-one relationship between the true selection function
41Interestingly, shutdowns are far more numerous than exiting plants; see Figure 1.4.2 in Appendix 1.4.
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Table 1.8: Production Function Extraction-stage
Dependent variable:
log(Nitrate output)
(1) (2) (3)
log(Workers) 1.086∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.029)
log(Animals) 0.273∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.038) (0.018)
Fixed effects No Yes Yes
Adjusted Selection No No Yes
Observations 10,782 10,782 8,608
R2 0.483 0.671 0.995
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.667 0.995
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Obser-
vations are plant-months. Nitrate output measured in
tons. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
that generates the censoring and the propensity score. The new expression that will be taken to the data
corresponds to
log(qit) = log(φi) + α · log(Lit) + β · log(Ait) + λ(νit) + 1it, (1.3)
where νit corresponds to the propensity score of oficina i to shutdown in period t, and the polynomial λ(·)
used has four degrees of freedom and was chosen according to the BIC criteria.
The propensity score is computed using a logit regression, where the dependent variable was the shutdown
choice of the firm and the independent variables are their lagged input values.42 To compute the propensity
score, several additional operations were done on the original dataset.43
Results from the estimation of plant-level productivity are summarized in Table 1.8. We restricted the
estimation to plants for which we have at least 10 observations with positive nitrate output. Figure 1.4.3
and Table 1.9 summarize the estimated distribution of productivity, which has a dispersion, measured by
the TFP 90-10 ratio, of 2.67. This value is on the same order of magnitude of the average 90-10 TFP ratio
in the U.S. manufacturing sector of 1.92 (Syverson, 2004).
Since we require at least 10 data points, we do not estimate the productivity of all plants that entered
42Estimation results are shown in Table 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C.
43First, we removed observations in which a plant was not active, but we know from the comments on the records
that the shutdown was because of force majeure. Examples include “cauldrons being repaired,” “leaching tanks
being repaired,” and “assembling refining facility.” Second, we remove observations in which there was a comment
explaining the plant was only performing extraction. Third, we remove observations from periods in which exceptional
circumstances may have induced additional shutdowns. These are the Chilean Civil War of 1891 and the Second
Cartel, which restricted output by capping the fraction of the year a plant could produce nitrate.
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Table 1.9: Summary Statis-
tics: Plant Productivity
Statistic Productivity
N 148
Mean 44.4
St. Dev. 15.6
Min 10.2
Pctl(25) 33.7
Pctl(75) 53.7
Max 97.1
Figure 1.7: Estimated Distribution of Plant Productivity
Notes: Each bar represents the estimated productivity of a nitrate plants (N=148). Values ordered in descending
order.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Cartels on Productivity of
Entrants
Dependent variable:
Productivity
(1) (2)
Cartel −10.630∗∗∗
(3.575)
Cartels 4th & 5th −13.365∗∗
(5.705)
log(Price) −28.425∗∗ −27.386∗∗
(13.830) (13.110)
Time 0.490∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.292)
Constant 108.835∗∗∗ 97.738∗∗∗
(30.260) (29.631)
Observations 108 108
R2 0.154 0.122
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.097
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Observations are individual plants at mo-
ment of entry. Dependent variable is estimated
plant-level productivity. Cartel takes the value
1 if any cartel was active and 0 otherwise.
Cartels 4th & 5th takes the value 1 if Fourth
or Fifth Cartels were active and 0 otherwise.
Price is contemporaneous nitrate of soda price
in UK. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
the industry in the period before World War One. In particular, of the 71 plants that started operating
during the Fourth and Fifth Cartels, we are able to estimate the productivity of only 48 (slightly less than
70% of the total). However, since the probability of shutdown is negatively correlated to productivity, the
set of plants without a productivity estimate is a negatively selected sample of the population.
1.6.2 Analysis of the Productivity Distribution
An additional question we can explore using the obtained distribution of productivity is whether cartels
negatively affected the “quality” of the entrants. Intuitively, as nitrate cartels generated artificially high
prices for an ex ante known period of time, some low-productivity plants, which would have not entered in
a competitive environment, could have decided otherwise. Table 1.10 shows that cartels had a significantly
negative effect on the productivity of new plants, even when we control for the contemporaneous nitrate
price level.
Furthermore, the distribution of entrants during cartels was different than the distribution of entrants
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Figure 1.8: Productivity vs Period of Entry
Notes: Each bar represents the mean productivity of entrants by period. Standard errors shown over the bars. Cartel
(competition) periods are shown in darkest (lightest) shade.
Figure 1.9: Productivity Distributions of Entrants
Notes: Productivity distribution of entrants during competition periods (lighter shade) and cartel periods (darker
shade).
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during competition (see Figure 1.9). A Chi-square test of the homogeneity of the distributions rejects that
both distributions are the same, at levels of significance of less than 1% or 2.6%, depending on the number
of categorical intervals used to split the sample.44
The difference in productivity is significant. The median-size plant in the industry would enjoy an
additional monthly gross revenue of approximately $410, 000 (in current dollars) if it went from the mean
productivity of an entrant during a cartel to the mean productivity of an entrant during competition.
1.6.3 Refining-stage Estimates
Lastly, using the productivity estimates from the extraction-stage, we estimate the parameters for the
refining-stage production function. The original production function equation for this stage, in logs, is
given by
log(qit) = log(θ) + δ · log(φi) + γ · log(Eit) + log(ε2it) (1.4)
Since we do not directly observe plant i´s productivity term, φi, we use the estimated value obtained
for the extraction stage. Thus, the equation we estimate is
log(qit) = log(θ) + δ · log(φˆi) + γ · log(Eit) + log(ε2it), (1.5)
where φˆi corresponds to the estimated productivity in the extraction stage.
An additional challenge in this case is that the Nitrate Agency’s inputs data only contain energy (specif-
ically, coal) for a subsample of the observations. Thus, we assume that the relationship between coal and
nitrate output in observed plants and periods is representative of the full population.
Table 1.11 shows the results of the production function estimation. Notice that the parameter associated
with log(φ), δ, is highly significant and close to one.45
1.7 Plant Entry Decision
In this section, we develop a simple entry model for potential entrants in the industry. We then separately
estimate its building blocks: the determinants of the plants’ output decision, the probabilities that ruled the
transition across state variables (price level and competitive regimes), and the total cost function. Later,
these pieces are combined to compute continuation values for potential entrants in the industry.
44Estimation details can be found in Table 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C.
45In addition, Figure 1.4.5 of Appendix 1.4 displays the relationship between energy (coal) and nitrate output.
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Table 1.11: Refining-stage Production Func-
tion
Dependent variable:
Nitrate Output
log(Coal) 0.643∗∗∗
(0.053)
log (Productivity) 0.956∗∗∗
(0.076)
Constant 0.153
(0.161)
Observations 2,326
R2 0.641
Adjusted R2 0.641
Notes: Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Observations are plant-months.
Nitrate output and coal measured in tons.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
1.7.1 Model of Entry
The main elements of our entry model are described next.
Time: Time is discrete and infinite. Periods consist of 6 months and are indexed by t ∈ {1, . . . ,+∞}.
Entry takes one period.
Plants: There is a set I = {1, . . . , NI} of potential plants in the industry, which are owned by a set
F = {0, . . . , NF } of existing firms. We consider the entry problem of each plant independently (hence, we
abstain from considering potential cost synergies across plants), so each plant is effectively treated as an
independent firm.
Plants are characterized by a vector of characteristics. Thus Plant i in time t is described by character-
istics
τit = (φi, kit) ,
where φi ∈ R+ is a constant productivity term and kit ∈ R+ is the maximum refining capacity of the plant.
We consider kit to be an exogenous characteristic of the plants for now.
State space: Market conditions at any period t are summarized by a vector of state variables ψt ∈ Ψ,
where ψt = (pt, ct).
• pt ∈ {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5} is the price of nitrate of soda in Chile. We discretize the space of prices into
five intervals pN , according to the empirically observed frequency of prices.
• ct ∈ {c0, c1, c2, c3, . . . , c10} is the current competitive regime of the industry. State c0 corresponds
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to free competition, while states {c1, . . . , c10} are cartel states. Specifically, for cartel states, their
index corresponds to the number of remaining periods in collusion, as established in the current cartel
contract. For instance, c3 means that after the current period concludes, there will be two more cartel
periods before competition resumes.
Plant entry decision: Current period profits for plant i of type τit are given by
pi(pt, qit, τit) = pt · qit − TCi(qit)
where pt is the price in Chile, qit is plant’s i output, and TCi(qit) is the production cost. Notice that τit
implicitly affects qit and TCi(·) through the productivity term φi.
Thus, a potential entrant of type τit faces at time 0 the following problem,
max
{t0}
Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtpi(pt, qit, τit)1t0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V (τit,ψt)
−βt0FC(kit)
 , (1.6)
where t0 is the period the firm enters; FC(·) is a sunk cost of entry that increases on plant size and is
independent of market conditions; β is the discount factor; and 1t0 is an indicator function that takes value
of 1 iif t ≥ t0.
Our main challenge consists in estimating the entry value V (τit, ψt), in order to evaluate counterfactual
levels of entry in a case without cartels. In the next subsections, we detail the process of estimation by
first explaining the estimation of revenue components and later the estimation of the cost function. Finally,
since the nitrate industry eventually declined due to the invention of a technological substitute, a potential
concern regarding our general approach is that potential entrants may have internalized in their entry
decision the probability that synthetic nitrate would be invented at some point in the future. However,
evidence from contemporaneous sources suggest that the invention of synthetic nitrate came as a surprise to
nitrate producers. For instance, the following commentary was included in NPA’s Quarterly Circular in 1904:
“Happily for country and industry, there is no close danger and, even as chemists and men of science work
tirelessly, it is impossible to foresee a time when nitrate has been dislodged, given the economic conditions
of its production, which seldom could be matched by a different industry.”46
46NPA Quarterly Circular, Number 34, May 31, 1904, p. 10.
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1.7.2 Revenue estimation
Output Determination Function
The main difficulty in the estimation of revenue is characterizing the output decisions of plants as a function
of own-characteristics and market conditions. That is, we look to estimate, for each plant i, a function of
the state variables, qi : ψ ≡ (c, p)→ R+.
Table 1.12: Determinants of Monthly Plant Out-
put
Dependent variable:
log(Nitrate Output)
log(Price) −1.174∗∗∗
(0.065)
Age −0.020∗∗∗
(0.001)
Productivity 0.031∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Cartel −0.059∗∗∗
(0.011)
Number Active Plants −0.006
(0.005)
Time 0.025∗∗∗
(0.002)
Constant 8.176∗∗∗
(0.133)
Observations 21,197
R2 0.390
Adjusted R2 0.390
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Dependent variable is plant-month output.
Cartel takes the value 1 if any cartel was active
and 0 otherwise. Age is the number of peri-
ods since start of operations. Number of Ac-
tive Plants is the number of active plants, ex-
pressed in tens. Price is contemporaneous ni-
trate of soda price in UK. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Notice that in the specification, we have not included any terms related to a potential strategic interaction
across plants. In fact, although the operation of the nitrate market closely resembled a Cournot model, the
low levels of concentration in practice caused firms to behave as in a perfectly competitive environment.
Evidence supporting this statement is found in Table 1.12, in which we regressed monthly nitrate output for
all plants in our dataset with respect to several potential explanatory variables. In particular, the number of
plants active in the industry is not significant. Figure 1.10 further illustrates the lack of correlation between
33
Figure 1.10: Average Output by Productivity Type and Number of Plants
Notes: Vertical axis on the left is in tons and corresponds to monthly average plant-level output, which is indicated
for each productivity type by a solid line. Horizontal axis is time in years from the beginning of our data set in
1883. Vertical axis on the right is the number of active plants in the industry, and is indicated by the dashed black
line. Productivity types are described below the horizontal axis, with Φ1 being the lowest and Φ5 being the highest
productivity type.
number of plants and nitrate output.47
To estimate the output function, we use our main dataset in a two-step approach. First, for all points
in the state space ψ such that we have 10 or more observations per plant, we use the average of these
observations as our estimate of qi(ψ). Second, we discretize the space of plant types τ by creating 15 cells of
plants grouped according to their productivity level (5 groups) and their effective size (3 groups for each of
the productivity groups).48 The identifying assumption is that plants within the same cell should be similar
enough to have similar levels of output conditional on specific values of ψ and that, by law of large numbers,
deviations from the mean level of output of each cell should cancel out.
Finally, prices in Chile are directly observed from 1893 onward. We use UK prices to complete the series
of prices FOB for previous dates, taking advantage of the fact that the difference between Chile nitrate prices
and UK nitrate prices was extremely stable across the years.49
47In addition, we test whether it is necessary to control for seasonality. Figure 1.4.8 in Appendix 1.4 shows that
nitrate output tended to be evenly distributed across the year, and hence we do not need to consider seasonality in
our estimation.
48Computed as their mean effective output when active, once they had been already sorted by productivity. The
discretization is shown in Tables 1.3.12 and 1.3.13 of Appendix 1.C.
49See Figure 1.B.3 in Appendix 1.4 and Table 1.C.3 in Appendix 1.C for more details.
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Transition Matrix across State Variables
We construct a transition matrix that summarizes the empirical transition probabilities across state variables
observed in the data. We assume that transitions across state variables were exogenous from the point of
view of each firm. We believe these assumptions are not very strong: With respect to nitrate price, as we
explained in a previous section, the industry can be described as perfectly competitive. Meanwhile, regarding
the competitive state of the industry, cartel rules for both the formation and dissolution of cartels did not
depend on the choices of any individual firm.50
The procedure to compute the empirical transition probabilities consists of several steps. First, we use
the discretization of the price and competition state variables to label each period t according its observed
state variables (ct,pt). Second, we count the number of periods each possible combination of states variables
was observed. Hence, we denote as n(KD) the number of periods where the competition state was cK and
the price state was pD. Third, we count the number of transitions we observe from each combination of state
variables (ct,pt) to every possible other combination of state variables. We denote as nc(KD|L) the number of
transitions we observe from competition state cK and price state pD to competition state cL. Analogously,
np(KD|G) corresponds to the number of transitions from the same combination of state variables to price state
pG. Finally, mp{KL|D} is defined as the conditional probability of transition in one period from (ct = cK ,
pt = pD) to pt+1 = pG. This value is computed using the formula
mc{KD|L} =
nc(KD|L)
n(KD)
, (1.7)
similarly, mc{KL|G} is computed as
mp{KD|G} =
np(KD|G)
n(KD)
. (1.8)
In the case of competition states, we also assume that cartels had the same effect on the transition
probabilities of the price state variable pt, independent of the remaining duration of the cartel. That is
mp{KD|G} = m
p
{LD|G} , ∀ {cK , cL} ∈ {c1, . . . , c10}
.
Also, notice that transitions across competition states that correspond to cartel (that is, competition
states, ct ∈ {c1, . . . , c10}) are trivial, since with probability equal to one, the next competition state will
be equal to the current minus one (meaning that the cartel has one period fewer left before its contract
50Forming a cartel required the agreement of a set of producers equivalent to at least 95% of market shares, while
dissolving a cartel required a majority of 65% of market shares.
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expires).51
1.7.3 Cost Function Estimation
To estimate the total cost function of nitrate firms, we complement the production function estimates,
which were the focus of the last section, with additional contemporaneous measures of costs, summarized in
contemporaneous technical sources. The total cost expression we use, divided into its components, can be
written as
TCi(qit) = ECi(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extraction
cost
+RCi(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
refining
cost
+GC(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax
cost
+ PC(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
transportation
cost
+OC(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
other
cost
, (1.9)
where the first two components ECi(·) and RCi(·) correspond to extraction stage and refining stage costs,
respectively. Notice these components are plant specific, since they are directly affected by the plant-specific
productivity term φi. On the other hand, the terms GC(·), PC(·), and OC(·) are cost components common
to all plants in the industry. For these components, the approach is simply the use of technical sources that
describe variable costs in the industry, using what is known as the “engineering method.” The main source
in this case is the technical description of the industry provided by Semper et al. (1908).52
One of the data-related challenges for this industry is the relative scarcity of direct sources for input
prices. In our computation, we use the values provided by Semper et al. (1908), who compiled cost statistics
from an extensive field visit to the industry in 1901 and 1902. Additionally, when this source was translated
into Spanish in 1908, the edition was augmented by adding cost data from that date. Hence, we mostly have
cost data without time-series variation, although our main source centers precisely on the period of time
that is our focus of interest.
Extraction-stage Costs
Extraction-stage costs are derived directly from its production function. The cost minimization problem
plant i faces each period, in order to produce an output of at least q, can be written as
min
{Lit,Ait}
ECi(qit) = w · Lit + canim ·Ait (1.10)
s.t. qit ≥ q,
51Examples of the transition matrices can be observed in Appendix 1.C. Table ?? shows the transition matrix
for competition states, when pt = p1; Tables ?? and ?? present the transition probabilities for the state variable pt
for cartel and competition periods, respectively. Transition matrices not included in the text are analogous to those
shown.
52For a brief description of the engineering method, see Davis and Garce´s (2009, p. 157).
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where w is wages, and canim is the monthly cost per animal in period t.
From that minimization problem, it is easy to obtain the following cost function:
ECi(q) = q
1
α+β
(
1
φi
) 1
α+β
((
α
β
)β
+
(
β
α
)α) 1α+β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ci
(wαcβanim)
1
α+β︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω
,
which can be rewritten (replacing q for qit) as
ECi(qit) = ρiωqψit, (1.11)
where, ρi is a plant-specific cost parameter, ω is an industry-wide cost factor, and ψ = 1α+β is an
economy-of-scale parameter.
Refining-stage costs
The estimation of refining-stage costs is done in two steps. Since we do not observe the usage of
energy inputs for the whole sample, in the first step we use the estimated values of the parameters
for the refining-stage production function to estimate the coal consumption of those plants with
missing energy input:
Eˆit(qit) = q
1
γ
it
(
1
θφˆi
) 1
γ
. (1.12)
In the second step, the refining cost RC(·) is estimated using the following relationship:
RCi(qit) =

ccoalEit(qit) ,if Eit is observed
ccoalEˆit(qit) ,if Eit is not observed ,
(1.13)
where ccoal is the price of coal in Chile.
Tax costs
The Chilean government collected a per unit export tax on nitrate of soda equivalent to approx-
imately 2.54 pounds per ton (roughly, $400 per ton in current dollars). This tax rate remained
constant throughout the Nitrate Age. Thus, the tax cost is computed as
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GCi(qit) = Tqit, (1.14)
where T is the nitrate tax rate.
Transportation and other costs
The final two components of the total cost function are the expenses necessary to the commercial-
ization of nitrate that were incurred after production had concluded. Parameters for these costs
were obtained from Semper et al. (1908), and when a range was provided, we use the inferior value
in the interval.
First, there were costs associated with the packaging and transportation of nitrate to the port
(where it was sold to nitrate traders). These costs include the cost of the sacks used to transport
nitrate, cpack; the railroad cost to the port, crail; and port costs, cport:
PCi(qit) = cpackqit + cportqit + crailqit (1.15)
Second, there are others costs, which include plant administration costs cadm and advertising
costs cadv. This last item corresponds to the mandatory contribution the NPA collected from
producers to fund their joint marketing effort in the destination markets:
OCi(qit) = cadmqit + cadvqit. (1.16)
Total Costs
Putting all of the cost components together, we obtain the final expression we take to the data:
TCi(qit) = ρiωqψit︸ ︷︷ ︸
extraction
cost
+ ccoalEˆit(qit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
refining
cost
+Tqit︸︷︷︸
tax
cost
+ qit (cpack + cport + crail)︸ ︷︷ ︸
transportation
cost
+ qit (cadm + cadv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
other
cost
. (1.17)
Table 1.11 presents estimated costs for the observations in our sample, with plants grouped
for illustrative purposes according to their productivity in three groups (low, medium, and high
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Figure 1.11: Total Costs by Productivity Type
Notes: Vertical axis is total estimated cost in pounds sterling in 1900. Horizontal axis is nitrate output expressed
in tons. Each point corresponds to a plant-month level observation, where coordinates are observed output and
estimated total cost, respectively. Points are colored by productivity type. Productivity types are described below
the horizontal axis.
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Table 1.13: Summary Statistics: Estimated Plant Entry Values
Statistic Discounted value (£1900) Discounted value ($2018)
N 148 148
Mean 306,598 45,099,752
St. Dev. 362,009 53,250,692
Min -64,879 -9,543,475
Pctl(25) 68,754 10,113,555
Median 165,442 24,336,110
Pctl(75) 434,211 63,871,440
Max 1,944,433 286,021,351
Notes: Observations are plants. In the second column, figures presented in
contemporaneous pounds sterling. In the third column, figures presented
in current dollars. See main body of the text for detailed explanation of
the estimation procedure.
productivity).
1.7.4 Entry Values Results
The three building blocks described in the previous subsections are combined to compute the entry
values of the plants observed as entrants in the data as a function of the state variables. The entry
value of each plant is separately estimated using value function iteration.
Figure 1.12 shows an example of the resulting estimated values, as a function of both ct and pt.
Plant values increase together with the competition state ct and, conditioning on ct, plant values
are also increasing in pt. These basic patterns are observed in the whole cross-section of estimated
plant values. Moreover, plant values increase together with the TFP term φi.
Table 1.13 presents summary statistics for the estimated plant values, both in contemporaneous
currency (£1900) and present-day currency ($2018)53. The median (mean) plant in the industry had
a value in present dollars of approximately 25m (45m).54
There is highly significant dispersion in plant values, as exemplified by the fact that the standard
deviation is larger than the mean plant value. Graphically, the cross-sectional dispersion of values
can be seen in Figure 1.13, which shows plant values arranged by date of entry.
53Parameters used to do the conversion are found in Table 1.3.11.
54Estimated monthly profits, grouped by productivity groups, are shown in Figure 1.4.7 of Appendix 1.4.
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Figure 1.12: Estimated Entry Values Pen˜a Chica plant
Notes: Vertical axis is the estimated entry value in pounds sterling in 1900. Values are indicated as points with
other coordinates given by a combination of state variables (competitive regime and price level). Horizontal axis
is competitive regime and is increasing from left to right: c0 corresponds to competition, while the index of other
competitive regimes denotes the number of periods left in the current cartel. Price level indicated by color, with p1
being the lowest, and p5 being the highest price interval.
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Figure 1.13: Estimated Plant Entry Values
Notes: Vertical axis is total estimated cost in pounds sterling in 1900. Horizontal axis is entry date. Each point
corresponds to a single plant’s estimated value at the moment of entry. Points are colored by productivity type.
Productivity types are described below the horizontal axis, with Φ1 being the lowest and Φ5 being the highest
productivity type.
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Table 1.14: Demand Elasticity Estimation
Dependent variable:
log(Nitrate Output) log(Price)
OLS IV First stage
(1) (2) (3)
log(Price) −0.445∗ −0.328∗∗
(0.231) (0.166)
log(Price Last Year) 0.649∗∗∗
(0.072)
Time 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Cartel −0.185∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ 0.058∗
(0.048) (0.054) (0.035)
Constant 13.945∗∗∗ 13.753∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.268) (0.139)
Observations 31 31 31
R2 0.933 0.932 0.709
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.925 0.677
F Statistic (df = 3; 27) 126.159∗∗∗ 21.975∗∗∗
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Periods are years.
Dependent variable in OLS and IV columns is log of industry out-
put in tons. Dependent variable in First state column is contempo-
raneous UK nitrate price. Variable Cartel takes value 1 if a cartel
was active. Prices correspond to mean period price.
1.7.5 Demand elasticity estimation
Using our data on prices and aggregate industry output, we estimate the demand elasticity for
nitrate of soda, which we will use to perform counterfactual simulations.
To deal with the endogeneity of observed prices caused by the simultaneity problem, we use
the lagged price of nitrate as an instrument. Our choice of this instrument is based on the specific
characteristics of the nitrate market described in Section 2 and summarized in Figure 2.2.2: Demand
shocks are realized once per year (in a few months of very heavy consumption); shocks can’t
be anticipated by producers, since they are caused by weather conditions iid across years; and
consumption markets are too distant for producers to be able to react to contemporaneous demand
shocks.
These facts, put together, mean that nitrate firms made a yearly output-level decision influenced
by the market conditions at the end of the last consumption cycle. Since demand shocks to current
year’s price will be determined by current year’s weather shocks, this instrument should provide
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supply variation independent of contemporaneous demand shocks.
Contemporaneous discussions among producers support the mechanism proposed: “Given the
news received about small existing stocks in Europe in the last few months, which created fears of
reduction in consumption due to lack of supply . . . a majority of the board agreed upon requesting
the assembly of producers to change the [aggregate] quota to 33, 000, 000 quintals.”55
Table 1.14 shows the results obtained by using a simple OLS and implementing our IV strategy.
Results show that nitrate of soda had a price demand elasticity of −0.33.
A potential issue regarding this instrument could be present if there is temporal interdependence
in the consumption of nitrate—that is, if farmers could strategically postpone or move forward their
consumption of nitrate given current prices and the content of nitrogen present in their fields.
1.7.6 Entry Costs
There are two main costs to enter the industry: the cost of acquiring nitrate land and the capital
cost of installing a refining facility. The parameters used to estimate the entry cost of each plant
are taken from Semper et al. (1908)56:
FC(kit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
entry
costs
= KC(kit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital
costs
+LC(kit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
land
costs
(1.18)
FC(·) can be written as a function only of kit under an assumption that there is a function that
maps refining capacity to nitrate reserves R(·) or, equivalently, that the amount of nitrate reserves
available in the nitrate property land uniquely determined the capacity of the refining facility.
Narrative evidence suggests that the cost of nitrate land was moderate, highly variable, and
increasing with time. This is consistent with a complex history of nitrate ownership rights and a
large aggregate supply of nitrate-rich land. For our estimations, we use the minimum value of the
range provided for nitrate land costs during the early years of the Fourth Cartel (denoted as cl).
It is worth noting that when nitrate land was traded, its aggregate nitrate content would be
measured; hence the cost of land corresponds to a price per unit of reserves.
We do not directly observe reserves, so they are estimated by adding up the nitrate output
55NPA Quarterly Circular, Number 31, July 28, 1903, p. 17.
56Parameters are summarized in Table 1.3.10 of Appendix 1.C. It is worth mentioning that this source was written
as a technical report requested by potential German investors to assess the industry’s profitability.
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observed in each plant. However, since the industry experienced an abrupt collapse, the amount
of time we see in operation plants that entered near the end of our dataset is censored. To correct
for this, we assume that each plant had reserves to operate at its mean output level for 20 years
before being depleted, and apply this correction to obtain a value R˜(kit). Hence, we compute land
costs using
LC(kit) = cl · R˜(kit). (1.19)
Regarding capital costs, Semper et al. (1908) describe a concave cost function for the capital
costs that is supported with detailed itemized budgets for a plant installation. When this source
was published in Spanish in 1908, the translators added an updated estimation for the capital costs
of installation.57 We assume a linear progression on time between our two cost estimates. Equation
1.20 shows the base formula used to compute capital costs, as a function of refining capacity:
KC(kit) =

ck1 · kit , if kit ≤ 100, 000
100, 000 · ck1 + (kit − 100, 000) · ck2 , if 100, 000 ≤ kit ≤ 150, 000
100, 000 · ck1 + 50, 000 · ck2 + (kit − 150, 000) · ck3 , if kit > 150, 000
(1.20)
1.8 Counterfactual Analysis
We use the estimates obtained in the previous sections to implement two counterfactual scenarios.
In the first, we compute counterfactual cartel profits under an assumption that incumbent cartel
members were able to restrict entry for the duration of the Fourth Cartel. In the second, we
estimate counterfactual industry levels of entry under the assumption that instead of the Fourth
and Fifth Cartels, the industry remained under a competitive regime.
57Itemized costs increased by 50% between 1901 and 1908.
45
Table 1.15: Counterfactual Fourth Cartel Profits
Case Total Cartel Profits (£1900) Total Cartel Profits ($2018)
Observed 10,175,654 1,496,813,758
Counterfactual 14,166,612 2,083,873,750
Difference (%) -39.2 -39.2
Notes: The second column presents results in contemporaneous pounds sterling. The
third column presents results in current dollars. For a detailed explanation of the com-
putation procedure, see the main body of the text.
1.8.1 Cartel Profits with Barriers to Entry
In this section, we leverage our estimated parameters to compute the negative effect of low barriers
to entry on cartel profits. The previously described low barriers to entry meant that, when a cartel
was formed, producers would incorporate new entrants into the cartel. As a result, market shares
for incumbent producers gradually shrank, eroding their profits as time went by. In this section,
we compute the counterfactual profits incumbent firms would have achieved had they been able to
completely exclude new plants from entering the nitrate industry.
We estimate plant-level profits in a counterfactual case in which cartel members are able to
prevent any entry to the industry, for the case of the Fourth Cartel. This episode of collusion is
especially well suited to explore this question. First, unlike previous cartels, the Fourth Cartel
had both a long cartel duration (5 years) and collusive market shares, determined at the onset of
the cartel, that would remain valid by contract for its entire duration. Second, our productivity
estimates include the almost full population of plants present in the industry at the beginning of
this cartel, meaning that we can accurately estimate aggregate cartel profits in the counterfactual
case.58 In contrast, for the Fifth Cartel (the only collusive episode after the Fourth Cartel), because
less data from that period are available, there is a larger number of plants whose productivity we
are still not able to estimate, which renders our potential estimation of total cartel profits less
precise.
Three assumptions are made to perform the estimation. The first is that both aggregate industry
output and nitrate prices would have been the same in the counterfactual case without entry. This
is, cartel members would have chosen the same aggregate output levels in the absence of entry.
58We have estimates of productivity for plants corresponding to 98.5% of total industry output in the year 1901.
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Narrative sources from the time show that when determining cartel output levels, the main concern
was to match expected consumption growth conditional on current market conditions. Moreover,
individual producers could only directly affect the aggregate output decision after a proposal was
first made by the NPA, based on the expertise of its permanent staff.59 Hence, it is not obvious
how the absence of potential entry would have modified the cartel decision-making process in this
respect. The second assumption is that in the counterfactual case, the observed allocated collusive
market shares would also not have changed, with the implication that we can use the market
shares in the Fourth Cartel contract to construct counterfactual plant-level output levels. A final
assumption is that plants would have had a constant monthly output level (and so we are refraining
from considering, for instance, potential shutdowns).
To estimate counterfactual cartel profits, the procedure consists of two steps. First, using the
already mentioned collusive market shares, we obtain annual output levels for each plant during
the cartel period. Using the third assumption, we transform those into monthly output levels.
Second, using the cost function estimated before, we compute counterfactual monthly costs. Finally,
revenues and costs are discounted and aggregated.
The main results of this section are shown in Tables 1.15 and 1.16. Aggregate cartel profits in
the counterfactual scenario would have been 39.2% larger than they were in the low-barriers-to-
entry case, which translates to approximately $585m of additional profits (in current dollars). This
result is generated by an increase in the median monthly plant-level profits of almost $100,000.
A potential concern in this case is that without the entry of new plants, incumbent producers
may not have had enough excess capacity to supply the observed industry outputs during the rest of
the Fourth Cartel. We do not find evidence to substantiate this concern. A relevant detail for this
point is that the Fourth Cartel contract allocated market shares based on plant capacity. Hence,
since market shares remained constant during the cartel, and these were based on individual plant
capacity, and it was feasible for all plants to satisfy their allocated quota during the first year of
the cartel, we only need to show that the aggregate capacity of the incumbent plants was large
enough to accommodate the additional supply. In fact, Figure 1.14 shows that industry capacity
at the onset of the Fourth Cartel was significantly larger than the aggregate output level chosen by
59Cartel contracts also required a large majority of producers to agree in order to introduce modifications to the
NPA proposal.
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Table 1.16: Counterfactual Plant Profits in Fourth Cartel
Statistic Monthly profit observed ($) Monthly profit counterfactual ($)
N 4,070 4,070
Mean 455,751 609,454
St. Dev. 477,135 545,602
Min −180,587 −30,298
Pctl(25) 90,790 236,998
Median 353,637 446,888
Pctl(75) 684,760 808,068
Max 3,722,985 4,605,773
Notes: Observations correspond to plant-month pairs. Figures presented in current dol-
lars.
the nitrate producers by the end of that collusive episode.
1.8.2 Entry without cartels
In this section, we study what entry patterns for the industry would have been like in a counter-
factual case in which the Fourth and Fifth Cartels did not occur. Intuitively, as cartels decrease
aggregate output and have a known fixed-term length, potential low-productivity entrants may find
it more attractive to enter the industry during cartel periods.
To estimate the effect of these cartels on the number and productivity of entrants, we use the
building blocks estimated in the previous sections and follow the following procedure:
• Periods are years. The simulation covers 8 periods corresponding to the sum of the duration
of the Fourth and Fifth Cartels (which were consecutive), between 1901 and 1909, plus an
additional year 0 to start the simulation.
• At year 0, we start from market conditions ψ0, observed in the period before the start of the
Fourth Cartel.
• Evolution of the state variables is governed by following process:
1. Counterfactual levels of industry output are obtained from cubic spline computed using
only the values of industry output in competitive years.60
60See Figure 1.4.10 in Appendix 1.4 for counterfactual output levels.
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Figure 1.14: Industry Output and Capacity at the start of the Fourth Cartel
Notes: Vertical axis is tons. Horizontal axis is time in years. The black solid line is the observed industry level
output, and the black dashed line is the estimated industry level capacity at the beginning of the Fourth Cartel. The
time period of the Fourth Cartel is shaded.
2. Using the counterfactual level of output, we compute
∆Qt = Qt,count −Qt,obs.
This is the difference between counterfactual and observed industry outputs.
3. We use ∆Qt and demand elasticity η to compute ∆Pt, the difference between observed
and counterfactual nitrate prices.
4. We update the counterfactual price as
Pt,count = Pt,obs + ∆Pt.
• We construct a set of potential entrants for each year, formed by those plants that were
observed entering in reality plus those plants that were potential entrants in a previous year,
but decided against entering at that point.
• Entry decisions are made simultaneously by all potential entrants at the end of each period.
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Figure 1.15: Effect of Competition on Plant Entry
Notes: Vertical axis is total plant productivity. Horizontal axis is entry date. Each point corresponds to a single
plant. Entry date is the observed moment of entry (first positive output) in the data. Shapes and colors, described
below the horizontal axis, show the effect on entry decisions of the counterfactual change in competitive regime of
the industry.
Firms that decide to enter are observed entering one period later. Firm i will enter in period
(t+ 1) iff:
V (τit, ψt)− FC(kit) > 0.
The reason for estimating counterfactual output using a nonparametric approximation is derived
from the fact that there is a subset of plants that entered the industry during these cartels, for
which we do not have a productivity estimate yet (23 out of 71 plants). Hence, it is not possible
to establish what their counterfactual output levels would have been without making extreme
assumptions.
However, plants that do not enter into our analysis are those that accumulated very few observa-
tions during the monthly Nitrate Agency reports we collected. Since the probability of shutdown is
negatively correlated with productivity, we can infer that those unobserved plants are a negatively
selected subsample. Thus, we can safely interpret our results regarding entry as a lower bound of
the true effects of these cartels on the number and quality of entrants.
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Table 1.17: Counterfactual Industry Characteristics by end of Fifth Cartel (1909)
Case Observed Counterfactual Difference (%)
New plants (number, by 1909) 48 39 -18.8%
Mean productivity entrants 44.4 48.0 +8.3%
Mean industry productivity (1909) 45.9 47.3 +3.1%
Total number plants (1909) 145 136 -6.2%
Industry monthly capacity (1909, tons) 538,280 518,443 -3.7%
Notes: New plants: defined as plants with first positive output in the period. Industry monthly capacity:
computed from estimates in Section 4. Second and third rows are arithmetic means. Figures on first
three rows referred to subsample of plants with productivity estimates.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 1.17. The main results indicate that out
of the 48 plants in our analysis, 9 plants would not have entered by 1909 and 3 more would have
postponed entry to a later moment within the counterfactual simulation (Figure 1.15). Moreover,
plants that do not enter, or that postpone entry, are those with the lowest productivity levels. This
translates into the mean productivity of new plants in the counterfactual case increasing by 8.3%.61
1.9 Final Remarks
This paper studies the interaction between cartels, productivity, and entry. As cartels temporarily
increase profits, in a low-barriers-to-entry industry, more firms may decide to enter. As cartels have
a greater influence on the profitability of low-productivity firms, this effect should disproportion-
ately increase the entry of this type of firm. Over time, this mechanism may erode the industry’s
productivity.
To study this question, we focus on the Chilean nitrate industry as an application. We use a
new dataset with rich cross-sectional variation in plant characteristics. Our analysis proceeds in
several steps. First, we do a reduced-form analysis to describe the effect of cartels on the quantity of
entrants. Second, we estimate plant-level productivity and compute by how much cartels reduced
the productivity of new entrants. Third, we implement a simple entry model to obtain plant-
level continuation values. Finally, we perform two counterfactual simulations. The first computes
incumbent cartel members’ profits in a case without entry. The second estimates counterfactual
61Additional results can be seen in Figures 1.4.14, 1.4.11, 1.4.13, and 1.4.12 of Appendix 1.4.
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levels of entry and productivity for a case in which two cartels in the study period did not occur.
Results show that cartels have a large effect on both the quantity and quality of new firms in
the industry. Moreover, from the first counterfactual, we learn that low barriers to entry had a
large and negative effect on the cartel profits of incumbent firms. Lastly, the second counterfactual
shows that a large fraction of the least productive new firms would not have entered the industry in
a case without cartels. Our results suggest that robust antitrust enforcement not only protects the
short-term surplus of consumers, but may also have an important long-term effect on productivity
by disciplining the quality of entrants. Furthermore, lowering barriers to entry, conditional on
the absence of other negative consumer surplus effects, may be an effective tool at the disposal of
antitrust agencies by severely reducing the potential profitability of cartels. A tentative application
for this mechanism may be found in the wide range of professional activities that require state
licensing in the United States.
Our study can be expanded in several directions. In our current period of interest, the inter-
esting margin is the extensive one. However, in the period after the First World War, contractual
innovations motivated by the declining prospects of nitrate of soda caused the intensive margin to
acquire a far larger importance, giving us the opportunity the compare production efficiency under
both contractual regimes. In addition, nitrate cartels used dramatically different rules of organi-
zation. This fact may allow us to enrich our current analysis by directly mapping the relationship
between plant characteristics and the specific rules governing cartels.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.A Nitrate Industry
1.A.1 Industry Location and History
The nitrate industry was located in the Atacama Desert of South America, within a narrow and
long strip of land that covers a substantial fraction of the Regions of Tarapaca and Antofagasta in
modern day Chile. Figure 1.A.1 describes the location of nitrate deposits within this region.
Table 1.A.1 describes the evolution of the industry before the War of the Pacific (1879-84).
Before the Nitrate Age, the industry was in its early stages of development and, politically, was
fragmented between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. The presence of nitrate of soda in the Atacama
Desert was known since Spanish colonial times (Cuevas, 1917), when the desertic territories, where
the industry would later developed, were virtually uninhabited. Although the very first shipments
of nitrate of soda to Europe date as early as the 1830s, consumption of nitrates was small, produc-
tion process remained primitive and the main fertilizer exported from South America was guano
(Bermu´dez Miral, 1963). The modern phase of the industry began in 1853, when steam-based
refining machines were first introduced and on-site elaboration of the product on isolated facilities
became the industry norm. The following decades would witness a gradual growth of the industry
and its expansion into the territories controlled by Bolivia and Chile, although the bulk of the
production was still located in Peruvian territory.
Chile enters its Nitrate Age after the War of the Pacific (1884-1914). At the end of the conflict,
all nitrate-producing territories of Peru and Bolivia were transferred to Chile. The evolution of
industry during the Nitrate Age is described in Figure ??.
With the breakout of the World War I, nitrate of soda gained additional importance as a major
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Figure 1.A.1: Nitrate Region and Deposits
Notes: Illustration shows the northern Chilean provinces of Tacna, Tarapaca, and Antofagasta, according to their
limits in 1913. Areas with nitrate deposits are marked in black. Name of ports are written to the left of the illustration.
Source: Popular Science Monthly Volume 83, September 1913.
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Figure 1.A.2: Industry Evolution during Nitrate Age (cartel periods shaded)
(a) Industry Yearly Exports (tons)
(b) Active Plants (number)
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Table 1.A.1: Nitrate Exports by Country (selected years)
Exports (tons) Plants (number)
Year Peru Bolivia Chile∗ Peru Bolivia Chile
1855 51,900∗∗ 0 0 NA 0 0
1866 97,500∗∗∗ 0 97 NA 0 0
1872 200,943 6,164 203 18 1 0
1878 268,601 55,765 741 30 1 5
Sources: Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991), O’Brien (1980),
Lu¨ders, Dı´az, and Wagner (2016), Semper et al. (1908), and Godoy
Orellana (2016).
Note: ∗, value for Chile corresponds to output (tons).
Note: ∗∗, average for period 1855-59.
Note: ∗∗∗, average for period 1865-69.
Figure 1.A.3: HHI Nitrate Industry
Notes: Each bar represents the HHI index of the industry for a year. Computed using total yearly plant outputs.
Notice that index is computed at the plant, not the firm level. Cartels periods are shaded.
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ingredient in production of munitions. The allied blockade of the Central Powers (Germany and
Austria-Hungary) triggered the rapid expansion in production of synthetic nitrate of soda by those
countries, using the newly invented Haber-Bosch process. As a result of this invention and the
expansion of synthetic nitrate’s supply, after the end of World War I Chile’s monopoly had been
broken and the industry’s conditions had substantially changed.
1.A.2 Nitrate Lands Ownership
The history of the ownership of nitrate rights is complex and heavily dependent on which country
each deposit was originally located (Peru, Bolivia, or Chile). We provide a brief summary of the
main facts related to nitrate lands ownership in each of these countries.
Old Peruvian Nitrate Regions
The thin presence of the Peruvian state in the Tarapaca Province, together with the various legal
sources of ownership of nitrate rights, caused nitrate rights in this region to be poorly registered
and, in some case, disputed.
Mining laws of Peru descended from Real Ordenanza Miner´ıa de Nueva Espan˜a (Royal Mining
Ordinances). Under this framework, underground resources do not belong to owner of the surface
and must be adjudicated by the state. Moreover, local authorities could grant exploitation licenses,
as a form to “promote industry”, but these were not always officially recorded. Finally, if a con-
cession was not being actively “used” by the owner, the state (or a third party) could claim it,
according to the despueble clause.
In addition, the Peruvian government implemented erratic policies regarding its nitrate industry
(hoping to protect its competing guano industry) which made even more difficult to account for
nitrate rights by the time of the Chilean occupation of the Tarapaca Province in 1880.
In chronological order, the main policies implemented by the Peruvian government were:
• 1868: Peruvian government stops granting new concessions on nitrate lands and claims for
the state all unclaimed nitrate rights.
• 1873: Peru starts a “soft” export monopoly on nitrate.
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– Government sets a fixed price at which it buys nitrate.
– Private firms can still export nitrate autonomously, but paying a larger export tax.
• 1875: Peru begins the nationalization of the nitrate industry, this process also involved several
options, depending on the willingness of the owner to sell:
– Case 1: If the nitrate plant’s owner was willing to sell.
∗ Nitrate plants would be exchanged by bonds (certificados), according to price set
by an appraisal committee.
∗ Bonds would be paid by a loan taken by the Peruvian government in the U.K., using
nitrate plants as collateral.
∗ The necessary loan could not be obtained before the outbreak of war with Chile.
– Case 2: If the nitrate plant’s owner was not willing to sell.
∗ Producer could still produce and sell his production, however paying a more onerous
export tax.
.
– Case 3: Owners of inactive plants or plants in construction.
∗ These plants were not considered by the appraisal committee. Subsequently, the
Peruvian government announce the use of the despueble clause to expropiate them.
Depending on the legal situation of the original Peruvian concession, the Chilean policy was:
• Plants with outstanding bonds or certificados would be returned to whoever was in possession
of at least 50% of the certificados.
– In many cases, this was not feasible due to the dispersion of the certificados,since many
had been “fire saled” when it became clear Peru would lose the war.
– The Chilean government auctioned in 1882 the oficinas that had not been claimed, the
proceeds of the auction were distributed between the owners of the certificados.
– In 1887, the Chilean government paid a flat conversion rate to buy all remaining out-
standing certificados.
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• Owners of oficinas that had been declared in despueble by the Peruvian government tried to
regain possession in the Chilean courts. After an initial success in 1893, the Chilean Supreme
Court declared all of their property rights to be void between 1894 and 1896
As a result, the Chilean government progressively became the owner of a large fraction of the
nitrate rights in the Tarapaca Province. Notice the main reason for this was that government
intervention was thought to be most practical way to provide clear property right to the industry.
Old Bolivian Nitrate Regions
The Bolivian territories in the Atacama Desert were far from the center of the Bolivian nation.
Communications were poor and the population of the (then called) Bolivian Litoral Department
was small and mostly Chilean. In fact, the incipient nitrate industry in the region can be described
as a Chilean-owned industry. Unlike the industry in the Peruvian Tarapaca Province, the industry
in the Bolivian territory was centered around a single firm, since the Bolivian government granted
a concession to produce nitrate, build a railroad, and gave tax-exempt status to the Antofagasta
Nitrate Company (a Chilena-British firm). After the War of the Pacific, this company continued
its operations uninterrupted.
In addition, to prevent the entry of competition to their Tarapaca Province, the Peruvian
government had commissioned Juan Meiggs in 1876 to lease some nitrate rich lands in hands of
the Bolivian government. After the War, Chile had to negotiate a settlement with the descendants
of Juan Meiggs (since the Peruvian government had promised to Meiggs rights to extract nitrate
from the leased lands). A fraction of those lands, then, were ceded to the family as part of the so
called Transaction Squire of 1883.
The rest of the government-owned nitrate lands in the former Bolivian territory were transferred
to the Chilean government as part of the peace treaty. As in the case of Tarapaca Province, the
Chilean government then became the owner of a large majority of nitrate rights in this region.
Old Chilean Nitrate Regions
A decree from 1877, granted to the discoverer of a nitrate deposit the right to claim 3 Chilean
stakes (each Chilean stake corresponds to an hectare). In most cases, entrepreneurs would then
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Table 1.A.2: Status of Nitrate Lands by 1925
Status Property Surface (km2)
Exploited Private 550
Measured, not exploited Private 5,811
Unmeasured Public 25,000
Notes: Table shows status of nitrate lands, measured in terms
of area, by 1925. Nitrate content around this period var-
ied between 10% and 20%, hence surface area is informative
about the relative amounts of nitrate contained in different
categories. Exploited: nitrate lands already used. Measured,
not exploited nitrate lands whose total nitrate content had
been estimated in detail, and were owned by a private firm.
Unmeasured: state lands on which nitrate presence had been
established, but without detailed estimates of total content.
Sources: Chilean Ministry of Finance (1925, p. 11).
Table 1.A.3: Nitrate Industry Ownership by Nationality
Fraction of total industry output
Year Peruvian British Anglo-Chilean Chilean German Other
1878 58 13.5 - 19 8 1.5
1884 - 20 14 36 17 13
1895 - 60 - 13 8 19
1901 - 55 - 14 15 16
1912 - 38.5 - 37 15 9.5
Sources: Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991).
have family members or associates to petition for additional rights, until a sizable property had been
acquired. In 1884, a new decree forbid new claims of nitrate rights. Finally, in 1888 the new Mining
Law declared all new nitrate deposits to be exclusive property of the Chilean state. However, a
sizable number of nitrate rights had been allocated under the previous liberal legislation.
As a summary, after the War of the Pacific, nitrate rights were held both by private en-
trepreneurs and, the largest part, by the Chilean state. Table 1.A.2 shows the estimated status of
nitrate lands, according to the Chilean Ministry of Finance, by the year 1925.
Entrepreneurs from various origins were attracted by the nitrate industry, besides the native
Chilean and Peruvian businessmen. Table 1.A.3 presents a summary of the ownership evolution of
the industry, were firm owners have been group according to their nationality.
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Nitrate tax and Government Revenues
During the War of the Pacific, the Chilean government decided to implement an export tax on
nitrate of soda. The tax rate was determined as 28 pence per Spanish quintal. A pound under
the Imperial System had 240 pence, and a Spanish quintal corresponds to, approximately, 101.44
pounds. Thus, the nitrate export tax is roughly equivalent in modern dollars to $400 per ton. The
export tax remained constant throughout the Nitrate Age in value and accounted for a significant
fraction of the price of nitrate.
In addition, the Chilean government periodically sold rights to extract nitrate in state-owned
lands. However, this revenue was only equivalent to 3% of the export tax revenue (Chilean Ministry
of Finance, 1925). Nitrate lands auctions seem to have been motivated by the opportunity of
obtaining a good selling price, given high demand for nitrate lands, as explained on one of the bills
submitted to the Chilean Congress:62
It is in the interests of the [Chilean] state to dispose of some of its nitrate properties
that can be sold under advantageous conditions, without disturbing the prosperous state
the nitrate industry presents today . . . Making the auction of the properties referred to
in this bill, the government has the purpose of not offering new nitrate lands for sale
but in accordance with the interests of the industry . . . which will lead to considerable
advantages for the state as well as for private interests.
Government attitude towards Nitrate Cartels
During the Nitrate Age there was no systematic antitrust concern on the part of the Chilean
authorities. The Chilean legislation did not forbid or regulated cartels or trusts (the first antitrust
legislation was not promulgated until 1959 (Bernedo, 2013). In addition, government policy regard-
ing combinations was influenced by laissez faire ideology that predominated at the time among the
Chilean elite. Moreover, Chilean consumption of nitrate of soda remained negligible with respect
to the total volume of product sales. Hence, consumer surplus considerations were absent from the
policy discussions regarding competition in this market.
62Bill presented by Chilean Government on March 2nd 1902. Proyecto de Lei que autoriza enajenacio´n de ciertos
terrenos salitrales (Repu´blica de Chile, 1903). Bill message cited from NPA Quarterly Circular, Number 27, April
21, 1902, p. 7.
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Although the use of a per-volume tax made cartels to have a negative effect on short-term tax
revenues, other factors partially balanced this concern. First, the sheer importance of the industry
made crisis in the nitrate sector highly damaging to the whole Chilean economy. Hence, cartels
were regarded as a policy tool, that helped to ensure the stability of the wider economy. As an
example, Chilean financial sector provided short and long-term finance to the nitrate industry, hence
cartels were favoured by them, as decreased the risk on their loans (O’Brien, 1982). Second, during
the decade of the 1900’s, mode Chilean entrepreneurs became directly involved in the industry as
owners. A large fraction of them were also members of Congress or held high political offices. Thus,
the private interests of part of the elite partially counterbalanced the fiscal interest of the republic.
As a consequence, the attitude of Chilean government towards the organization of cartels changed
on time and depended of the specific short-term economic and political circumstances (Brown,
1963).
Appendix 1.B Data
Table 1.B.1: Summary Statistics Prices UK (£/ton)
Statistic Nitrate of soda Ammonium sulfate Beet sugar Iodine
N 407 408 408 398
Mean 10.0 12.5 12.4 1,097.9
St. Dev. 1.8 3.0 4.2 272.0
Min 6.8 6.8 5.8 587.9
Pctl(25) 8.7 11.0 9.2 881.8
Median 9.7 11.9 11.2 1,102.3
Pctl(75) 11.0 12.8 14.1 1,322.8
Max 18.7 21.8 30.2 2,131.1
Sources: The Economist, Chemical Trade Journal.
62
Figure 1.B.1: Coverage Main Data Sources
Notes: Vertical values represent the two main sources of plant-level data. Horizontal axis is time. Each black bar
corresponds to a month of data.
Figure 1.B.2: Weekly Nitrate Prices in U.K. by Source
Notes: Vertical axis is prices in contemporaneous pounds. Horizontal axis is time. Observations obtained from The
Economist are in black, while observations from the Chemical Trade Journal are in grey.
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Figure 1.B.3: Monthly Nitrate Prices in the U.K and Chile
Notes: Vertical axis is prices in contemporaneous pounds. Horizontal axis is time. Prices in the U.K. arein black,
while prices in Chile are in grey.
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Figure 1.B.4: NPA Monthly Output Statistics (June 1900)
Notes: Periodic publication of the NPA. Each row corresponds to a nitrate plant. Output expressed in metric quintals.
Obtained from the Chilean National Library, Santiago, Chile.
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Figure 1.B.5: Nitrate Agency Monthly Report (November 1899)
Notes: Periodic publication of the Nitrate Agency. Each row corresponds to a nitrate plant. Output expressed in
Spanish quintals. Obtained from the Tarapaca Regional Archives, Iquique, Chile.
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Figure 1.B.6: Second Cartel Contract
Sources: Chilean National Notarial Archives, Santiago, Chile. Iquique Notaries. Volume 132.
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Appendix 1.C Additional Tables
Table 1.C.1: Logit Regression Shutdown
Probability
Dependent variable:
Plant shutdown
lagged(Workers) −1.030∗∗∗
(0.060)
lagged(Animals) 0.194∗∗∗
(0.057)
Constant 2.668∗∗∗
(0.171)
Observations 10,349
Log Likelihood −3,738.645
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,483.289
Notes: Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Observations are plant-months.
Plant shutdown takes value of 1 if the
plant was inactive in a given month but
is observed in operation later in the data.
Table 1.C.2: Chi-
Square Test
Number intervals:
Two Three
8.56 7.26
(1) (2)
Notes: Degrees of
freedom in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.C.3: Regression Prices U.K. and Chile
Dependent variable:
Nitrate price UK
Nitrate price Chile 0.957∗∗∗
(0.027)
Constant 3.399∗∗∗
(0.172)
Observations 250
R2 0.809
Adjusted R2 0.809
Residual Std. Error 0.553 (df = 248)
F Statistic 1,053.463∗∗∗ (df = 1; 248)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Obser-
vations are monthly prices.
Table 1.C.4: Discretization of Nitrate Price (pt)
Interval Lower bound (£/ton) Upper bound (£/ton)
p1 4.44 5.32
p2 5.32 5.91
p3 5.91 6.74
p4 6.74 7.57
p5 7.57 9.35
Table 1.3.8: Summary Statistics Observed Plant Values
Statistic Periods observed Discounted value ($) Mo. Profit ($)
N 148 148 28,084
Mean 214 33,802,826 378,945
St. Dev. 119 37,172,924 506,587
Min 10 -7,936,688 -6,461,858
Pctl(25) 106.5 9,364,678 0
Median 214 20,687,580 226,831
Pctl(75) 342.2 47,631,551 566,686
Max 381 224,558,616 6,274,296
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Table 1.3.9: Parameters Cost Function Estimation
Variable Description Value Units
 Exchange rate 16 p/CLP$
w Monthly average wage 90 CLP$
canim Monthly cost per animal 30 CLP$
ccoal Coal price 1.55 CLP$/SPQ
T Export tax nitrate 28 p/SPQ
cpack Packaging cost 2 p/SPQ
cport Port services cost 1 p/SPQ
crail Railroad cost 3.5 p/SPQ
cadm Plant administration costs 1.5 p/SPQ
cadv Contribution to nitrate advertising 5/16 p/SPQ
Notes: p: pence (1900); CLP$: Chilean peso (1900); SPQ: Spanish quintal.
Sources: Semper et al. (1908).
Table 1.3.10: Parameters Entry Costs Estimation
Variable Description Value Units
β Discount factor (yearly) 0.92
cl Cost nitrate reserves 2 p/SPQ
ck1 Capital cost interval 1 1 £1900/SPQ
ck2 Capital cost interval 2 18/20 £1900/SPQ
ck3 Capital cost interval 3 3/4 £1900/SPQ
Note 1: p: pence (1900); CLP$: Chilean peso (1900); SPQ: Span-
ish quintal.
Note 2: In capital cost parameters, SQP refers to monthly produc-
tion capacity measured in this unit.
Sources: Semper et al. (1908).
Table 1.3.11: Parameters
used for Currency Conversion
Exchange rate Value
£2018/£1900 120.74
US$/£2018 1.22
Sources: boe˙exchange,
boe˙inflation.
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Table 1.3.12: Discretization of Productivity types
Number of groups:
5 groups 3 groups
Productivity group Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
φ1 10.2 32.6 10.2 36.2
φ2 32.6 39.0 36.2 50.4
φ3 39.0 45.2 50.4 97.1
φ4 45.2 55.3 - -
φ5 55.3 97.1 - -
Table 1.3.13: Discretization of Capacity types (tons)
Capacity groups:
Group 1 bounds Group 2 bounds Group 3 bounds
Prod. group Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
φ1 39.2 342.0 342.0 759.0 759.0 1217.9
φ2 215.7 664.4 664.4 895.6 895.6 1439.2
φ3 182.4 736.7 736.7 1221.6 1221.6 2967.8
φ4 595.7 976.1 976.1 1722.4 1722.4 4033.8
φ5 222.4 2032.0 2032.0 3045.3 3045.3 5605.0
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1.4 Additional Figures
Figure 1.4.1: Net-entry of Plants during Nitrate Age
Notes: Vertical axis is plants (number). Horizontal axis is time. Net-entry computed as plants that enter minus
plants that exit in a given month. Cartel periods are shaded.
Figure 1.4.2: Exiting Plants during Nitrate Age
Notes: Vertical axis is plants (number). Horizontal axis is time. Exiting plants variable determined by the last
observation of an establishment in the data. Cartel periods are shaded.
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Figure 1.4.3: Comparison Plant Productivity Estimates
Notes: Vertical axis is productivity after implementation of correction by selection. Horizontal axis is productivity
before implementation of correction by selection. Each point corresponds to a plant.
Figure 1.4.4: Productivity vs residuals (points) for Plants with more than 95 observations
Notes: Each plot corresponds to a plant. Horizontal axis is time. Plant FE is plotted as an horizontal line. Estimated
residuals plotted as points.
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Figure 1.4.5: Relation between Energy Input and Nitrate Output in Refining Stage
Notes: Each point is a plant-month observation. Horizontal axis is coal usage (tons). Vertical axis is nitrate output
(tons).
Figure 1.4.6: Estimated Plant Productivity vs Time of Entry
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a plant. Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is productivity.
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Figure 1.4.7: Estimated Monthly Profits by Productivity Type
Notes: Each point corresponds to a plant-month observation. Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is profits current
dollars.
Figure 1.4.8: Seasonality of Monthly Output by Productivity Type
Notes: Horizontal axis are months of the year. Vertical axis is nitrate output (tons). Each line corresponds to the
average nitrate output per productivity type in a given month.
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Figure 1.4.9: Plant Values Net of Entry Costs: 4th & 5th Cartels
Notes: Each point corresponds to a plant. Horizontal axis is moment of entry (time). Vertical axis is estimated value
in current dollars.
Figure 1.4.10: Observed and Counterfactual Industry Output
Notes: Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is nitrate output (tons). Continuous line is the observed industry output,
while the dashed line is the counterfactual output, computed as a cubic spline.
76
Figure 1.4.11: Observed (continuous line) and Counterfactual Number of Plants
Notes: Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is number of plants. The continuous line represents the observed number
of plants in the industry, while the dashed line represents the counterfactual number of plants.
Figure 1.4.12: Observed (continuous line) and Counterfactual Industry Capacity
Notes: Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is industry capacity. The continuous line represents the observed number
of plants in the industry, while the dashed line represents the counterfactual industry capacity.
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Figure 1.4.13: Observed (continuous line) and Counterfactual Mean Industry Productivity
Notes: Horizontal axis is time. Vertical axis is productivity. The continuous line represents the observed mean
productivity in the industry, while the dashed line represents the counterfactual mean productivity.
Figure 1.4.14: Observed and Counterfactual Productivity Distributions
Notes: Productivity distributions of entrants during Fourth and Fifth Cartels. Observed distribution is shown in
lighter shade, while counterfactual distribution is shown in darker shade.
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Chapter 2
Learning-by-colluding: Experience
and Efficacy of Cartels in the Chilean
Nitrate Industry
This paper studies the degree to which experience helps firms to organize successful cartels. Between
1884 and 1909, Chilean producers of nitrate of soda organized cartels on five separate occasions
which allow us to explore how collusive agreements evolved as producers accumulated experience in
their organization. Our setting has absence of antitrust regulation and perfect monitoring, which
translated in completely public cartels. Thus, unlike most of the previous literature on cartels,
issues related to monitoring and enforcement were of secondary importance with respect to the
challenge of allocating the collusive surplus among the colluding firms. We document that cartel
contracts gradually became more complete, generated a smoother transition from competition to
collusion, and that producers eventually discarded inefficient methods of market share allocation,
associated to larger production costs, in favor of better alternatives.
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2.1 Introduction
Although cartels are ubiquitous and very costly in terms of economic efficiency little is known about
the process of cartel organization that eventually leads to the organization of successful cartels
and the role of learning-by-doing in it. Do firms intuitively “know” how to optimally organize
collusion once an opportunity arises? Or, alternatively, do firms learn as they go about cartel
organization? Shedding light on these questions could greatly help prevention, detection, and the
design of remedial measures for detected cartels.
We use the Chilean nitrate industry between 1880 and the First World War to explore this
research question. Over this extended period of time nitrate producers organized cartels on five
separate occasions. Moreover, collusion was both legal and public, which allow us to use sources of
qualitative evidence not distorted by the fear of prosecution.
We find that collusive agreements in this industry gradually became more complex and complete,
incorporating new contractual dimensions such as regulating firms’ behavior during the transition
to collusion. Moreover, through a process of experimentation that lasted for four cartel episodes,
the producers were able to discard inefficient market share allocation methods. Furthermore, we
are able to show using counterfactual simulations that the discarded methods increased production
cost at least by 10%. Finally, we are able to document the process by which producers converged
to a system of periodic fixed-term collusion episodes instead of organizing a permanent cartel.
Ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to document the dynamic learning process
leading to the organization of a successful cartel. Our rich sources allows us to describe the evolution
of producers’ understanding about relevant contractual dimensions and to trace how they dealt with
challenges that affected the cartel’s efficacy through contractual innovations. In addition, our paper
identifies a novel mechanism that hampers the organization of collusion in durable goods markets:
the preemptive cheating motive. Finally, this papers contributes to our knowledge about the role
of trade associations as cartel facilitators, especially in industries with a large number of producers
and to explain the existence of periodic episodes of collusion, which have been observed in a wide
variety of industries.
Main among the reasons for our lack of knowledge about learning in cartel organization is that
cartels in most of the developed word have been illegal since about the end of WW2. Even when
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a cartel is exposed, it is safe to assume that the discovered evidence has been distorted in order
to limit the potential future legal liabilities, which makes very hard to address this question in a
modern setting.
We are able to surpass this challenge due to the fact that nitrate cartels were legal and public,
which made possible the survival of a large number of truthful qualitative sources that include full
texts of the implemented collusive agreements, the minutes of producers’ meetings, and the periodic
publications of their trade association. We supplement this evidence with newly assembled data,
including the detailed output and export statistics at the plant level.
Several features of this industry make it especially suitable for studying cartel organization.
Nitrate of soda was the main fertilizer used at the time, and Chile was the sole producer. Since
the domestic market for the product was negligible, every industry stakeholder in Chile was funda-
mentally concerned only about the maximization of producer surplus. The production process of
nitrate was simple and the technology remained without significant changes. Finally, the product
was completely homogeneous across firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 describes the main
relevant features of the industry; Section 2.3 presents the main characteristics of the nitrate cartels
and, specifically, their contract and their evolution; Section 2.4 outlines the data sources and
presents summary statistics; The main aspect of learning, the allocation of collusive market shares,
is explored in section 2.5; Finally, Section 2.6 describes two other important dimensions of learning:
The regulation of transition from competition to collusion, and the choice of fixed-terms agreements
and inter-cartel bargaining instead of permanent cartels with flexible market share allocation.
2.2 Industry Background
2.2.1 Historical development and industry characteristics
The period between the annexation by Chile of the nitrate rich territories of Peru and Bolivia
during the War of the Pacific (1879-84) and the outbreak of WWI was the zenith of the nitrate
of soda industry. During this period, nitrate of soda, became the main commercial fertilizer used
in the world: By 1900, nitrate of soda represented two thirds of the world’s total supply of com-
mercial fertilisers (Wisniak and Garces, 2001). Moreover, nitrate of soda almost instantly turned
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Table 2.2.1: Evolution of Nitrate Industry
Year Plants (number) Output (thous. of tons) Workers (thous.)
1882 43 492 7.1
1887 57 713 7.2
1892 - 804 13.5
1897 42 1,187 16.7
1901 66 1,329 20.3
1906 96 1,822 -
1910 102 2,465 43,5
1914 137 2,463 44,0
Sources: Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991), Semper et al. (1908), and Godoy
Orellana (2016).
into the most important export and source of revenue for the Chilean government, accounting for
approximately 65% of exports.1. Hence, this period of Chilean history is often called the Chilean
Nitrate Age.
Nitrate of soda is a natural fertilizer used to transfer nitrogen to the soil. The only commercially
viable deposits in the world were found in the newly acquired Chilean provinces of the Atacama
Desert (Vicun˜a, 1931).2 It was an homogeneous product and its main uses were as a fertilizer,
which accounted for roughly three-quarters of consumption, and as an input in the manufacture of
explosives.3 The closest available substitute during this period was sulphate of ammonia.
Nitrate was produced by private firms, in purposefully built plants located on the desert. Figure
2.2.1 shows La Patria nitrate plant, as a representative example. The basic configuration of a nitrate
plant consisted of a central refining facility, placed in the midst of the nitrate-bearing grounds that
would feed it.4 The packaged nitrate would then be dried and stored near the refining facility,
before its transportation via railroad to the nearest port. In a standard transaction, producers
would sell ready for export nitrate at the port. Traders would then transport it by boat to the
consuming markets of Western Europe and the United States.
The nitrate industry featured a large number of firms and experienced a constant expansion
1Computed from Cariola, Sunkel, and Sagredo (1991, p. 139) as average of nitrate participation on exports in
years ended with 0 or 5 during the Nitrate Age
2The provinces were Tarapaca (previously owned by Peru), and Antofagasta, shared between Bolivia and Chile
before the War).
3It was sold in two versions: Ordinary (95% purity) and refined (98% purity), with ordinary constituting almost
all of output.
4The only exception to this configuration was the Antofagasta Company before 1907, which used instead a central
refining facility in the port of the same name.
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Figure 2.2.1: Nitrate Plant Example: Bearnes Plant
Sources: Boudat (1889).
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during the Nitrate Age. Table 2.2.1 presents basic statistics regarding the industry evolution during
our period of interest. As a consequence of the large number of firms,5 the industry had persistent
low levels of concentration. For instance, in 1901 the largest firm had a market share of 6.4%, while
in 1907 the largest market share was 7.6%. Firms were owned mostly by British, German, and
Chilean entrepreneurs.
A distinct industry characteristic is that demand and prices were very volatile. This came as
a result of three market characteristics (Bertrand, 1910). First, most nitrate was used during the
European harvest season, between March and June of each year, which corresponded to about
90% of the agricultural consumption of nitrate. Second, the European demand had high variance
depending on current year’s weather shocks. Third, the large distance between Europe and Chile
meant nitrate producers were not able to react to same-year demand shocks,6 since nitrate produc-
tion, due to economies of scale, was bound to be year-round. These patterns are summarized in
Figure 2.2.2. This situation was reinforced by the fact nitrate intermediaries did minimum storage,
because of the financial risks associated to its wide fluctuations in price.
The Chilean government implemented a nitrate policy based on two pillars: private-ownership
of the industry with low regulation, inspired by laissez faire principles; and heavy taxation using a
per-unit export tax of, approximately, 2.54 pounds sterling per ton exported (this corresponds to
about $400 per ton, in current dollars) (Brown, 1963).7 At the same time, the nitrate export tax
became the most important source of government revenues explaining, on average, 45% of total tax
revenues between 1885 and 1914 (Chilean Ministry of Finance, 1925).
The great economic and fiscal importance of the industry motivated the development of the
Nitrate Agency,8 a specialized state institution solely tasked with monitoring the industry’s op-
eration and development. Among its most important tasks, were to establish government policy
5Some firms owned more than one plant. Most of the firms that entered during our main period of interest were
single-firm plants.
6Semper et al. (1908) estimates average times of travel of 90 to 100 days for sailboats and 45 to 65 days for
steamboats.
7Figures regarding nitrate export tax also include the export tax collected on iodine exports. Iodine is a sub-
product of the elaboration of nitrate of soda.
8The name of the agency in Spanish was Delegacio´n Fiscal de Salitreras y Guaneras. It was based on the city of
Iquique, main city of the Chilean nitrate region. Immediately after the occupation of the Peruvian nitrate territories,
in December 1879, the Chilean government named a general representative to the region to oversee the territory,
including its nitrate industry (Ministerio de Hacienda, Chile, 1880, p. 46). A specialized General Inspectorate of
Nitrate (In Spanish, Inspeccio´n General de Salitreras) existed by 1885 (Ministerio de Hacienda, Chile, 1885, p. 395).
Finally, in 1889, the Chilean government increased the budget and rank of its nitrate agency, obtaining the name
and features that would persist until 1914.
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Figure 2.2.2: Industry-level Output and Consumption
Notes: Monthly industry-level output (dashed line) and consumption (continuous line) between the years 1905 and
1908.
towards the industry, the collection of industry and plant-level statistics, and the management of
government-owned nitrate assets, particularly state-owned nitrate lands.
The First World War fundamentally changed the market for nitrate of soda, 9 as Chile lost its
monopoly on nitrate of soda due to the invention of the Haber-Bosch method for production of
synthetic nitrate. The effects of this event for the Chilean nitrate industry were devastating, never
recovering its previous levels of profitability.
2.3 Nitrate Cartels and Learning
2.3.1 General Description
Nitrate of soda producers formed cartels on five separate occasions (see Table 2.3.1) to take ad-
vantage of their joint market power in the fertilizer world market.10 These cartels lasted from a
9The breakout of the war, also greatly disrupted the industry, as the blockade of the Central Powers closed overnight
some of the most important export markets at the same time as the industry experienced a positive demand shock,
driven by sales to the Allied powers.
10For instance, during a competitive period, a nitrate producers’ publication reads, “Currently, it can be said the
industry is producing as much as it is allowed by the potency of the elements at its disposal . . . On the other hand, is
the conviction of every and each producer that today they deliver their valuable product . . . depressed by at least a
shilling in the price consumers can still pay at great advantage for their economy . . . The result, therefore, of sound
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Table 2.3.1: List of Nitrate Cartels
Cartel Start Date End Date Early termination
First 1884-August 1886-December No
Second 1891-March 1894-March No
Third 1896-April 1897-October Yes
Fourth 1901-April 1906-March No
Fifth 1906-April 1909-March No
Notes: Early termination indicates whether the End Date corresponds to
the original termination date agreed on collusive contract, or if an early
termination clause of the collusive contract was invoked. Sources: Brown
(1963).
minimum of seventeen months to a maximum of five years, and had almost unanimous participa-
tion among nitrate firms. Moreover, the start of the first three cartels followed drops in the nitrate
price.
All nitrate cartels share some distinctive features. First, before the start of each cartel, a
collusive contract would be signed by all participating producers, stipulating all the relevant rules
that would govern its operation. Second, as a result of the absence of any antitrust legislation at
the time in Chile, they were completely public (including their contracts) and the large importance
of the industry guaranteed their actions received a great deal of attention by the press and the
general public. Third, nitrate producers’ limited capacity to respond to contemporaneous demand
shocks, due to their long time-to-market, made unpractical for them to try to directly set the price
of nitrate of soda. As a result, all nitrate cartels were limited to being quantity-setting agreements.
The management of the nitrate cartels, given their large number of firms and their geographic
dispersion, required the existence of a executive body with enough power to make operational
decisions in short order. The first two cartels were managed by a board of producers (denominated
Nitrate Committees) elected by cartel members after the signature of the collusive agreement. In the
first two cartels the group of producers that promoted their organization were heavily represented
in their cartel boards. A pivotal change in the organization of the industry was the creation in
1894 of a permanent trade association, called Nitrate Propaganda Association (NPA from now on)
which took over and expanded the staff and organization developed during the Second Cartel after
advice and mere commercial foresight would be to agree on a formula under which all [producers] consulted their
interests and marched together in pursuit of own and general welfare (NPA, 1899, p. 6).”
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Figure 2.3.1: Industry yearly output (tons)
Notes: Yearly industry output shown as circles (triangles) for competition (cartel) years. Dashed line presents a
non-parametric trend, computed only using industry output observed during years in competition. Cartel periods
are shaded. Texts correspond to cartel number by chronological order and to the War of the Pacific period.
its conclusion in 1894. The NPA retained from the initial cartels an elected board of producers
(elected for one-year terms) as its governing body but its reach was limited mostly to strategic
aspects, leaving day-to-day operations in hands of its manager and a permanent professional staff.
Starting from the Third Cartel, the NPA manager was the main organizer of the successive nitrate
cartels.
Regarding the effects of nitrate cartels, as an illustration, Figure 2.3.1 shows the industry yearly
output, together with a trend that considers only years with free competition, showing that output
during cartel years were always below what it could be expected given the previous trend of output
during competition.
On the other hand, Table 2.3.2 summarizes the effect cartels had on aggregate industry output.
On this Table, the dependent variable is monthly industry-level output, while the main independent
variables of interest are individual cartel dummies. The regression also includes dummies related
to high and low-demand seasons and a time trend. The main result from Table 2.3.2 is that going
from competition to cartel was correlated with an average industry output reduction of around
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18%.
2.3.2 Relevant Dimensions of Learning
A successful cartel must solve four fundamental organizational issues: monitoring and enforcement,
resistance from related firms and authorities, bargaining, and entry.11
The special characteristics of this industry’s physical and institutional environment made the
nitrate industry to develop in a perfect-monitoring setting. Nitrate production was the only eco-
nomic activity developed in the Atacama Desert and all plants, grouped in distinctive districts, were
situated nearby from each other, sharing the same railroad networks to transport their outputs to
port. Moreover, the sheer importance of the industry ensured that the Chilean state developed
monitoring institutions that could compile public statistics and prevent the evasion of the nitrate
export tax. As mentioned above, nitrate producers followed the lead of the Chilean state and used
the NPA as an statistical agency for monitoring purposes. As an example of the detailed monitoring
system put in place by the NPA, Figure 2.B.1 shows an example of the Nitrate Shipment Magazine,
published by the NPA from at least 1894, which contained information on all nitrate shipments
made from Chile in a given month, including the firm of origin, quantity exported, name of the
ship, and destination.
In addition, there is evidence that nitrate cartels had effective tools to enforce the fulfillment
of their agreements. Although nitrate cartels were based on legal contracts to the best of our
knowledge there is no evidence of litigation associated to contract infringements. However, there is
narrative evidence that failing to comply with cartel rules would translate into a strong retaliation:
1213
To a person not resident in Iquique it is difficult to realise the power which the Nitrate
Committee possess.14 Firstly, they have the support and are recognised . . . by the
Republic. Secondly, the object of the combination, the banking interest, and of all
11McAfee and McMillan (1992). Bargaining, refers to the division of the collusive surplus among the cartel members;
Entry corresponds to the presence of new producers, tempted by the large profits generated by the cartel; Monitoring
and enforcement, corresponds to the mechanisms by which the cartel agreement will prevent cheating; and resistance
from firms and authorities, relates to the potential actions that firms on the other side of a market and to enforcement
by antitrust agencies.
12Russell (1890, p. 333)
13See additional supporting evidence related to the power cartels had in Appendix 2.B.
14Note: written as “Comite Salitreros” [sic] in the original text.
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Table 2.3.2: Cartel Effects Regression
Dependent variable:
log(Nitrate Output)
(1) (2)
Cartel −0.187∗∗∗
(0.031)
Cartel 1 −0.549∗∗∗
(0.084)
Cartel 2 −0.045
(0.053)
Cartel 3 −0.019
(0.095)
Cartel 4 −0.137∗∗∗
(0.022)
Cartel 5 −0.167∗∗∗
(0.029)
Time 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001)
High season −0.031 −0.020
(0.051) (0.045)
Low season −0.042 −0.047
(0.040) (0.038)
Constant 16.426∗∗∗ 16.184∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.145)
Observations 404 404
R2 0.818 0.841
Adjusted R2 0.817 0.838
Notes: Robust standard errors in paren-
thesis. Observations correspond to
months at the industry level. Cartel
takes the value 1 if any cartel was ac-
tive, and 0 otherwise. Cartel 1 takes
the value 1 if First Cartel was active,
and 0 otherwise. Additional indica-
tor variables for individual cartels fol-
low the same logic.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Figure 2.3.2: Example of Monitoring: Nitrate Shipment Magazine (February 1895)
Notes: The Nitrate Shipment Magazine (Revista del Cargu´ıo de Salitre) was a monthly publication of the NPA from
at least 1895 until 1929. It summarized all the nitrate shipments made in Chile, including the producer of origin,
quantity of nitrate, ship name, date of shipment, port of origin, and port of destination. Source: Vol. 2659, Ministry
of Finance Collection, Chilean Historical Archives.
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trade depending on the manufacture of nitrate, are so closely bound together, that a
fiat issued with regard to any firm or individual who has persistently offended against
the Articles of Association means to them immediate ruin. The form or individual is
treated as one whose signature is not worth the paper it is written upon; he or they are
in every form boycotted.
These characteristics that promoted “good behaviour” on the part of cartel members were
reflected in a very small number of deviations from the agreed-upon firm level quotas. For instance,
by the end of the first year of the Fourth Cartel only 5 plants had excess output over their quotas,
for an amount equivalent to less than 0.15% of the total industry quota.15 During the second year
of the same agreement, the deviations were even smaller. 16
Finally, the absence of antitrust legislation in Chile meant that the usual concerns colluding
firms face when organizing collusion regarding detection and potential antitrust litigation were
absent from this setting. Furthermore, local consumption of nitrate in Chile was negligible. Hence,
authorities had no local consumer surplus to protect from the high prices induced by the cartel.
As a result, in contrast to a large fraction of the cases studied in the previous literature, in the
nitrate cartels the challenges faced by producers were mostly related to the issues of bargaining and
entry. The focus of this paper is to describe the learning process associated to bargaining problems
while a companion paper17 studies how entry affected these cartels and the solutions implemented
by incumbent nitrate producers. Besides the topical differences between the two papers there is
also a chronological distinction: The bulk of the learning related to bargaining occurred during
the first three cartels, while the entry problem became crucial fundamentally during the last two
cartels.
15NPA (1902, p. 6).
16“The only excesses over the quotas established by the agreement were:
Output: Aguada plant, owned by Compan˜ia Comercial y Salitrera La Aguada. . . 1,836 Sp. quintals.
Exports: Progreso plant, owned by Evaristo Quiroga and Bro. . . . 1,627 Sp. quintals.
Although their insignificance suggest that these violations were involuntary errors, the producers have been fined as
stipulated in articles 15 and 16 of the contract . . . ” NPA (1903, p. 4).
17Carrera and Titov (2019).
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2.3.3 Evolution of Nitrate Cartel Contracts
Nitrate cartel contracts exhibited a relevant evolution.18 As nitrate producers gained more practical
experience at the organization of cartels they incorporated clauses about additional contractual
dimensions, making contracts more complete. Table 2.3.3 summarizes this trend. Quantitative
measures of the length of the contracts together with qualitative description of the new topics
added in each of them show the collusive contracts’ increasing complexity. Specifically, cartels
organized by the NPA are at least twice as long as the firsts two agreements an incorporated
regulations in topics that were perceived as greatly damaging to the success of previous cartels
(e.g., regulation of transition to collusion). Moreover, after the success of the Fourth Cartel there
was a remarkable degree of continuity in the contract used in the Fifth Cartel.
In terms of structure, the contracts also had a clear evolution: A large fraction of the First
Cartel contract described the attributions and tasks of the Nitrate Committee, while at the same
time setting only very general rules for the cartel itself; the Second Cartel contract reads included
rules that were conditional on a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations and left the regulation
of some aspects of the cartel to a general meeting to be held after the agreement was signed. On
the other hand, all cartel contracts negotiated under the umbrella of the NPA share a common
structure.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
We use two main sources of data: All the collusive agreements signed by the nitrate cartels between
1884 and 1909, and a monthly plant-level panel dataset describing the output of each nitrate plant
between 1883 and 1914. Table 2.4.1 describes the location of our main sources.
The cartel contracts were collected from the National Notarial Archives and other sources
located in the National Library of Chile. Figure 2.4.1 presents an example of a cartel contract.
Our output data was compiled from two main contemporaneous sources. The first corresponds
to monthly plant-level industry reports compiled by the Nitrate Agency, which cover the period
1883 to 1909, and include nitrate output, exports, and stocks, in addition to input data. We are
able to collect spreadsheets for 228 months over this period, with 15, 804 observations. The second
18To see the full text of the contracts and their translation go to the Appendixes.
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Figure 2.4.1: Second Cartel Contract
Sources: Chilean National Notarial Archives, Santiago, Chile. Iquique Notaries. Volume 132.
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Table 2.3.3: Evolution of Nitrate Cartel Contracts
Cartel # articles # words Innovations (new topics) NPA Cartel?
First 14 781∗ Allocation collusive quotas, cartel governance, No
transfer quotas across plants same owner,
punishment of deviations.
Second 11 775 No
Third 14 1,811 Procedure to set industry-level quota, Yes
accommodation of entry, hiring of inspectors,
small deviation leniency, upper-bounds to output,
update of quotas due to investments,
lower-bound to industry-level quota.
Fourth 22 2,577 Regulation of transition to collusion, Yes
transfer quotas across time for small producers.
Fifth 21 2,224 Yes
Notes: ∗ word count excludes articles exclusively related to organization of Nitrate Committee (trade associ-
ation). Sources: Prepared by authors using cartel contracts. See Section 2.4 for more details on sources and
Appendixes for translation of cartel contracts.
source are plant-level output and export monthly reports produced by the NPA, which cover the
period 1900-1914. In this case, records are available for 21 months before 1900 and for every month
after that year, for a total of 23, 518 observations. The merged dataset has a total of 32, 623
plant-month observations.
Our quantitative sources were complemented with extensive narrative historical evidence from
the nitrate producers’ internal discussions, contained both in the Quarterly Circulars distributed
by the NPA to its members and the nitrate producers’ meeting minutes (NPA, 1909).
Table 2.4.2 shows summary statistics for the 200 plants in our main dataset. The median
nitrate plant had 245 workers and 89 animals, although there was a significant dispersion. Column
3 shows capacity, which was estimated as the maximum plant-level monthly output observed in any
month of a moving 5-year interval. Column 4 presents the average monthly output, conditional on
plants being active. The industry presents a large amount of excess capacity, with average output
doubling the average monthly output.
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Table 2.4.1: Summary of Data Sources
Data Sources
Prices UK The Economist, Chemical Trade Journal
Prices Chile Nitrate Agency, NPA
Cost parameters Semper et al. (1908)
Plant characteristics Narro (several issues), Boudat (1889)
1st Cartel contract Comite´ Salitrero (1884)
2nd Cartel contract National Notarial Archives. Iquique Notaries. Volume 132.
3rd Cartel contract National Notarial Archives. Iquique Notaries. Volume 141.
4th Cartel contract NPA (1900)
5th Cartel contract Semper et al. (1908, p. 321)
Table 2.4.2: Summary Statistics: Nitrate Plants
Statistic Workers Animals Capacity (tons) Avg. output (tons)
N 176 178 200 200
Mean 289 103 3,494 1,703
St. Dev. 179 64 2,861 1,239
Min 5 2 30 18
Pctl(25) 167 57 1,610.2 932
Median 245 89 2,663.7 1,337
Pctl(75) 383 139 4,267.1 2,161
Max 1,038 309 15,647 6,721
Notes: Capacity estimated as maximum monthly observed output in moving period
of five years (observations from year 1896 were dropped). Workers, animals, capac-
ity, and average output correspond to mean monthly values, excluding zero output
observations. Sources: Authors’ calculations using main dataset.
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Table 2.5.1: Cartel Market Shares Allocation Methods
Method Description
Time Mandatory shutdown for predetermined
number of months each year.
Trial Determination of capacity according to output
during a “trial period” after negotiations.
Past-output Determination of capacity based on previously
realized outputs.
Theoretical capacity Determination of capacity based on assessment of theoretical
production capacity by experts.
2.5 Allocation of Cartel Market Shares
The allocation of collusive market shares was the main challenge that nitrate producers faced when
trying to implement stable cartels. In consequence, this was the contractual aspect that received
by far the most attention, as it was explicitly declared by the NPA:19
“The main challenge for a cartel resides in finding an adaptable formula, permanent in
a way, that allows the survival of all the plants through an agreement that limits the
output of each of them in harmony with some general requirements, including those
originated by the cartel’s own existence. ”
In particular, producers hoped to find a way of allocating production under collusion that
ideally: (i) satisfied the incentive compatibility restrictions of all the producers, so that they will
decide to join the cartel; (ii) was perceived as “fair”; (iii) did not introduce additional production
costs (iii); (iv) did not provide incentives for new investments.
Several methods for allocating market shares under collusion were used: direct negotiation of
market shares, the periodic suspension of production for a fixed length of time each year (which will
be referred to as “time-method”), and three methods based on assessing the production capacity of
each plant, which we collectively denominate as “capacity methods”: the trial, past-outputs, and
theoretical capacity methods. Table 2.5.1 and Figure 2.5.1 present a description of the methods
and the cartels when they were used.
Notice that the methods tried by the nitrate producers inherently emphasize only subset of
19NPA (1898a, p. 4)
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Figure 2.5.1: Allocation Methods used by Nitrate Cartels
their objectives. Thus, using each method presented the producers with a different trade-off. For
instance, the time method generates a perfectly proportional reduction in output across produc-
ers (maximizing the “fairness” objective) and it does not induce investments. However, imposes
additional costs associated to periodical shutdowns and an inefficient scale of production.
Given that the quota-allocation method was the central feature that made each nitrate cartel
unique, next we provide a chronological description of each cartel.
2.5.1 First Cartel: Early theoretical-capacity Method
The First Cartel operated between August of 1884 and the end of 1886. Its beginning is related
to a sharp reduction in nitrate prices due to the end of the War of the Pacific. A general meeting
of producers determined that collusive market share would be based on each plant’s production
capacity, which would be assessed by a committee of producers which would visit each plant shortly
before the start date of the cartel. The committee, however, only had ten days to visit all the
plants in Tarapaca Province, which signals a potentially shallow assessment of each facility (Comite´
Salitrero, 1884, p. 20).
The result of this procedure was a generalized exaggeration of each firm’s production capacity.20
20“As we all remember in the cartel from 1884 to 1887 all the plants produced following quotas based on the
production capacity estimated by committees of experts and the exaggerations that were incurred caused, among
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For instance, total potential output was estimated as 17,000,000 Spanish quintals when the output
in the previous year had only been 12,000,000 Spanish quintals. As the British consul explained:21
“The principle over which limitation was agreed on was a percentage of the possible output of each
plant; consequently each plant claimed as large an output as possible.”
Contemporaneous narrative sources emphasize the lack of fairness had very detrimental effects
on the continuity of the cartel and its effectiveness. For instance, Cruchaga (1929, p. 205) claims:
More numerous are the defects due to the bad organization. Among them is the lack
of equity in the estimation of the production capacity of the plants, situation for which
there is substantiated evidence to consider as true and that naturally has brought about
conflict between the associates that want to take advantage of an irregular partition
and those that prefer the destruction of the cartel itself before accepting the lack of
proportionality.
2.5.2 Second Cartel: Time method
After the end of the First Cartel in December of 1886, the industry experience a period of free
competition that lasted for 4 years. By the end of 1890, however, nitrate prices had dropped and
producers started talks in order to form a new cartel. Interestingly, producers decided to use a
different system to allocate collusive market shares: the time method.
The time method, instead of using fixed quotas for each plant, consists on a restriction on the
amount of time each firm could refine nitrate, which was initially set at seven months of the year.
In this manner, producers hoped to achieve a reduction in output perfectly proportional for every
plant in the industry. Figure 2.5.2 illustrates how the system worked in practice for a subset of
plants.
Compared to the earlier theoretical capacity method, the time method imposed some important
trade-offs. Since each firm could produce at full capacity during the same amount of time, the
allocation of production during the cartel was perfectly “fair”. Also, it was not necessary to estimate
production capacities and there was no distortions in the investment decisions. Finally, this method
made monitoring very simple, since it was only necessary to control whether a plant was active
other factors, the posterior disagreement.”NPA (1898a, p. 3).
21Great Britain (1889, p. 1).
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Figure 2.5.2: Time Method Examples (selected plants)
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Transition Period is the time interval between the
signature of the cartel contract and the start of collusion.
or not. However, the system also had important drawbacks. Complete shutdown of production
implied that workers had to be brought back to the plant before resuming activity. Furthermore,
with the time method there was no explicit aggregate production target for the industry.
To counteract the negative consequences of the time method, it was agreed that producers could
opt, after the first year of the cartel, to switch to a fixed quota system.22 Hence, during the second
and third years of this cartel there were some producers using the time method while others had
a fixed quota computed using the past-output method, considering output during the first year of
the cartel as a reference period.23
Table 2.5.2 shows the results of a counterfactual simulation of the production costs the industry
would have had if each plant in the industry produced its observed output in 1891, but with a
constant level of output instead of using the time-method. Results indicate that the additional
costs induced only by the temporal re-allocation of output within plant are very substantial (above
10%). Notice that this computation corresponds to a lower bound of the total costs, since it does
22Brown (1963).
23NPA (1898a, p. 4).
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Figure 2.5.3: Illustration of Time Method Counterfactual (Agua Santa plant)
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Counterfactual case assumes that plants produce same
total output during 1891, but that they produce it at a constant level.
not add up shutdown costs.24 Figure 2.5.3 illustrates the re-allocation of output used to compute
the counterfactual costs. Our results are further supported by the fact that in no other posterior
cartel nitrate producers used the time method.
2.5.3 Third Cartel: Trial Method and Menu of Options
After the end of the Second Cartel prices of nitrate of soda experienced a sharp decline. Moreover,
the existence of the NPA provided the industry for the first time with an impartial third party
to lead the negotiations. Nevertheless, negotiations were long and difficult. Several drafts of the
collusive agreement were circulated by the NPA before all producers could agree on a contract.
The organization of the cartel could only be completed by late February of 1896, after 16 months
of negotiations.25
The complex negotiation process translated into a collusive agreement full of intricacies and
special conditions. In particular, firms could choose how to determine their collusive quotas from
24However, the fact that most plants stopped operating more than once during 1891 signals that shutdown costs
must have not been extremely high.
25NPA (1896b, p. 6)
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Table 2.5.2: Counterfactual Costs Time Method
Observed costs Counterfactual ∆ Costs (%)
costs
1,831,362 1,617,994 -11.65
Notes: Observed and counterfactual costs based on cost
estimations in Carrera and Titov (2019). Counterfactual
costs are estimated assuming that plants produce same
total output during 1891, but that they produce it at a
constant level.
a menu of options:26
• It was established a reference period, going from July 1 of 1894 until July 1 of 1895.
• Plants that had been active during the reference period could opt to have their quotas set by
the past-output method based on their output on that period.
• Plants that did not want to use the past-output method and new plants could use the trial
method. NPA inspectors would estimate the capacity of each plant according to the output
generated during a trial period lasting 90 days.
• Additionally, some firms decided to negotiate their quotas directly with the NPA board.27
• Small plants, defined as those with exports smaller than 100, 000 Spanish quintals during
the reference period, would have a quota equal to their production on that period. Similarly,
plants with less than 200, 000 Spanish quintals of exports during the same period would suffer
only a fraction of the discount suffered by larger plants.
Interestingly, firms seem to have selected a quota allocation method in a non-strategic way.
Figure 2.5.4 suggests that, at least, productivity and size are not systematically correlated to the
method selected.
26See Article 5 in 2.E. Appendix 2.A presents a list of the quota-allocation methods chosen by the firms.
27The history of the negotiations between the Lautaro Nitrate Co. (owners of the Lautaro plant) and the NPA
board is illustrative. Lautaro Nitrate Co. initially demanded a quota of 1, 200, 000 Spanish quintals to join the cartel.
In December of 1895, after the initial demand had been accepted by the NPA, the board of this firm demanded an
even larger quota of 1, 500, 000 (which would be later lowered to 1, 400, 000 Spanish quintals). The difference between
the initial and the final demand of the company were finally absorbed as a small discount on the quotas of some other
signatory firms.
101
Figure 2.5.4: Selection of Allocation Method in Third Cartel
Notes: Vertical axis is productivity. Horizontal axis is the initial capacity of each plant. Productivity and initial
productivity values taken from Carrera and Titov (2019).
The trial method generated an incentive for firms to produce an output as large as possible
during the trial period:28
“Since the distribution of production quotas was to be proportional to the production capacity
estimated by the work of the first three months, many plants were dragged into expanding their
machinery and force production over this period of time, making crazy expenditures.”
Indeed, the NPA had to quickly update its previously estimated industry wide capacity of
44, 000, 000 Spanish quintals, after the trials were conducted, to over 55, 000, 000 Spanish quintals.
The surprise expressed by the NPA communications is telling about this respect:29
. . . and as these figures showed production capacities largely superior to those observed
only months ago, to the extreme of drastically changing the calculations used as refer-
ence during the negotiations of the cartel, the [NPA] board quickly collected the new
data, some of it truly surprising to the more knowledgeable producers of the [Atacama]
desert, and updated its estimations to predict the export quotas during the first year
28Semper et al. (1908, p. 143)
29NPA (1896c, p. 2).
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Figure 2.5.5: Trial Method Examples (selected plants)
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Transition Period is the time interval between the
signature of the cartel contract and the start of collusion.
of the cartel.
One effect of the trial method was that the quotas allocated during the first year of the cartel
were much smaller, as a percentage of capacity, than it was previously expected. Indeed, plants
were supposed to restrict their output to only 35% of their capacity instead of the 50% of capacity
that had be assumed during the negotiation of the agreement. However, since only a fraction of the
firms had used the trial method, firms that had chosen the past-output method instead suffered
the bulk of the reduction.
The problems described above contribute for the Third Cartel to be considered almost instantly
a failure. Instead of the 3 years stipulated on the contract it lasted only for eighteen months, after
an early termination clause was invoked.
Table 2.5.3 presents the counterfactual costs of the plants that used the trial method, assuming
they produce the same output observed during the first year of the Third Cartel, but with a
constant output level instead of using the trial method. Results show that savings of not using the
trial method would have been above 20% of the observed production costs. Notice that this figure
represents a lower bound, since it does not include the value of any additional investments made
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Figure 2.5.6: Illustration of Third Cartel Counterfactual (Agua Santa plant)
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Counterfactual case assumes that plants produce same
total output during 1891, but that they produce it at a constant level.
by the firms in order to be prepared for the trial period. Figure 2.5.6 illustrates the re-allocation
of output used to compute the counterfactual costs.
Table 2.5.3: Counterfactual Costs Trial Method
Observed costs Counterfactual ∆ Costs (%)
costs
1,377,384 1,097,726 -20.3
Notes: Observed and counterfactual costs based on cost
estimations in Carrera and Titov (2019). Counterfactual
costs are estimated assuming that plants produce same
total output during 1891, but that they produce it at a
constant level.
2.5.4 Fourth and Fifth Cartels: Theoretical-capacity Method
Negotiations to resume collusion were started promptly after the collapse of the Third Cartel and
a new agreement was signed in October of 1900.30 The Fourth Cartel included several innovations.
30NPA (1898b, p. 5)
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The complex menu of options used in the Third Cartel was replaced by a single method for all
the plants in the industry. With only a single exception, direct negotiation was abandoned as a
quota allocation method, and small plants received the same proportional discount in their quotas,
although they were given the chance to roll-over their quotas from one year to the next.31
The failure of the trial and time methods used in previous cartels motivated the re-introduction
of the theoretical-capacity method in a more sophisticated version than the one used in the First
Cartel.32 The NPA board would assess the production capacity of each plant based on both its re-
fining capacity and the nitrate content of its lands. The resulting estimation of production capacity
would then remain confidential until all producers had signed the agreement. Theoretically, this
procedure would force producers to only focus on the fairness of their plant’s capacity assessment,
instead of negotiating directly for a larger market share. On the other hand, the reputation of
the NPA as a valid third party mediator would not survive if, once the market shares were finally
revealed, they seemed to be arbitrary or unfair.
The Fourth Cartel was contemporaneously regarded as very successful. This is reflected in the
fact that right before the expiration of the Fourth Cartel the nitrate producers agreed on extending
collusion for 3 more years, in what would be the fifth nitrate cartel of this period.
Contractually, the Fifth Cartel was a continuation of the previous agreement and the main
innovations regarding quota allocation were maintained and protected. In particular, when there
was a risk that the negotiations of the new contract would fail, the NPA did not show any flexibility
about the necessity to keep the estimated plant capacities confidential before all the firms signed
the agreement and refused to negotiate directly quotas for the firms that were initially blocking the
signature of the agreement.33 At the same time, the Antofagasta Nitrate Company lost the special
privilege it had during the Fourth Cartel and its quota was determined by theoretical capacity
instead of by direct negotiation.
31The only company that used direct negotiation was the Antofagasta Nitrate Company, which was the only
company to refine the untreated nitrate ore at a central location (O’Brien, 1980).
32NPA (1898a, p. 4).
33In particular see minutes of the producers’ meetings held on March 26st and 31st of 1906 (NPA, 1909)
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2.5.5 Comparing Cartel Market Shares Allocation in the Nitrate Cartels
Table 2.5.4 the coefficient of variation of the ratio between the output in a reference period before
the start of the cartel and the quota allocated to each plant in the industry. A higher dispersion of
this ratio means that some plants were suffering a proportionally larger reduction on their output
with respect to the previous competition period. In this comparison the Third Cartel has a much
lower performance with respect to the theoretical-capacity method cartels, which present relatively
similar levels of dispersion.
Table 2.5.4: Market Shares Allocation
in Various Cartels
Cartel Coefficient of Variation
(CV)
First 0.468
Third 1.196
Fourth 0.471
Notes: Coefficient of variation is com-
puted taking the ratio between the
average output in the last year be-
fore the signature of the cartel con-
tract and the monthly quota allo-
cated to the plant. Computation uses
a balanced panel with plants that had
positive output in competitive period
previous to the cartel.
2.6 Other Dimensions of Learning
This section describes other contractual dimensions over which the nitrate producers implemented
innovations to improve cartel organization as they gained experience.
2.6.1 Transition to Collusion
A very acute problem that harmed the effectiveness of earlier cartels was the handling of transition
from free competition to collusion. In the nitrate cartels, once a cartel contract was signed there
would be a period of a few weeks or months before each firms’ output had to be reduced. We
will refer to this period from signature until the effective start of collusion as the transition period.
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Their existence can be explained by the time it would take to conclude the market share allocation
across producers, for the adjustments firms had to make before significantly reducing their output
level, and for the already committed sales made by the colluding firms.
The existence of an unregulated transition period generated incentives detrimental for the suc-
cess of a cartel. Nitrate is a storable commodity, so during the transition period consumers had an
incentive to purchase the product while prices were still low. Thus, producers would be tempted
to to front-load sales, causing a negative externality for the rest of the producers in the form of a
reduced price effect of the cartel. We will denote this as the preemptive cheating motive.
The preemptive cheating motive caused the gradual introduction of transitory articles in the
collusive agreements aimed at generating a smoother transition to collusion.
In the case of the First Cartel the contract did not include any clauses regarding the transition
period, although they implemented a detailed procedure to verify the stocks held by each plant
at the start of the cartel.34 The result of an unregulated transition period was that producers
increased their output levels in the months before the official start of the cartel. This pattern is
shown in Figure 2.6.1.
Figure 2.6.2 shows the transition to collusion on the Third Cartel.35 In this case, the preemp-
tive cheating motive of producers was compounded by the use of the trial method that induced
an additional front-loading of production. The signature of the cartel contract was immediately
followed by a boom in industry output, reducing the quantity available to be allocated as export
quotas, as the NPA communicated to its members:36
“. . . the excessive and anticipated exports of the month of March . . . had already reduced to
20,300,000 the minimum amount of 22,000,000 [Spanish quintals], that at the time of the negotia-
tions was expected and was used as a reference to compute the export quotas of the present nitrate
year.”
Interestingly, recognizing the existence of a transition problem in the First Cartel, the cartel
contract had tried to solve the transition to collusion problem by fixing the total industry exports
for an extended transition period that encompassed the last year of competition before the cartel
34Comite´ Salitrero (1884).
35Notice that one of the advantages of the time method used in the Second Cartel was the absence of the need for
regulating the transition period.
36NPA (1896c, p. 2).
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Figure 2.6.1: Transition to Collusion in First Cartel
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Transition Period is the time interval between the
signature of the cartel contract and the start of collusion.
started and the first year of the cartel. However, the NPA failed to recognize that setting an
aggregate upper bound did not solve the individual producer incentive problem
During the Fourth Cartel the transition to collusion problem could be handled in a more effective
manner. First, the use of the theoretical capacity method had the positive feature that a larger
industry output was not directly induced during the transition period as a part of the quota
allocation process. Second, a transitory article in the collusive agreement established a plant-level
regulation of the transition period that prevented an increase in firms’ outputs. The procedure put
in place consisted of three stages before the cartel became effective in April 1, 1901:
1. Plant level stocks of nitrate would be inspected on December 31, 1900. This production could
be freely sold during the period from January to March (but if still unsold by April, it would
be subtracted from the collusive quota).
2. Depending on the aggregate stocks resulting from the previous step, the NPA board would
determined an upper bound for additional industry exports during the transition period
(finally, the NPA board decided to not authorize any additional exports). This additional
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Figure 2.6.2: Transition to Collusion in the Third Cartel
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Transition Period is the time interval between the
signature of the cartel contract and the start of collusion.
exports would be assigned to the firms based on their collusive market shares.
3. Any other amount produced by the plants during the first quarter of 1901 could only be
exported after April 1 and would be counted as part of the respective collusive quota.
Figure 2.6.3 shows the industry output pattern at the beginning of the Fourth Cartel. The
new mechanism implemented by the NPA that tried to fully internalized the effects of increasing
production during the transition period seems to have been effective at solving the preemptive
cheating motive of producers since industry output had a monotonic downward trend.
2.6.2 Flexibility For Adjustments and Duration
A long-lasting cartel, concerned about the fairness of the allocation of its collusive surplus must
find a way to adjust its allocation of market shares when the relative situation of its members
change with respect to their initial allocation. In the case of the nitrate cartels this challenge is
interwined to the issue of cartel duration and the natural question of why nitrate producers could
never implemented a permanent cartel.
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Figure 2.6.3: Transition to Collusion in the Fourth Cartel
Notes: Vertical axis is output in tons. Horizontal axis is time. Transition Period is the time interval between the
signature of the cartel contract and the start of collusion.
Table 2.6.1: Nitrate Cartels by Duration Characteristics
Cartel Initial duration Effective duration Quota-allocation Automatically
(months) (months) method (main) renewable
First 12 29 Theoretical-capacity No
Second 24 36 Time No
Third 36 19 Trial Yes
Fourth 60 60 Theoretical-capacity No
Fifth 36 36 Theoretical-capacity No
Cartel duration was explicitly agreed upon in the collusive contracts.37 Table 2.6.1 presents
the characteristics of the duration on the 5 nitrate cartels. Initial duration corresponds to the
original duration of the agreement, effective duration is the actual time the collusion lasted, and
automatically renewable refers to whether the agreement would be extended automatically and
indefinitely after its initial duration had expired.
Based on this dimension of learning, we can divide nitrate cartels in two groups. The first
group are the first three cartels, characterized by a slow evolution towards the establishment of a
37After the Second Cartel, a specific procedure to trigger an early dissolution of the cartel was also included in
the contracts. This procedure, required the agreement of an absolute majority of producers as a fraction of industry
output. Only in the case of the Third Cartel, an early dissolution was discussed and approved.
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permanent cartel. Earlier cartels were emergency arrangements made in order to face transitory
negative demand shocks.38 In the case of the first two cartels, duration was initially set for a
short period of time (1 or 2 years) under the implicit understanding that the cartel would, at the
expiration date, be renewed under the same basic collusive contract if market conditions made it
desirable. However, producers were tempted by the prospect of continued cooperation and the
cartel contracts they signed increasingly had the perpetuation of collusion as a concern. This
trend culminated in the Third Cartel contract which incorporated a clause that made its renewal
automatic (in the exact same way as the contract that created the NPA automatically renewed its
charter).
On the other hand, after the failure of the Third Cartel, producers never again attempted
forming permanent cartels. The last two cartels were fixed-term agreements, which implied a
complete renegotiation to form a “new” cartel in case that producers wanted to extend the collusive
period (as it was the case when the Fourth Cartel expired) since the default situation was the
resumption of competition once their terms expired .
Moreover, the cartel duration decision is linked to the question of how to implement adjustments
to collusive market shares in order to keep the allocation of surplus fair. During the first three
cartels the producers were looking for adjustment mechanisms that could work in the framework
of a permanent cartel, which explains in part the choices they made about what quota-allocation
methods they tried: Both the time and trial methods are good solutions for keeping market shares
allocation dynamically fair. The time method automatically transfers market shares from plants
that become relatively less efficient or lose capacity to those that become more productive or
increase capacity. Relatedly, the Third Cartel contract required that plants performed periodic
trials, which would generate approximate dynamic fairness in the same manner.
On the contrary, in the last two cartels instead of having a quota-allocation method that allowed
for both a fair initial allocation of market shares and a dynamic adjustment as conditions evolved,
the NPA could now focus only on the initial allocation leaving the adjustments for the inter-cartel
period (i.e., the renegotiation of the agreement). At the same time, the diminished focus on
dynamic fairness allowed the producers to reduce the incentives to invest in increased capacity, by
explicitly eliminating any sort of quota increases due to investments made after the signature of
38Cruchaga (1929, p. 207) offers this interpretation for the First Cartel.
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the agreement.
2.7 Final Remarks
This paper studies whether firms learn how to better organize collusion as they gain experience.
Since cartels are illegal organizations this remains an open question. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first paper to be able to explore learning in relation to cartels.
To study this research question we use the case of the cartels in the Chilean nitrate industry.
Between 1884 and 1909 there were five cartels in the nitrate industry. Since collusion was not
illegal in Chile at the time these cartels were completely public and their rules codified in legal
contracts. Moreover, there was no meaningful technological innovation in the industry. Thus, the
environment where these cartels developed was static throughout the period of study.
First, a descriptive analysis of the cartels contracts show that they grew more complex and
complete during the first four cartels as producers gained experience: New clauses were incorporated
that addressed issues that had mined the performance of previous cartels.
We then explore the main challenge that nitrate producers faced when organizing collusion: The
allocation of collusive market shares. We describe how nitrate cartels used a total of five different
methods to allocate market shares and are able to show that the additional costs caused by using
two methods of special interest, the time and trial methods, were very substantial and explain why
they were discarded in later cartels.
Finally, we describe how nitrate cartels were able to solve the incentive problems caused by the
transition from competition to collusion and the process by which the industry converged to having
periodical fixed-term agreements, instead of a permanent cartel.
Our results point to a large importance of learning in the organization of cartels. Even in an
advantageous setting for collusion as the nitrate industry many of the initial solutions employed
by the cartelized firms were shortsighted or sub-optimal, and only through trial and error they
were able to arrive to a model contract. At the same time, this paper highlights the relevance
of trade associations for cartels as a repository of relevant institutional knowledge about collusion
organization.
One important extension of this paper is to explore the relation between cartel leadership and
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observed distortions in the allocation of collusive surplus. Specifically, exploring whether cartel
organizers received a disproportionate share of collusive surplus
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A Election of Allocation Method in Third Cartel
• Past production method was used by the following plants: Cala-Cala, Carolina39, Cruz de
Zapiga, Democracia, Mercedes, Paccha, Peruana, Progreso, Rosario de Huara, San Fernando,
Santa Rosa de Huara, and Sebastopol.40
• Quotas were determined by direct negotiations with the plants: Antofagasta, Atacama,
Cholita, Julia, Lautaro, Limen˜ita, Paposo, Santa Ana, Santa Catalina, Santa Fe, Santa Luisa,
Virginia, Vis, and Yungay Bajo.41
• The rest of the plants had their quotas determined by the trial method. However, some
plants opted for trial method, but requested extension on the start of the trial period due
to investments: Agua Santa, Angela, Aragon, Compan˜ia, Providencia, Rosario de Negreiros,
San Antonio, Santiago, Tres Marias, and Valparaiso. A second group of plants requested
an extension due to other factors, which were resolved by the arbitration of mediators, as
described in article 14 of the cartel contract. The plants that appealed to the resolution
of the mediators in this specific case were: Aguada, Amelia, Josefina, Reducto, and Santa
Isabel.42
• By January of 1897 the plants Agua Santa, Angela, Aragon, Compan˜ia, Providencia, Re-
ducto, Rosario de Negreiros, San Antonio, Santa Rita, Santiago, Serena, and Tres Marias has
changes their initial capacity due to investments in refining capacity. The following plants
39Note: In the text says it had been acquired by Santa Rita Company and was forming “a single plant” with Santa
Rita plant.
40NPA (1896b, p. 6).
41NPA (1896b, p. 6).
42NPA (1896b, p. 6).
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were planning on having new trial periods: Aguada, Buena Esperanza, Compan˜ia, Jazpampa,
Josefina, La Granja, Paccha, Peregrina, San Esteban, San Fernando, San Pedro, and Union.43
• In the fist four months of 1897, there were the following trial periods: Providencia, Serena,
Reducto, San Fernando due to new investments in refining capacity, and San Jose, Santa
Clara, and Puntilla de Huara as new plants starting operation. By May, the plants: La
Granja, Josefina, Union, San Esteban, Aguada, and Paccha started new trial periods invoking
also investments in refining facility or purchase of new nitrate lands. The plants Jazmpampa
and San Pedro were about to start a new trial due to the same reason, and Huascar as a new
plant.44
Appendix 2.B Enforcement Evidence
43NPA (1897b, p. 3).
44NPA (1897a, p. 7).
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Figure 2.B.1: Example of Threat to Intermediaries Dealing with Non-cartel Producers
Notes: Letter dated February 8, 1905 signed by the NPA manager.
Text translation: As a consequence of some recent sales of nitrate manufactured on plants that still have not joined
the nitrate cartel the [NPA] board has made the decision that, in case of this event happening again, none cartel
member will do business with the broker that intervened in said sale. To this effect it will be considered as the same
broker or firm both the Iquique office and its agents in Valparaiso. For your knowledge, find attached a list of the
firms and plants that currently form part of the cartel. You will receive opportunely notice of those that join in the
future. In Valparaiso, our representation will give the same notice to interested parties. Source: Vol. 96, Nitrate
Collection, Chilean Historical Archives.
Appendix 2.C First Cartel Contract
Convenio para la Formacio´n del Comite´ Salitrero45
Art´ıculo 1: El presente convenio tiene por objeto obligarse, por el te´rmino de un an˜o, a´ [sic]
no elaborar en las oficinas que en seguida se menciona i a´ no exportar mas [sic] cantidad de salitre
que la sen˜alada por el Comite´ Salitrero permanente, la cual en ningun [sic] caso podra´ exceder de
diez millones de quintales espan˜oles para toda la costa.
45Comite´ Salitrero (1884).
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Los duen˜os de varias oficinas en actual trabajo podra´n elaborar la cuota de todas sus oficinas en
una so´la, pero los duen˜os de varias oficinas actualmente paralizadas debera´n trabajar en cada una
de ellas la cuota que les fuere sen˜alada.
Es entendido que ningun elaborador podra´ vender ni comprar cuota de elaboracio´n asignada a´ otro.
La cuota asignada a´ cada oficina actualmente paralizada no se contara´ sino desde la fecha en que
principie a´ trabajar.
El total de elaboracio´n i exportacio´n que se fijara´ sera´ prorateado [sic] entre dichas oficinas, tomando
por base la capacidad productora que a´ cada una asigna este convenio.
Las oficinas a´ que se refieren los incisos anteriores i su capacidad indicada son los siguientes:
(El cuadro sera´ presentado en la reunio´n que tendra´ lugar el pro´ximo 10 de Junio.)
Art´ıculo 2: Por el te´rmino de este convenio existira´ en Iquique una comision [sic] de elabo-
radores de salitre que se denominara´ Comite´ Salitrero, con las atribuciones que mas [sic] adelante
se indican.
Art´ıculo 3: El Comite´ Salitrero se compondra´ de nueve miembros propietarios i dos suplentes,
todos esplotadores [sic] de oficinas en actual trabajo o´ representantes de tales en la jestio´n jeneral
[sic] de sus negocios.
Todas las personas que concurren a´ este convenio son aptas para ser miembros del Comite´, sea que
residan en Tarapaca´, Tocopilla, Antofagasta, Aguas Blancas, Taltal o´ Valparaiso.
El miembro del Comite´ que residiere fuera de Iquique tendra´ la obligacion [sic] de atender personal-
mente o´ de hacerse representar, en el desempen˜o de las atribuciones que le corresponden, por un
esplotador de oficina en actual trabajo o´ representante de tal en la jestion jeneral de sus negocios.
Art´ıculo 4: Son atribuciones del Comite´ Salitrero:
1◦ Vijilar [sic] i hacer efectiva las obligaciones contraidas por el presente convenio, i representar
en todo sentido los intereses de la industria salitrera.
2◦ Resolver, con audiencia de los interesados i previos los estudios e informes del caso, las quejas
sobre falta de proporcionalidad entre la capacidad productora real de una oficina i la cuota
que se le haya asignado con relacion a´ la cantidad total fijada para la elaboracion i exporta-
cion, u´ [sic] otras.
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Si el representante de la oficina a´ que se refiere la resolucion del Comite´ sobre falta de propor-
cionalidad en la fijacion de la cuota, no se conforma´se [sic] con ella, sin perjuicio de empezar
a´ cumplirse dicha resolucion, podra´ apelar ante la comision [sic] de peritos mencionada en el
art. 7◦.
No habra´ recurso alguno contra la resolucion de esta segunda comision.
3◦ Acordar las medidas necesarias para imponer el cumplimiento de sus resoluciones i las que
fueren menester para vijilar la exportacion que a´ cada oficina corresponda.
Las medidas de coaccion que acorda´re [sic] el Comite´ consistira´ solo en multas, que no podra´n
exceder de un peso por cada quintal que se exporta´re [sic] de exceso sobre la cuota respectiva.
4◦ Fijar la cantidad con que cada oficina deba contribuir a´ los gastos que demande el ejercicio
de sus atribuciones.
Esta contribucion [sic] se distribuira´ a´ prorata [sic], fija´ndose a´ tanto por quintal de salitre
elaborado, i no podra´ exceder en ningun [sic] caso de un centavo por quintal.
El fondo para gastos del Comite´ se formara´ tambien con las multas indicadas en el nu´mero
3◦ de este art´ıculo.
5◦ Nombrar i remover los empleados que sean necesarios para el objeto de este convenio i sen˜alar
la remuneracion [sic] que deben gozar.
6◦ Acordar los gastos que exija el objeto de su institucion [sic].
7◦ Nombrar apoderados que representen al Comite´ fuera de Iquique i en los lugares que sea
menester que los haya.
8◦ Convocar a´ una reunion jeneral para resolver sobre los casos en los que encontra´re resistencias
graves en el cumplimiento de sus reglamentos i resoluciones, o´ cuando la produccion [sic] de
oficinas nuevas que no acepten la presente combinacion [sic] comprometan el objeto con que
se forma.
9◦ Resolver i fijar las condiciones con que deban aceptarse las solicitudes de otras oficinas sobre
ingreso a´ la presente combinacion.
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Art´ıculo 5: Los miembros del Comite´ sera´n nombrados, en votacio´n secreta, por mayor´ıa
absoluta de votos, en reunion [sic] a´ que concurran a´ lo menos la mitad mas uno del total de las
personas naturales o´ fict´ıcias que forman este convenio.
Su nombramiento sera´ por un an˜o.
Art´ıculo 6: En la reunion jeneral del dia [sic] 10 se procedera´ a´ la eleccion [sic] del Comite´
permanente en la forma en que indica el art´ıculo 5◦.
En esta reunion i las demas jenerales ninguna persona podra´ tener mas de dos votos, uno por s´ı
propio i otro en virtud de un poder conferido.
Es absolutamente prohibido conferir poderes a´ personas que no sean salitreras o´ representantes de
casas elaboradoras.
Art´ıculo 7: En la reunion indicada en el art´ıculo anterior se elejira´n ademas, a´ mayor´ıa absoluta
de votos, dos inspectores propietarios i dos suplentes, encargados del exa´men de las cuentas i balance
del fondo de gastos del Comite´, i una comision de peritos compuesta de siete propietarios i dos
suplentes, encargados de resolver en definitiva sobre las quejas a´ que se refiere el n◦ 2 del art. 4◦.
Para la comision de peritos puede ser nombrado cualquiera que ejerza la profesion de salitrero.
En la u´ltima reunion que celebre la comision de peritos para resolver en definitiva la queja sometida
a´ su conocimiento, tendra´ voz i voto el Presidente i en su ausencia el Vice del Comite´ Salitrero.
Los inspectores presentara´n en cada reunion jeneral un informe sobre la inspeccion que hubieren
verificado.
Art´ıculo 8: El Comite´ elejira´ de entre sus miembros, en la primera reunion que celebre, un
Presidente i un Vice-presidente que lo sera´n tambie´n de las reuniones jenerales i designara´ el o´rden
en que deben reemplazarles los otros miembros.
Art´ıculo 9: Toda resolucion del Comite´ necesita, para que se tenga por tal, que haya sido
adoptada con el acuerdo uniforme de seis de sus miembros a´ lo menos.
Art´ıculo 10: El plazo de un an˜o mencionado en el primer inciso del art. 1◦, solo [sic] empezara´
a´ contarse desde el dia 1◦ de agosto pro´ximo.
Art´ıculo 11: Cada tres meses, contados desde el 1◦ de agosto pro´ximo, habra´ una reunion
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jeneral con el objeto de oir el informe de los Inspectores, deliberar sobre los asuntos que el Comite´
someta a´ su conocimiento i aprobar las cuentas del trimestre.
Art´ıculo 12: En la reunion jeneral del tercer trimestre se deliberara´ sobre si se prorroga o´
no por un an˜o mas el compromiso contraido segun el presente acuerdo. El voto una´nime de los
asistentes a´ esa reunion obligara´ a´ los inasistentes.
Art´ıculo 13: La obligacio´n del art´ıculo 1◦ con respecto a´ la exportacion no se refiere a´ la
existencia de salitre que cada cual tuviera en el dia, ni tampoco a´ las compras a´ adquisiciones que
se hicieren del salitre que se elabore con arreglo a´ este convenio.
Art´ıculo 14: Si alguno de los que concurren al presente convenio traspasa´se [sic] por cualquier
causa su derecho a´ la oficina u´ oficinas que le correspondan, el traspaso no podra´ hacerse sino con
la condicion expresa de que el nuevo adquiriente respetara´ i cumplira´ las obligaciones contraidas
por este convenio.
Agreement for the Formation of a Nitrate Committee46
Article 1: The present agreement has for object to bind [us], for the term of a year, not to
produce in the plants named below and not to export a larger amount of nitrate than the one
indicated by the permanent Nitrate Committee, which in any case will not exceed ten millions of
quintals for all the Nitrate Coast.
The owners of several plants currently in operation will be able to produce the quotas of all of their
plants in any of them, but the owners of several plants that are currently shutdown will have to
produce their quotas in the same plant to which it was allocated.
It is implicit that it is forbidden to sell or buy the quota assigned to a different producer.
The quota granted to a plant currently in shutdown will not be active until it resumes operation.
The total [industry-level] quantity of production and exports that will be set, will be allocated to
the plants using the production capacity estimated for each of them.
The plants alluded to in the previous subsections and their estimated capacity are the following:
(The table will be shown during the meeting that will take place on June 10.)
46Translated by author from Comite´ Salitrero (1884).
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Article 2: For the duration this agreement there will be in Iquique a commission of nitrate
producers, denominated as Nitrate Committee, with the powers stated below.
Article 3: The Nitrate Committee [board] will be composed by nine owner-members and two
substitutes, all of them shall be exploiters of currently operating plants or their representatives
tasked with the management of their plants [managers].
All the signatories of this agreement are fit to be members of the Committee, whether they reside
in Tarapaca, Tocopilla, Antofagasta, Aguas Blancas, Taltal or Valparaiso.47
A member of the Committee that resides out of Iquique will be bound to attend in person or to
name a deputy for the performance of his responsibilities, among the plant owners or managers.
Article 4: The attributions of the Nitrate Committee are:
1◦ To monitor and to make effective the commitments contracted through this agreement, and
to broadly represent the interests of the nitrate industry.
2◦ To adjudicate, after having an audience with the interested parties and using prior studies
and reports regarding the case, complaints about lack of proportionality between the true
production capacity of a plant and its quota. If the representative of the plant declared his
disagreement with the ruling, he will be able to appeal before the commission of experts
mentioned in article 7. The ruling of this commission will not be subject to any instance of
appeal.
3◦ To agree on the necessary measures to enforce implementation its resolutions and to monitor
the exports of each plant to ensure quotas are respected. The coercitive measures will be
limited to fines, which will not be larger than one Chilean peso per quintal of excess exports
over the respective quota.
4◦ To set the amount with which each firm must contribute to finance the operation of the
Committee. The contribution will be allocated proportionally, on the basis of output and it
will not be larger in any case than one cent per Spanish quintal. The expense fund for the
47Tarapaca, Tocopilla, Antofagasta, Aguas Blancas and Taltal correspond to localities or districts of Northern Chile
where nitrate deposits are found. Valparaiso was the main commercial and financial city of Chile at the time.
122
Committee will also receive the fines included in section 3 of this article.
5◦ To name and to remove the required personnel for the objectives of this agreement and to set
their wages.
6◦ To determine the necessary expenses for the fulfillment of its mission.
7◦ To name agents to represent the Committee outside of Iquique in the cities where this is
required.
8◦ To convene a general meeting on cases in which the Committee finds resistance to its regula-
tions and resolutions, or when the entry of new plants which refuse to join the cartel threatens
the fulfillment of its objectives.
9◦ To decide and to set the conditions on which the applications of other plants to join the cartel
will be resolved.
Article 5: The members of the Nitrate Committee [board] will be elected by secret ballot in a
meeting with the presence of an absolute majority of the signatories.
They will hold office for a period of one year.
Article 6: The election of the Nitrate Committee will be done using the procedure described
in article 5 during the general meeting on the 10 [of June].
On said occasion, and more generally at any general meeting, no person will be able to have more
than two votes, one for his own firm and one as a representative of a second firm.
It will be absolutely forbidden to name as a representative a person that is not an owner or a
manager.
Article 7: In the general meeting mentioned above will also be elected, by absolute majority of
votes, two owner-inspectors and two substitutes, which will be tasked with monitoring an adequate
use of the expense fund of the Committee, and a commission of experts formed by seven owners
and two substitutes, charged with resolving as last instance the complaints mentioned in number
2 of article 4.
Any person with practical experience can be nominated to be part of the commission of experts.
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In the meetings when the commission of experts resolve about complaints put in front of them, the
President of the Committee will have voice and vote (the Vice-president in case of absence of the
President).
The inspectors will present on each general meeting a report about their activities.
Article 8: The Committee will select from among its members, during its first meeting, a
President and a Vice-president who will preside the general meetings and will decide the order in
which the other members of the Committee will substitute them in case of absence.
Article 9: All the resolutions of the Committee will need an agreement of at least six of its
members to be approved.
Article 10: The one year term mentioned in the first paragraph of article 1 will start on August
1.
Article 11: Every three months, counted from August 1, there will be a general meeting with
the object to receive the report from the inspectors, discuss issues put forward by the Committee
and approving the expenses of the period.
Article 12: In the general meeting of the third quarter will be discussed the extension of the
present agreement for one more year. The unanimous vote of the presents will bind those that do
not attend the meeting.
Article 13: The commitment made regarding the nitrate exports in article 1 do not refer to
the nitrate stocks that each producer has on that day, nor to the purchases of nitrate manufactured
according to the rules of this agreement.
Article 14: In the event of transferring for any reason their rights to the plant or plants they
operate, the signatories of this agreement will clearly stipulate that the new owner will comply and
respect all the obligations originated on this agreement.
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Appendix 2.D Second Cartel Contract
Convenio de Combinacio´n Salitrera48
Los infrascritos, todos productores de salitre, convienen en formar parte de una combinacion
salitrera, por el te´rmino de dos an˜os, contados desde el 1◦ de Enero de 1891, con arreglo a las
siguientes estipulaciones:
Art´ıculo 1: Cada uno de los firmantes de este convenio, en el caracter [sic] en que comparece
o por la sociedad que representa, conviene con los demas [sic] otorgantes, en no trabajar en sus
respectivas oficinas salitreras sino siete meses en el an˜o 1891 i [sic] se obliga del mismo modo, a
suspender por completo la elaboracion [sic] por cinco meses en el mismo an˜o en la forma siguiente:
Cada productor podra´ elejir [sic] los siete meses de elaboracion [sic] que le conviniese, dando un
aviso anticipado por escrito de quince dias a lo menos, al consejo directivo de la combinacion, cada
vez que principie o suspenda el trabajo; no pudiendo hacerse e´stas operaciones sino´ el 1◦ o 15 de
cada mes. El productor que elijiere en la forma dicha los siete meses de trabajo que le convenga,
debera´ suspender por completo la elaboracion durante los u´ltimos cinco meses del presente an˜o.
Art´ıculo 2: El nu´mero de meses que durara la elaboracion en 1892, sera´ fijado por el Consejo
Directivo de la combinacion, i sujeta´ndose aesta fijacion, cada productor podra´ elejir los meses de
elaboracion en la forma y condiciones estipuladas en el art´ıculo 1◦.
Art´ıculo 3: La suspension de trabajo se refiere u´nicamente a la elaboracion de salitre, pudiendo
en consecuencia, extraerse y acumularse caliche durante la paralizacion de las oficinas.
Art´ıculo 4: Los firmates de este convenio pagara´n al Consejo Directivo, la cuota que este juzgue
necesaria para atender a los gastos de propagacio´n de consumo de salitre, y a los que demanden
el sostenimiento y la administracion de la combinacion; no pudiendo dicha cuota exceder de medio
centavo por quintal de salitre embarcado.
Art´ıculo 5: Cualquier productor que elabore salitre fuera de los per´ıodos a que tenga derecho
segun este convenio, pagara´ por cada dia de esceso [sic] una multa cuyo monto sera´ fijado en
los estatutos y que ingresara´ a fondos comunes de la combinacion, sin perjuicio de obligarsele a
48Combinacio´n Salitrera (1891).
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paralizar la elaboracion por el tiempo que corresponda.
Art´ıculo 6: Los estatutos que por lo demas han de rejir la combinacion, sera´n acordados por
mayoria absoluta de votos en reunion jeneral, que se celebrara´ con los que asistan el dia que sen˜ale
el Consejo Directivo provisorio i en el local que e´ste determine, pre´vio aviso de quince dias que se
publicara en dos periodicos de Iquique. Los que no asistan a esa reunion por s´ı o por apoderado,
se obligan desde luego a someterse a los Estatutos que apruebe la mayor´ıa de los que concurran.
Art´ıculo 7: Los parecientes nombran a los sen˜ores J. Dawson, W. Patterson Roberson, F.G.
Lomax, P.G. Pascal, J. Vernal y B. Domı´nguez como propietarios y el sen˜or H.W. Sillem como
suplente, teniendo cada uno facultad para hacerse representar por un reemplazante, para que desde
luego compongan el Consejo Directivo provisorio de la combinacion, cuyas funciones durara´n hasta
que se elija el Consejo Directivo definitivo, una vez aprobados los estatutos. Se faculta a los
miembros del Consejo Provisorio para que conjunta y separadamente representen a todos y a cada
uno de los otorgantes judicial y extrajudicialmente, en todo lo que tenga por objeto hacer cumplir
las estipulaciones de este convenio; pudiendo delegar la representacio´n judicial, poner posiciones,
decir de nulidad, constituir compromisos, nombrar a´rbitros y arbitradores, percibir y transijir y
jurar de columnia, por s´ı o por el delegado.
Art´ıculo 8: Si alguno de los que concurren al presente convenio transfiriese por cualquiera
causa su derecho a la Oficina u´ oficinas que les corresponda, o la diese en arrendamiento, uso,
comodato, etc., o celebrase otro contrato semejante, debera´ en e´l estipular de una manera espresa,
con el nuevo adquiriente que e´ste respetara´ y cumplira´ las obligaciones del presente convenio. De
no hacerse as´ı, quedara´ aquel personalmente obligado.
Art´ıculo 9: Este convenio dejara´ de ser obligatorio desde el momento que la comision a que
se refiere el art´ıculo 10◦ comunique al Consejo Directivo que no ha podido llegar a un acuerdo
con las compan˜ias Agua Santa, Antofagasta, Banco Mobiliario y los sen˜ores Pedro Perfetti y Jose´
Devescovi; fija´ndose como plazo para este objeto hasta el 31 del presente mes.
Art´ıculo 10: Se nombrara´ una comision compuesta por los sen˜ores Pedro Pascal, E.W. Vincent,
Alfredo Quaest Faslem y F.G. Lomax, para que trate con los productores de salitre mencionados
en el art´ıculo anterior.
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Art´ıculo 11: Este convenio se reducira´ a escritura pu´blica una vez que se haya llegado a un
acuerdo con los productores a que se refiere el art´ıculo 9◦.
Pro´rroga de la Combinacio´n Salitrera49
Reconvienen en continuar i formar parte de la asociacion o combinacion salitrera que fue´ re-
ducida a´escritura pu´blica, el ocho de Julio de mil ochocientos noventa i uno, quedando ahora dicho
convenio constituido por las estipulaciones i cla´usulas que mas adelante se insertan i el cual rejira´
desde el primero de Enero de mil ochocientos noventa i tres hasta el treinta i uno de de Marzo de
mil ochocientos noventa i cuatro.
Art´ıculo 1: Cada uno de los firmantes de este convenio, en el cara´cter en que comparece o´
por la sociedad que representa, conviene con los demas otorgantes en no trabajar en sus respectivas
oficinas salitreras, desde el primero de Enero de mil ochocientos noventa i tres hasta el treinta i uno
de Marzo de mil ochocientos noventa i cuatro, sino en conformidad a´ las reglas i con las limitaciones
que siguen.
Primero: Durante la vijencia de este convenio i de acuerdo con sus estipulaciones, cada produc-
tor de salitre podra´ optar entre trabajar por tiempo, suspendiendo la elaboracio´n en algunos meses
del an˜o, o´ trabajar por cuota, limitando la produccio´n a´ una cantidad fija de quintales espan˜oles
de salitre.
Segundo: El Directorio o´ Consejo Directivo de la Combinacio´n fijara´ el nu´mero de meses
o´ tiempo en que no pueda elaborarse salitre en las Oficinas en que se trabaje por tiempo, en mil
ochocientos noventa i tres, i su fijacio´n se tendra´ desde luego como parte integrante de este convenio.
Cada productor por tiempo podra´ elejir los meses de elaboracio´n que le convenga, no excediendo del
nu´mero de los fijados por el Directorio, debiendo dar a´ este un aviso por escrito con anticipacion de
quince dias a´ lo menos, cada vez que principie o suspenda el trabajo, sin que puedan hacerse estas
operaciones sino el primero o´ el quince de cada mes. El productor por tiempo que no diese aviso
para el principio i continuacion de la elaboracio´n estara´ obligado a´ paralizar luego que se complete
el tiempo fijado por el Consejo para la elaboracio´n. Esta suspension no implica la extraccion i
49Combinacio´n Salitrera (1892).
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acumulacio´n de caliche u otras obras que no sean de elaboracio´n.
Tercero: Durante la vijencia de este convenio la elaboracion por cuota se fijara´ como sigue, i de
acuerdo con los datos de la misma combinacio´n, previamente comprobados.
1◦ Para el que hubiere trabajado por tiempo en el an˜o de mil ochocientos noventa i dos se tomara´
la cantiddad elaboro´ durante los seis meses de trabajo del mismo an˜o.
2◦ Para el que tiene cuota basada sobre el trabajo por tiempo de mil ochocientos noventa i uno
se tomara´ la cantidad que elaboro´ en ese an˜o, mas un diez por ciento; debiendo determinarse
la cuota por los datos de la misma Combinacio´n previamente comprobados. Esta cuota o´
nu´mero de quintales de salitre se entendera´ aumentada o´ disminuida en la proporcio´n que el
Directorio aumentare o´ disminuyere el nu´mero de meses o´ parte de un mes de elaboracio´n
para los productores por tiempo.
El productor por cuota no tendra´ derecho para elaborar en una so´la oficina, las cuotas de dos o´
mas. Unicamente podran variarse las bases establecidas en este inciso mediante el acuerdo una´nime
de todos los miembros de la Combinacio´n, sin perjuicio de lo establecido por el inciso segundo del
mismo art´ıculo.
Cuarto: La eleccion a´ que se refiere el pa´rrafo primero de e´ste art´ıculo debera hacerse, para
mil ochocientos noventa i tres, antes del treinta i uno de Marzo del mismo an˜o, por medio de una
carta dirijida i entregada al Directorio de la Combinacion; entendiendose que los que no llenen e´stos
requisitos optan definitivamente por la produccion por tiempo.
Quinto: Una vez elejido por el productor espresa o´ ta´citamente el sistema de cuotas o´ el de
tiempo, no podra´ hacer nueva eleccio´n. Pero el productor que hubiese trabajado por sistema de
cuotas durante el an˜o mil ochocientos noventa i dos, podra´ elejir el de tiempo para mil ochocientos
noventa i tres, i vice versa, siempre que la eleccion la haga antes del primero de Abril de mil
ochocientos noventa i tres. Para hacer uso de e´sta facultad, el que haya trabajado por cuota durante
el an˜o mil ochocientos noventa i dos, debera´ haber dado los avisos de paralizacion i de principio de
trabajo correspondientes a´ los tres meses anteriores al primero de Abril de mil ochocientos noventa
i tres.
Sesto: Los productores por cuota podra´n trabajar en la forma que mas le conviniese, sin ser
limitados a periodos sen˜alados anticipadamente.
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Art´ıculo 2: Los firmantes de este convenio pagaran al Consejo Directivo, hasta un centavo por
quintal espan˜ol de salitre embarcado, para que atienda a´ los gastos de propagacio´n de consumo del
salitre i a´ los que demanden el sostenimiento i la administracio´n de la Combinacio´n.
Art´ıculo 3: Cualquier productor por tiempo que elabore salitre en contravencion al presente
convenio o´ a´ los acuerdos que se tomen en conformidad a e´l, pagara´ una multa de mil a´ quince
mil pesos diarios, segun lo determine el Directorio en atencio´n a´ la importancia de la Oficina; i si
el infractor fuere productor por cuota, la multa sera´ de tres pesos por cada quintal espan˜ol que
elaborare en exceso sobre la cuota que le corresponda, todo lo cual se entiende sin perjuicio de
obligarles a´ cumplir el convenio. No obstante, si hubiere exceso en la elaboracio´n de una oficina que
trabaja por cuota no se impondra´ multa sino cuando el exceso sea mayor que un cinco por ciento de
la cuota correspondiente al an˜o. En el caso de un aumento dentro de e´ste l´ımite, se computara´ como
parte de la elaboracio´n del an˜o siguiente; i solamente entonces podra´ embarcarse. De igual manera,
si resultare deficit en la elaboracio´n, siempre que no pase de cinco por ciento con relacio´n a´ la
cuota corespondiente, habra´ derecho para elaborarlo en el an˜o siguiente. Las multas se impondra´n
por el Directorio, i su valor ingresara´ a´ los fondos comunes de la Combinacio´n, principalmente con
el objeto espresado en el art´ıculo precedente. Por toda otra infraccion en las estipulaciones del
convenio o´ de los acuerdos debidamente tomados por el Directorio o juntas jenerales, el infractor
estara´ obligado a´ una indemnizacio´n proporcionada a´ los perjuicios que su falta ocasionare a´ la
asociacion; i la falta como tambien la cantidad que por ella haya de satisfacerse, sera´ resuelta en
un arbitraje de amigable composicion constituida en conformidad con las reglas establecidas en el
reglamento.
Art´ıculo 4: Si alguno de los que concurren al presente convenio trafiriese por cualquiera causa
su derecho a´ a Oficina u´ oficinas que le corresponda o´ le diese en arrendamiento, uso, comodato,
etce´tera, o´ celebrase otro contrato semejante, debera´ en e´l estipular de una manera espresa, con
el nuevo adquiriente, que este respetara´ i cumplira´ las obligaciones del presente convenio. De no
hacerse as´ı quedara´ aquel personalmente obligado.
Art´ıculo 5: Forman tambie´n parte integrante de este convenio el reglamento que mas adelante
se inserta i los acuerdos que celebre el Directorio o´ Consejo Directivo, como los que se tomen en
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juntas jenerales, siempre que unos i otros esten conformes con las estipulaciones de esta escritura i
reunan la mayor´ıa de votos convenida.
Nitrate Cartel Agreement50
The undersigned, all nitrate producers, agree to be part of a nitrate cartel, for a term of two
years, starting from January 1, 1891, in accordance with the following stipulations:
Article 1: Each one of the signatories agree to operate in their respective plants for seven
months in the year 1891 and, at the same time they commit to completely suspend the production
in the same year according to the following rules:
Each producer will be able to choose the seven months of production that are more convenient to
him, giving advance notice of at least fifteen day to the board of the cartel each time that production
is resumed or suspended; The only days when it will be possible to change the operational status
of a plant will be the 1 and the 15 of each month. The producer that does not select in this manner
seven months of production, will have to stop working during the last five months of the year.
Article 2: The number of months each plant will be able to have active production during
1892 will be set by the cartel board and, subject to that decision, each producer will be able to
choose his months of operation in the same manner outlined in article 1.
Article 3: The suspension of operations refers only to the refining of nitrate. Thus, extraction
and accumulation of nitrate ore is allowed during the shutdown period.
Article 4: The signatories of this agreement will pay to the cartel board the fees that the
board deems necessary to promote the consumption of nitrate and to pay for the expenses caused
by the administration of this agreement. This fee will no exceed half a cent per Spanish quintal of
exports.
Article 5: Any producer that produces nitrate outside of the periods when he is authorized
according to this agreement will pay a fine for each day of excess production whose amount will be
set in the statutes. These fines will enter a common fund of the cartel and the producer will have
50Translated by author from Combinacio´n Salitrera (1891).
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to suspend production to compensate for the unduly time of work of his plant.
Article 6: The statutes that are to rule the cartel will be approved by absolute majority of
votes in a general meeting that will be celebrated on a day and location chosen by the provisional
cartel, after a fifteen days notice that will be published in two Iquique newspapers. Producers that
do not attend the meeting will have to accept the statutes that are agreed upon the assistants.
Article 7: The signatories name the Misters J. Dawson, W. Patterson Roberson, F.G. Lomax,
P.G. Pascal, J. Vernal y B. Domı´nguez as owners and Mister H.W. Sillem as alternate, having each
one of them the ability to be represented by a substitute, to compose the provisional cartel board
whose functions will last until the election of a definitive cartel board once the statutes have been
approved. The members of the provisional cartel board will have, jointly and separately, ample
powers of legal and administrative representation.
Article 8: In the event of transferring for any reason or in any form their rights on the plant or
plants they produce, or to give them in lease, use, loan, or to celebrate any other similar contract,
the signatories of this agreement are expressly obligated to clearly stipulate with the new owner
that he will inherit all the obligations originated on this agreement and to produce the export
quota corresponding to each plant in the same plant. In contrary case the original owner will be
personally liable.
Article 9: This agreement will stop being valid in the moment the commission refereed to
in article 10 communicates the board that the negotiations with the companies: Agua Santa,
Antofagasta, Banco Mobiliario and the Misters Pedro Perfetti and Jose Devescovi. The deadline
for achieving this objective will the 31 of the present month [January].
Article 10: A commission composed by the Misters Pedro Pascal, E.W. Vincent, Alfredo
Quaest Faslem y F.G. Lomax will be tasked with negotiating with the companies mentioned in
article 9.
Article 11: This agreement will be transferred to a public deed as soon as a consensus has
been reached with the firms mentioned in article 9.
131
Appendix 2.E Third Cartel Contract
Convenio de la Combinacio´n Salitrera51
Art´ıculo 1: Los que suscriben convienen en no exportar ni elaborar Salitre de la Oficina u´
[sic] Oficinas que actualmente poseen o´ explotan y de las que poseyeren o´ explotaren despue´s de
esta fecha y durante la vigencia del presente Convenio, sino en la cantidad o´ cuota anual que le
corresponda a´ cada Oficina en conformidad a´ las reglas y con las limitaciones que a´ continuacio´n
se expresan.
Art´ıculo 2: El presente Convenio regira´ desde el 1◦ de Enero de 1896 hasta el 31 de Marzo
de 1899, pero si ninguno de los Asociados, diese aviso por escrito al Gerente de la Asociacio´n,
antes de seis meses de su te´rmino, que desea retirarse, continuara´ en vigencia por otro an˜o y as´ı,
sucesivamente, hasta que se cumpla esa condicio´n y as´ı lo acordase la mayor´ıa de las tres cuartas
partes de los Asociados en Junta General convocada especialmente para ese fin.
Art´ıculo 3: Tanto la fijacio´n y distribucio´n, como las modificaciones en las cuotas que corre-
spondan anualmente a´ cada Oficina, sera´n establecidas por el Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera
de Propaganda con sujecio´n a´ las prescripciones de este Convenio; y la cifra que se sen˜ale a´ cada
Productor se tendra´ como parte integrante del mismo Convenio.
Art´ıculo 4: Se conviene con todos los Productores en que la exportacio´n desde el 1◦ de Abril
de 1895 hasta el 31 de Marzo de 1897 no excedera´ de 49.000.000 de quintales espan˜oles; pero en el
caso de que el precio del Salitre en la Costa suba a´ ma´s de 6 chelines por quintal espan˜ol, ley de
95 por ciento, el Directorio queda facultado para aumentar la exportacio´n del segundo an˜o en la
cantidad que juzgare conveniente.
Sera´ atribucio´n exclusiva de dicho Directorio fijar la exportacio´n en los an˜os siguientes y modificarla
segu´n las circunstancias del mercado, pero en ningu´n caso podra´ limitarla a´ menos de 23.500.000
quintales espan˜oles en cada an˜o.
El Directorio fijara´ la cantidad de la exportacio´n de cada an˜o a´ ma´s tardar en el primer trimestre,
esto es, entre el 1◦ de Abril y 30 de Junio y las modificaciones que acordare antes del 30 de
51NPA (1896a).
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Septiembre.
Art´ıculo 5: Se tomara´ como base para las cuotas de embarque de cada Oficina la cifra que
se acuerde para la exportacio´n del an˜o, de conformidad con el art´ıculo anterior; y el Directorio
distribuira´ anualmente esa cantidad entre todos los Productores segu´n las reglas siguientes:
A. Las Oficinas que hayan elaborado los doce meses comprendidos entre el 1◦ de Julio de 1894
y el 1◦ de Julio de 1895 podra´n tener en el primer an˜o la cuota proporcional por sus embar-
ques efectivos hechos durante ese mismo per´ıodo, segu´n total comprobado por la Asociacio´n
Salitrera de Propaganda.
Las Oficinas que no se conformasen con la cuota que les correspondiere por este inciso tendra´n
derecho a´ que se les fije la que resultare despue´s de someterse al per´ıodo de prueba de la que
habla el insciso siguiente.
B. Las Oficinas que no hayan trabajado durante todo el per´ıodo antedicho o´ que hayan comen-
zado a´ elaborar despue´s, pero antes del 1◦ de Enero de 1896, tendra´n en el primer an˜o la cuota
que les corresponda por la produccio´n calculada en un per´ıodo de prueba de 90 d´ıas cont´ınuos
de trabajo, debiendo paralizar despue´s dos meses seguidos para verificar las existencias.
Este te´rmino de prueba puede ser escogido dentro del per´ıodo de seis meses comprendido
entre el 1◦ de Octubre de 1895 y el 1◦ de Abril de 1896, de modo que dicho te´rmino de prueba
debera´ terminar para todas las Oficinas, a´ ma´s tardar, el 30 de Junio de 1896.
Es entendido que el te´rmino de prueba a´ que se someta cualquiera Oficina, sea de las compren-
didas en este art´ıculo o´ en otro de este Convenio, se contara´ de fecha a´ fecha, d´ıas seguidos,
sin lugar a reclamos por interrupciones en la elaboracio´n, salvo que e´sta deba suspenderse
por causas de fuerza mayor, cuya calificacio´n correspondera´ al Directorio.
Para establecer la cifra de produccio´n y la cuota de embarque a´ que tendra´n derecho se pro-
cedera´ como sigue:
Antes y despue´s de la prueba, el Directorio, por medio de Inspectores, tomara´ razo´n de las
existencias de Salitre en esta forma:
Antes de la prueba:
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Existencia a´ bordo de buques a´ la carga.
Existencia en bodega en puerto.
Existencia en camino al puerto.
Existencia en canchas y bateas.
Despue´s de la prueba:
Cantidad embarcada en los cinco meses.
Cantidad adicional a´ la anterior sobre la cual se ha pagado flete por ferrocarril.
Cantidad en camino al puerto.
Cantidad en canchas y bateas.
Cantidad gastada en el consu´mo de la Oficina.
Deducida la partida “Antes de la prueba” de la que resulte “Despue´s de la prueba”, la cantidad
que quede sera´ la elaboracio´n total de los 90 d´ıas y, descontando de e´sta la duode´cima parte,
se tendra´ la produccio´n neta o´ efectiva para servir de base a´ la fijacio´n de la cuota anual.
(Ejemplo: Supo´ngase que en los 90 d´ıas resultaran 400.000. Deducida la duode´cima parte,
33.334, quedan 366.666 o´ sea 1.466.664 de produccio´n anual; por consiguiente, la cuota de
embarque sera´ la proporcional entre esa suma y la que se fije para la exportacio´n del an˜o.)
C. Las Oficinas que comiencen a´ elaborar despue´s del 1◦ de Enero de 1896 debera´n someterse a´
un te´rmino de prueba de 90 d´ıas cont´ınuos a´ contar desde dos meses despue´s de la fecha en
que principien a´ trabajar; y para fijar la cifra de su produccio´n y la cuota de sus embarques
en el primer an˜o, se procedera´ como queda determinado en el inciso anterior.
D. Las Oficinas cuyos embarques totales en los doce meses comprendidos desde el d´ıa 1◦ de Julio
de 1894 hasta el 1◦ de Julio de 1895 han sido menores de 100.000 quintales espan˜oles, tendra´n
una cuota igual a´ la cantidad embarcada.
Las que en el mismo per´ıodo han embarcado ma´s de 100.000 quintales espan˜oles y menos de
150.000 tendra´n una cuota igual a´ la cantidad embarcada rebajada en el 50 por ciento de la
reduccio´n general.
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Y las que en el igual per´ıodo antedicho embarcaron ma´s de 150.000 y menos de 200.000, su
cuota sera´ la cantidad embarcada reducida en un 75 por ciento de la reduccio´n general.
Las cuotas de estas Oficinas en los an˜os siguientes sera´n fijadas de acuerdo con lo establecido
en este inciso y con relacio´n a´ lo embarcado en el an˜o anterior.
E. Las Oficinas que por sus contratos actualmente vigentes con el ferrocarril estan obligadas
a´ bajar una cantidad mı´nima de salitre y las que se hallan en condiciones tales que les
impiden formar parte del Convenio, segu´n sus estipulaciones generales, tendra´n la cuota que
les acuerde el Directorio por el voto una´nime de todos sus miembros. A este efecto cada
uno de los firmantes del presente Convenio faculta ampliamente al Directorio para fijar dicha
cuota y arreglar las bases de la adhesion de ellas por convenios especiales.
F. Las Oficinas que hagan mejoras que aumenten el poder productivo de sus ma´quinas o´ adquiriesen
nuevos terrenos tendra´n derecho a´ exigir que se constate la mayor produccio´n, sujeta´ndose
al mismo per´ıodo de prueba de que habla el inciso B de este art´ıculo, y a´ que se aumente en
proporcio´n la cuota que podr´ıa corresponderles.
Art´ıculo 6: Ninguna Oficina podra´ elaborar en caso alguno ma´s de quince por ciento en exceso
de la cuota de embarque que le haya correspondido en cada an˜o; y este exceso debera´ quedar en la
Costa como existencias de la respectiva Oficina para el an˜o siguiente.
Art´ıculo 7: Toda Oficina esta´ obligada a´ someterse a´ un nuevo te´rmino de prueba despue´s de
cada dos an˜os de trabajo, a´ contar desde el 1◦ de Enero de 1896 y las cuotas sera´n rectificadas de
conformidad con el resultado de cada nueva prueba.
Art´ıculo 8: El productor que es actualmente duen˜o de varias Oficinas no podra´ elaborar en
cualesquiera de ellas la cuota de una o´ de todas sus dema´s Oficinas, sino la de aquella en que haya
elaborado despue´s del 1◦ de Enero 1894; y perdera´ este derecho si la ma´quina de la Oficina que
paralice sufre despue´s cualquier modificacio´n que disminuya el poder productivo que ten´ıa cuando
dejo´ de elaborar y si no suspende en absoluto la extraccio´n de caliche desde el momento mismo
en que decida hacer uso de esta facultad que le otorga este inciso, segu´n aviso que debera´ dar por
escrito al Gerente de la Asociacio´n.
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La Oficina que paralice a´ virtud del inciso anterior debera´ comenzar la nueva prueba de que habla
el art´ıculo 7◦, a´ ma´s tardar, el 1◦ de Marzo del an˜o que corresponda.
Art´ıculo 9: Cualquier productor que exporte o´ elabore en exceso de la cuota anual que le
corresponda por los art´ıculos 5◦ y 6◦ de este Convenio pagara´ una multa que impondra´ el Directorio
de la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda de tres pesos mı´nimum por cada quintal espan˜ol de exceso
y su valor ingresara´ a los fondos comunes de este mismo Convenio.
Sin embargo, no habra´ lugar a´ multa si el exceso no es mayor de 2.5 por ciento de la cuota
correspondiente al an˜o, pero este aumento se descontara´ de la cuota del an˜o siguiente.
Art´ıculo 10: Queda autorizado el mismo Directorio para nombrar los Inspectores que creyere
necesarios y asignarles sueldos convenientes.
Los firmantes de este Convenio tendra´n la obligacio´n de dar a dichos Inspectores libre acceso a´ sus
Oficinas a´ cualquier hora y con todas las facilidades posibles para el debido cumplimiento de su
misio´n.
Los Inspectores ejercera´n sus funciones de conformidad con el Reglamento que dictara´ el expresado
Directorio.
Art´ıculo 11: Para los gastos que origine este Convenio los Asociados se comprometen a´ pagar
una contribucio´n especial que no excedera´ de tres octavos de centavo por quintal espan˜ol esportado
y sera´ cobrada mes a´ mes por la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda.
Art´ıculo 12: En caso que cualquier productor nuevo haya principiado a´ elaborar sin haber
dado previamente su entera adhesio´n a´ este Convenio, el Directorio tendra´ la facultad de declarar
desahuciado el Convenio por la mayor´ıa absoluta de todos sus miembros.
Art´ıculo 13: En caso que cualquiera de los firmantes transferiese por cualquier motivo o´ en
cualquier forma sus derechos en la Oficina u´ Oficinas en que elabora o´ la diese en arrendamiento,
uso, comodato o´ celebrase otro contrato semejante, debera´ en e´l expresar claramente con el nuevo
adquirente que e´ste se obliga a cumplir las obligaciones de este Convenio y a trabajar la cuota que
le correponda a´ cada Oficina en la misma Oficina. En caso contrario quedara´ aquel personalmente
responsable.
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Art´ıculo 14: Toda divergencia sobre infraccion de las estipulaciones de este Convenio y toda
otra dificultad cuya resolucio´n no estuviese prevista en e´l sera´ resuelta en arbitraje de amigable
composicio´n constituido en conformidad de las reglas que establecen los Estatutos de la Asociacio´n
Salitrera de Propaganda.
Nitrate Cartel Agreement52
Article 1: The subscribers agree not to export or produce nitrate from the plant or plants
they currently own or exploit, and from those they will own and exploit after this date and during
the term of this agreement, but in the amount and annual quota that to each is allocated according
to the the rules detailed below.
Article 2: The present agreement will be valid from January 1, 1896 to March 31, 1899, but if
none of the signatories declares in writing his desire to withdraw from the agreement in six months
period before right before its conclusion, the agreement will be extended for an additional year.
After this extension, the agreement could be likewise extended indefinitely for one year increments
every time, if no notice of the type described above is given and three quarters of the signatories
reunited in a special general meeting approve it.
Article 3: The export quotas of every plant will be set, allocated, and modified by the Nitrate
Propaganda Association [NPA] board according to the rules of this agreement, and the quota that
will be allocated to each producer will be considered as an integral part of this contract.
Article 4: It is agreed by all signatories that the industry export from April 1 1895 to March
31 1897 will not exceed 49,000,000 Spanish quintals. However, in the case that the nitrate price
in the Nitrate Coast surpasses 6 shillings per Spanish quintal of 95 percent purity, the NPA board
will have the power to increase the amount to be exported during the second year in the quantity
that it deemed convenient.
The total export on each nitrate year of the agreement will be set by the board which is also
authorized to modify it as a function of market conditions, as along as it is never smaller than
23,000,000 Spanish quintals.
Total exports on each nitrate year during the duration of this agreement will be determined by the
52Translated by author from NPA (1896a).
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board and notified to the producers during the first quarter, this is, between April 1 and June 30.
Any modifications to the total exports figure will be communicated before September 30.
Article 5: To obtain the export quotas of all the plants in the agreement, the annual industry
exports figure will be allocated to the producers according to the following rules:
A. Plants that have operated in the twelve months between July 1 of 1894 and July 1 1895 may
choose to have during the first year of the agreement an export quota proportional to their
shipments made during the same period, according to total verified by the NPA.
The plants that are not satisfied with the quota they would obtain in this manner, will have
the right to obtain a different export quota by using the trial period described in the next
subsection.
B. Plants that not have operated during the entirety of the period described above or that
started operations afterwards but before January 1 1896, will have during the first year an
export quota based on a trial period of 90 continuous working days, having to completely
stop production for two consecutive months so that their nitrate stocks are verified.
When the trial period will be, can be chosen by each firm within the six months period be-
tween October 1 1895 and April 1 1896, so that the trial periods for every plant has concluded
by June 30 1896.
The trial period for all plants, be those included in this article or in any other article of this
agreement, will be counted using consecutive days without any kind of exceptions for inter-
ruptions in the production unless reasons of force majeure, which will be qualified exclusively
by the NPA board.
To compute the production figure and the export quota the procedure will be the following:
Before and after the trial period, the board through its inspectors will verify the nitrate stocks:
Before the trial period:
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Stocks on board of cargo ships being loaded.
Stocks in warehouses at the port.
Stocks on the way to the port.
Stocks in crystallizing tanks and drying floors.
After the trial period:
Nitrate production shipped during the five months.
Production (in addition to the shipped quantity) for which the railroad fee has already
been paid.
Stocks on the way to the port.
Stocks in crystallizing tanks and drying floors.
Nitrate production used as input in the plant itself.
Deducting from the “After the trial” the “Before the trial” number it is obtained the total
production during the trial period. Discounting from this last number the twelfth part, the
resulting figure will be the effective or net production that will be used to compute the export
quota of the plant.
(Example: suppose that the resulting number for the 90 days was 400,000. Deducting the
twelfth part, 33,334, the resulting figure is 366,666 or 1,466,664 of estimated annual produc-
tion; therefore the the export quota of this plant will be the ratio between this last figure and
the total industry exports for the year.)
C. Plants that start operations after January 1 1896 will be subject to a trial period of 90 days
continuous no later than two months after the date when they began operating. Its annual
production and export quota will be determined using the rules described in the previous
subsection.
D. Plants whose total shipments in the twelve months between July 1, 1894 and July 1, 1895
were smaller than 100,000 Spanish quintals will have an export quota equal to the quantity
shipped.
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Similarly, plants whose total shipments in the same period were between 100,000 and 150,000
Spanish quintals will have an export quota equal to the quantity shipped minus a deduction
equivalent to 50 per cent of the general reduction.
Finally, plants whose total shipments in the same period were between 150,000 and 200,000
Spanish quintals will have an export quota equal to the quantity shipped minus a deduction
equivalent to 75 per cent of the general reduction.
The quotas of these plants will be set in subsequent years according to the rules on this article
and in relation to the quantity shipped in the previous year.
E. Those plants whose currently valid contracts with the railroad force them to ship a minimum
amount of nitrate, and those whose current circumstances prevent to join the cartel under
its general rules, will have an export quota agreed upon the NPA board by unanimous vote
of all of its members. To this effect, each of the signatories agree to empower the board to
set those quotas and to arrange the incorporation of these firms to the cartel using special
agreements.
F. Plants that during the term of this agreement make investments in their refining facility or
purchase new nitrate lands, will have the right to request a trial period, with the same char-
acteristics as the one described in subsection B, to verify their increased annual production
and to obtain a proportional increase on its export quota.
Article 6: Plants will not produce more than 15% in excess of their export quota in any nitrate
year. Any production above the effective export quota of the plant will be exported in the following
nitrate year.
Article 7: Starting on January 1, 1896, all plants will be forced to have a new trial period
every two years of operations, and the export quotas will be rectified according to the results of
each test.
Article 8: A producer who owns several plants will be able to produce their quotas in any of
them, as long as the recipient plant has been operative after January 1, 1894. However, he will
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lose this benefit if the refining facility of the plant that shutdowns suffers any reduction on its
production capacity or if the extraction of nitrate ore is not completely stopped from the moment
on which it decides to transfer its quota, by giving notice in writing to the manager of the NPA.
The plant that shutdowns as part of the previous subsection must start the new trial period
described in article 7 on March 1 of the respective year, at the latest.
Article 9: Any producer who exports or produces in excess of his annual quotas determined
according to articles 5 and 6 of this agreement will pay a fine that will be determined by the NPA
board, of a minimum of 3 Chilean pesos for each Spanish quintal of excess which will enter the
common funds of the cartel.
The fine will be waived if the excess is not greater than 2 1/2% of the export quota of the respective
year, but the excess exports will be deducted from the quota of the following nitrate year.
Article 10: The NPA board of directors is authorized to hire inspectors when it deems neces-
sary and to assign them the salaries it deems appropriate.
The signatories of this agreement will be bound to give inspectors free access to their plants at any
time and to provide any additional information they may require for the proper fulfillment of their
mission.
The inspectors will perform their duties according to the regulations issues by the board of directors.
Article 11: For the expenses caused by this agreement, the associates commit to pay a special
fee, which will not exceed three eighths of a cent per Spanish quintal exported and will be charged
month by month by the Nitrate Propaganda Association.
Article 12: If any new producer starts operating without first declaring his full adhesion to
this agreement, the board may declare the present agreement terminated by the absolute majority
of its members
Article 13: In the event of transferring for any reason or in any form their rights on the plant
or plants they produce, or to give them in lease, use, loan, or to celebrate any other similar contract,
the signatories of this agreement are expressly obligated to clearly stipulate with the new owner
that he will inherit all the obligations originated on this agreement and to produce the export
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quota corresponding to each plant in the same plant. In contrary case the original owner will be
personally liable.
Article 14: Any disagreement over any potential infringements of the clauses of this agreement
and any other conflicts over issues not explicitly contained within this agreements will be resolved
in friendly arbitration by mediators appointed in conformity to the rules established by the Nitrate
Propaganda Association Statutes.
Appendix 2.F Fourth Cartel Contract
Escrituras Pu´blicas de la Combinacio´n Salitrera de 1901 a 190653
Art´ıculo 1: Los que suscriben convienen en no exportar ni elaborar salitre de los terrenos que
actualmente poseen o´ explotan y de los que poseyeren y explotaren despue´s de esta fecha y durante
la vigencia de este Convenio, sino en la cantidad y cuota anual que, con sujecio´n a´ [sic] las reglas
que se expresara´n a´ continuacio´n, fijara´ el Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda.
El Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda lo sera´ a´ la vez de la Combinacio´n Salitrera
establecida por el presente Convenio en virtud de lo autorizado en el inciso IV del art´ıculo 2◦ de
los Estatutos de esa Asociacio´n.
Dicho Directorio debera´ ser nombrado anualmente, procedie´ndose a´ su eleccio´n conforme al art´ıculo
9◦ de los Estatutos mencionados y debiendo tener lugar la primera eleccio´n en la primera Junta
General ordinaria de la Asociacio´n Salitrera.
Art´ıculo 2: El presente Convenio regira´ por cinco an˜os forzosos desde el 1◦ de Abril de 1901
hasta el 31 de Marzo de 1906, salvo lo dispuesto en lo nu´meros 5◦ y 6◦ del art´ıculo 12.
Art´ıculo 3: La exportacio´n total del primer an˜o salitrero sera´ la que sen˜ala el cuadro general
de que se habla en el art´ıculo 6◦.
La exportacio´n total en cada uno de los an˜os salitreros siguientes sera´ fijada por el Directorio
y avisada a´ los productores a´ ma´s tardar el 15 de Mayo de cada an˜o; sin embargo podra´ ser
modificada, a´ ma´s tardar, en la primera semana de Julio de cada an˜o, si as´ı lo acuerda un nu´mero
53NPA (1900).
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de asociados que represente a´ lo menos el sesenta y cinco por ciento (65%) del total de las cuotas
de las Oficinas segu´n el cuadro mencionado en los art´ıculos 6◦ y 7◦, debiendo el Directorio convocar
a´ Junta General extraordinaria con ese fin.
Art´ıculo 4: La exportacio´n de cada an˜o salitrero siguiente al primero de este Convenio no
podra´ fijarla el Directorio en cantidad menor que la del consumo total en los doce u´ltimos meses
comprendidos entre el 1◦ de Mayo y 30 de Abril.
Art´ıculo 5: El Directorio tendra´ la facultad para fijar, a´ ma´s tardar, el 15 de Mayo de cada
an˜o la proporcio´n de lo que convenga exportar en los nueve meses de Abril a´ Diciembre a´ partir
desde el de 1901, pero no podra´ reducirla a´ menos del 75% de la exportacio´n total del an˜o salitrero
respectivo.
Art´ıculo 6: La cuota anual de exportacio´n que corresponde a´ cada Oficina en el primer an˜o de
este Convenio sera´ asignada en el cuadro general de todas las Oficinas que se suscribira´ en escritura
pu´blica adicional, la cual sera´ considerada como parte integrante de este mismo Convenio.
Art´ıculo 7: Dicho cuadro servira´ de base para la fijacio´n de las cuotas de exportacio´n a´ cada
una de las Oficinas en los cuatro an˜os siguientes de este Convenio, salvo las modificaciones que
u´nicamente pueden introducirse en e´l por la construccio´n de nuevas ma´quinas o´ por el ingreso de
nuevos productores conforme a´ lo dispuesto en el segundo pa´rrafo del art´ıculo 10 y a´ lo prescrito
en los art´ıculos 11 y 12.
Art´ıculo 8: Tanto la fijacio´n y distribucio´n, como las modificaciones en las cuotas que, con-
forme al cuadro de que hablan los dos articulos anteriores, corresponda anualmente a´ cada Oficina,
sera´n sen˜aladas por el Directorio.
La relacio´n ente cada cuota y el total que suma el cuadro de que habla el art´ıculo anterior da [sic]
el porcentaje que corresponde a´ todas y cada una de las Oficinas, sin excepcio´n, en la cifra de la
exportacio´n general fijada conforme a´ los art´ıculos 3◦ y 4◦. (Ejemplo: Si la cuota de una Oficina
es de 500.000 y el total del cuadro es 30.000.000, esa Oficina tendra´ el 1.6666% como cuota en la
exportacio´n que se fije.)
Art´ıculo 9: No se concedera´ durante la vigencia de este Convenio aumento de cuotas por
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mejoras o´ aumento de ma´quina, ni por mejora en la ley de los caliches, ni por la elaboracio´n de
nuevos terrenos en la ma´quina o´ ma´quinas existentes, ni por construccio´n de nuevas ma´quinas en
terrenos que sean propiedad de un productor al tiempo de firmar este Convenio y que hayan sido
consideradas parte integrante de la Oficina al asignarse la cuota de la Oficina.
Durante la vigencia de este Convenio sera´ prohibido en absoluto disminuir el nu´mero y cubicaje de
los cachuchos, bateas y calderos de la ma´quina que exist´ıa al asignarse la cuota de la Oficina.
Art´ıculo 10: El productor asociado que durante la vigencia de este Convenio adquiriese ter-
renos de persona que no forma parte de la Combinacio´n y quisiera trabajarlos en una de sus Oficinas
no tiene derecho para pedir nueva o´ mayor cuota para la misma Oficina.
Si dicho productor construye ma´quina en terreno no considerado en la cuota de que goza, la de la
nueva ma´quina se fijara´ como lo determina el art´ıculo 11, pero so´lo comenzara´ a´ regir desde el mes
siguiente al en que se compruebe que la ma´quina esta´ conclu´ıda [sic] definitivamente. El salitre que
haya elaborado hasta ahora formara´ parte de la cuota.
Art´ıculo 11: En el caso contemplado en el art´ıculo anterior la cuota de exportacio´n de la
Oficina sera´ establecida por una comisio´n de tres salitreros pra´cticos nombrados por el Directorio,
los que no procedera´n a´ la apreciacio´n sin exigir previamente del productor que sen˜ale el terreno
que va a´ explotar.
Si el productor no acepta la cuota dentro de quince dias, e´sta sera´ fijada por un tribunal arbitral
compuesto de peritos salitreros nombrados uno por cada parte, los que de comu´n acuerdo designara´n
un tercero de igual categor´ıa para que, en caso de discordia, e´ste falle en u´ltima instancia sin ulterior
reclamo de ninguna clase. Los peritos nombrados quedara´n obligados a´ presentar su fallo dentro
de quince d´ıas, a´ ma´s tardar, de recibir los datos.
Art´ıculo 12: El Directorio tendra´ la facultad de hacer arreglos con los productores nuevos que
instalen Oficinas despue´s de entrar en vigencia este Convenio, bajo las siguientes bases:
1◦ Cuando segu´n el estado de adelanto de la construccio´n de la maquinaria lo juzgue conveniente,
el Directorio nombrara´ una comisio´n compuesta de tres salitreros pra´cticos para que, en vista
de los planos de la ma´quina, la parte ya instalada, estudio de los terrenos, etc., determine la
cuota de exportacio´n aproximada que debe sen˜alarse a´ la nueva Oficina.
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2◦ Si el productor nuevo declara su entera adhesio´n al presente Convenio y acepta dicha cuota,
quedara´ e´sta [sic] como definitiva si la ma´quina ha sido concluida a´ juicio de la misma comisio´n
u´ [sic] otra en su defecto, nombrada tambie´n por el Directorio, con arreglo a´ los planos
estudiados previamente.
3◦ Si el productor nuevo declara su entera adhesio´n al presente Convenio y no acepta dicha cuota
dentro de los quince d´ıas de habe´rsela comunicado en carta certificada, se sometera´ la cuota a´
arbitraje constituido conforme al art´ıculo 11, una vez concluida la maquinaria de la Oficina.
4◦ La cuota del productor nuevo comenzara´ a´ regir desde el mes siguiente al en que se compruebe
por la comisio´n del inciso 2◦ que la ma´quina esta´ terminada definitivamente. El salitre que
se haya elaborado hasta entonces formara´ parte de su cuota.
5◦ Si el productor nuevo se niega a´ declarar su entera adhesio´n al presente Convenio y a´ aceptar
la cuota o´ el arbitraje dentro de los quince d´ıas de habe´rsele comunicado en carta certificada
la cuota sen˜alada por la comisio´n, el Directorio podra´ declarar desahuaciado el presente
Convenio por la mayor´ıa absoluta de todos sus miembros, previa consulta de los Asociados
en Junta General convocada al efecto.
6◦ Si el productor nuevo se negara a´ entrar en arreglos o´ permitir las funciones de la comisio´n
pericial, el Directorio, previa las formalidades prescritas en el inciso 5◦ anterior, podra´ declarar
desahuciado este Convenio por la mayor´ıa absoluta de todos sus miembros.
Art´ıculo 13: La Oficina que no elabora su cuota o´ parte de ella en el primer an˜o salitrero pierde
todo derecho de elaborar la cuota de ese an˜o o´ esa parte en el an˜o siguiente y as´ı sucesivamente.
Sin embargo, el productor propietario de varias Oficinas podra´ trabajar la cuota que les corresponde
en cualquiera de ellas bajo la condicio´n de que ninguna de las Oficinas produzca mayor cantidad
que la del total de su cuota en los an˜os de vigencia de este Convenio. Para hacer uso de esta
facultad, el productor debera´ dar aviso por escrito al Gerente de la Asociacio´n, a´ ma´s tardar, el
1◦ de Abril de cada an˜o, de la forma como [sic] distribuira´ el trabajo de sus cuotas en sus diversas
oficinas.
Asimismo, las Oficinas con cuotas anuales de 90,000 quintales o menos podra´n acumular sus cuotas
de dos o´ ma´s an˜os. Para hacer uso de esta concesio´n el productor debera´ declarar por escrito al
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Gerente de la Asociacio´n, a´ ma´s tardar el 30 de Junio de cada an˜o, si opta por trabajar en el an˜o
o´ acumular para el siguiente. En los an˜os que tengan dos o´ ma´s cuotas acumuladas y que opte por
trabajar, debera´ expresar adema´s el total de cuotas que elaborara´ en el an˜o salitrero respectivo.
Tanto en el caso del productor propietario de varias Oficinas que trabaje la cuota de una de ellas
en otra, como en el caso de las Oficinas con cuotas acumuladas, no habra´ derecho a´ elaborar en
el an˜o siguiente la parte de cuota dejada de producir en el an˜o que haya expresado la declaracio´n
dada por el productor en cumplimiento de lo prescrito en los dos incisos anteriores.
Art´ıculo 14: La Oficina que no exporte ı´ntegramente su cuota en el an˜o salitrero podra´
embarcar el saldo en el an˜o siguiente, pero so´lo en el caso que lo haya elaborado en el an˜o anterior.
Art´ıculo 15: Ningu´n productor podra´ elaborar en caso alguno en el an˜o salitrero ma´s de 15%
en exceso de su cuota anual de exportacio´n, sin incurrir en una multa de seis peniques esterlinos
por cada quintal espan˜ol de exceso.
Tanto dicho 15%, como lo producido de ma´s, no podra´n exportarse en dicho an˜o y se computara´n
como parte de la cuota del an˜o salitrero siguiente. El salitre usado para po´lvora y consumo propio
de la Oficina no forma parte de dicho 15%.
Art´ıculo 16: Cualquier productor que exporte en exceso de la cuota anual que le corresponde
pagara´ una multa de diez y ocho peniques esterlinos por cada quintal espan˜ol de exceso, y la
cantidad exportada de ma´s se le descontara´ de la cuota del an˜o salitrero siguiente.
Sin embargo, si el exceso no es mayor del 2.5% de la cuota de exportacio´n podra´ saldarse, sin
incurrir en multa, por traspaso de otra Oficina que haya producido el salitre dentro de su propia
cuota y no lo haya exportado, debiendo dicho transpaso ser indicado a´ la Gerencia de la Asociacio´n
de comu´n acuerdo entre los interesados. Las multas expresadas en este art´ıculo y el anterior sera´n
impuestas por el Directorio y sus valores ingresara´n a´ los fondos comunes de la Combinacio´n.
Art´ıculo 17: El Directorio nombrara´ comisiones que verificara´n las existencia de salitre tanto
en las Oficinas como en camino y en los puertos al fin de cada an˜o salitrero.
Queda autorizado el Directorio para nombrar Inspectores cuando lo creyera necesario y asignarles
los sueldos que estime conveniente. Los firmantes de este Convenio tendra´n la obligacio´n de dar a´
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dichas comisiones e Inspectores libre acceso a´ sus Oficinas con todas las facilidades posibles para el
debido cumplimiento de su misio´n.
Los Inspectores ejercera´n sus funciones de conformidad con el reglamento que dictara´ el Directorio.
Art´ıculo 18: Tanto los acuerdos de las Juntas Generales como las proposiciones que el Direc-
torio someta a´ la aprobacio´n de los productores, sera´n obligatorios para todos los miembros de la
Combinacio´n, siempre que sean aceptados por un nu´mero de Asociados que represente, a´ lo menos,
el 80% del total de las cuotas de las Oficinas, segu´n el cuadro mencionado en los art´ıculos 6◦ y 7◦.
Art´ıculo 19: Para los gastos que origine este Convenio, los Asociados se comprometen a´ pagar
una contribucio´n especial que no excedera´ de un cuarto de centavo por quintal espan˜ol exportado
y sera´ cobrada mes a´ mes por la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda.
Art´ıculo 20: Los firmantes de este Convenio se obligan expresamente, en el evento de transferir
por cualquier motivo o´ en cualquier forma sus derechos en los terrenos que poseen o´ exploten,
u´ Oficinas en que elaboran, o´ de darlos en arrendamiento, uso, comodato, o´ de celebrar otro
contrato semejante, a´ estipular claramente con el nuevo adquirente que este tomara´ a´ su cargo
todas las obligaciones del presente Convenio; y para que esta clau´sula surta todos los efectos legales
y obligue a´ terceros, aun [sic] cuando no se estampe tal condicio´n en dichos contratos, los firmantes
facultan para que de esta clau´sula se tome razo´n en los Conservadores de Bienes Raices y de Minas
correspondientes como una limitacio´n a su dominio.
Art´ıculo 21: Todas divergencia sobre infraccio´n de las estipulaciones de este Convenio y toda
otra dificultad cuya resolucio´n no estuviera prevista en e´l, sera´ resuelta en arbitraje de amigable
composicio´n de a´rbitros arbitradores nombrados de entre los miembros de la Combinacio´n uno por
el Directorio y otro por el Productor divergente, y estos dos a´rbitros designara´n de comu´n acuerdo
un tercero de igual categor´ıa para que, en caso de discordia, e´ste falle en u´ltima instancia sin ulterior
recurso de ninguna clase.
Art´ıculo Transitorio
A. El Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda hara´ tomar las existencias de salitre
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de todas y cada una de las Oficinas el 31 de Diciembre de 1900. Dichas existencias sera´n de
libre exportacio´n durante los meses de Enero a´ Marzo de 1901.
Es entendido que el todo o´ parte de la cantidad que cada Oficina haya podido embarcar y
no la haya exportado antes del 31 de Marzo de 1901, quedara´ por cuenta de la cuota de la
Combinacio´n de la Oficina respectiva en el primer an˜o de este Convenio.
(Se calcula que si la exportacio´n de los meses de Junio a´ Diciembre de 1900 llega a 21.000000
de quintales espan˜oles, quedara´ como existencia en la Costa el 31 de Diciembre de 1900 del
mismo an˜o de 7.000.000 a´ 8.000.000 para exportarse libremente de Enero a´ Marzo de 1901,
conforme con el inciso precedente.)
B. El mismo Directorio podra´ disponer que se exporte durante los meses de Enero a´ Marzo de
1901 la mayor cantidad que estime por conveniente en vista de las necesidades del mercado.
Esta mayor cantidad sera´ sen˜alada por el Directorio, a´ ma´s tardar, en la segunda quincena
de Enero de 1901, una vez conocidas las cifras de las existencias en 31 de Diciembre de 1900
y se distribuira´ entre todas las Oficinas a prorrata de la cuota de exportacio´n fijada a´ cada
una de ellas en el cuadro de que habla el art´ıculo 6◦ de este Convenio.
C. El salitre que produzcan las Oficinas en los meses de Enero a Marzo de 1901 no podra´
exportarse sino despue´s del 1◦ de Abril de ese mismo an˜o y por cuenta de las cuotas de la
Combinacio´n, salvo lo prescrito en el inciso B anterior.
D. Las existencias de salitre que tengan en cualquier forma las Oficinas en la Costa el 31 de
Marzo de 1901, menos las que este´n a´ bordo de buques despachados de aduana, aunque no
zarpados, formara´n parte de la cuota de exportacio´n que corresponda a´ cada Oficina desde el
1◦ de Abril de ese mismo an˜o.
Public Deed Nitrate Cartel from 1901 to 190654
Article 1: The subscribers agree not to export or produce nitrate from the grounds they cur-
rently own or exploit, and from those they will own and exploit after this date and during the term
of this agreement, but in the amount and annual quota that, subject to the rules detailed below,
54Translated by author from NPA (1900).
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will be set by the board of the Nitrate Propaganda Association.
The board of directors of the the Nitrate Propaganda Association [note: NPA] will serve simulta-
neously as the board of the nitrate cartel established by this agreement in virtue the authorization
in paragraph IV of article 2 of the statutes of that Association. Said board shall be appointed
annually, its election proceeding according to article 9 of said statutes. The first election shall take
place during the first ordinary general meeting of the Nitrate Association.
Article 2: The present agreement will last for five years from April 1, 1901 to March 31, 1906,
except as provided in Numbers 5 and 6 of Article 12.
Article 3: Total exports during the first nitrate year55 of this agreement will be given be the
figure shown on the table mentioned in article 6.
Total exports in each of the following nitrate years will be determined by the NPA board and
notified to the producers no later than May 15 of each year; however, this figure may be modified
at the latest in the first week of July of each year, if so agreed by a number of producers equivalent
to at least sixty-five percent of total market shares according to the table mentioned in articles 6
and 7. The board will have to convene an extraordinary general meeting for that end.
Article 4: The export of each of the successive nitrate years after the first year of the agreement
will not be set by the board in a smaller quantity than that of the total consumption in the last
twelve months between May 1 and April 30.
Article 5: The board of directors will have the power to set, at the latest on May 15 of each
year, the fraction of the output that will be exported in the nine months from April to December
of each year, beginning in 1901, but this fraction will not be smaller than 75% of the total exports
of the respective nitrate year.
Article 6: The export quota of each plant in the first year of this agreement will be the one
shown on the table attached to this public deed. Said table will be considered as an integral part
of this agreement.
55The nitrate year corresponded to the twelve months starting in April 1 and ending in March 31. The use of this
specific year was given by the period of peak demand before the European harvest season from March to June of
each year.
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Article 7: This table will be the basis to determine plant-level export quotas for the following
four years of this agreement, changes to the quotas will occur due to the construction of new plants
or the entry of new producers, according to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10
and as prescribed in Articles 11 and 12.
Article 8: The values of the initial plant-level quotas as their annual updates due to entry,
will be opportunely communicated to each firm by the board of directors.
The relation between each plant’s initial quota and the total sum of initial quotas on the table
previously mentioned gives the percentage [note: market share] that corresponds to every plant in
the cartel, according to Articles 3 and 4.
(Example: If a plant’s initial quota is 500,000 quintals and the total sum on the table is 30,000,000,
that plant will have an export quota equivalent to a market share of 1.6666% over the industry-level
quota determined by the board.)
Article 9: During the term of this agreement, quota increases will not be granted for improve-
ments or investments in a refining facility, nor for an increase in the nitrate content of the nitrate
ores, nor for the use of new lands in the existing plant or plants, nor for the construction of new
plants in lands that were already owned by the producer at the time of signing this agreement and
were accounted as a part of an existing plant when the quotas were determined.
During the validity of this agreement it will be completely forbidden to reduce the number and
cubic capacity of the leaching tanks, crystallizing tanks and boilers of the refining facility that
existed when the plant’s quota was assigned.
Article 10: The associated producer that during the validity of this agreement acquired nitrate
land from a person that not part of the cartel and would like to extract its nitrate ore to refine it
in one of its plants, will not have the right to request a larger quota for said plant.
If a producer builds a new plant on newly acquired land which was not considered as part of any of
his plants when quotas were determined, the new plant will have its quota determined as specified
in Article 11. This quota will become active one month after the plant’s construction has been
verified as completed. The nitrate produced until that moment will be deducted from the plant’s
quota.
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Article 11: In the case described in the previous article, the export quota of the plant will be
determined by a commission of three members with practical experience in the industry, appointed
by the NPA board of directors, which will not start their assessment until the producer specifies
the nitrate land to be exploited.
If a producer does not accept the quota allocated to one of his plants within fifteen days, the quota
will be set by an arbitral tribunal composed by three nitrate experts. Each of the partied will
appoint one expert, and then the third expert will be nominated by mutual agreement of the initial
two, so that in case of a disagreement, he will make the final determination. There will not be any
further appeals of any kind. The appointed experts will submit their decision within fifteen days,
at the latest, after receiving the data.
Article 12: The NPA board will have the power to sign agreements with new producers who
install plants after the cartel contract enters into force, under the following procedure:
1. When, given the progress in the construction of the new plant the NPA board deems it
convenient, the board will appoint a commission of three expert nitrate producers to estimate
using the plant’s blueprints, the progress on its installation, an assessment of the quality of
its nitrate lands, etc., the approximate export quota that probably will be allocated to the
new plant.
2. If the new producer declares his conformity with both the cartel agreement and its the prelim-
inary quota, the preliminary quota will be understood as the plant’s definitive quota after it
is ratified when the plant’s construction has been concluded by the same or a new commission
(also named by the board) which will use as inputs the studies previously enumerated.
3. If the new producer declares his full adhesion to this agreement but does not accept the
preliminary quota within fifteen days of being notified by official letter, then the plant quota
shall be submitted to arbitration according to Article 11, once the plant has been completed.
4. This quota will become active one month after the plant’s construction has been verified as
completed by the commission described in number 2. The nitrate produced until that moment
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will be deducted from the plant’s quota.
5. If the new producer refuses to declare his full adhesion to this agreement and to accept the
quota or arbitration within fifteen days of being notified by official letter, the board may
declare the present agreement terminated by the absolute majority of its members, after
consulting all signatories in a special general meeting convened for that purpose.
6. If the new producer refuses to enter into arrangements or to allow the inspection of the
commission of experts, the board, after following the procedure described in number 5 above,
may declare this agreement terminated by the absolute majority of all its members.
Article 13: The plant that does not produce its quota, or part of it, in the first nitrate year of
the agreement will not have the right to produce the missing quantity in the following year. The
same will apply in the successive years of the agreement.
However, a producer who owns several plants will be able to produce their quotas in any of them,
under the condition that none of the plants produce a quantity greater than its total quota during
the duration of this agreement. To make use of this clause, the producer must give written notice
to the manager of the association, no later than April 1 of each year, describing how his firm will
allocate the production of their quotas among its plants.
In addition, plants with effective quotas of 90,000 quintals or less may accumulate their quotas
for two or more years. To make use of this clause the producer must communicate in writing to
the manager of the association, no later than June 30 of each year, if he chooses to work during
the current year or to accumulate for the next. In the years a producer will produce two or more
accumulated quotas, he must also express the total number of quotas that will be used in current
nitrate year.
Article 14: The plant that does not fully export its quota in a nitrate year will be able to
export the balance in the following year, on the condition that the nitrate was produced in the
preceding year.
Article 15: Plants will not produce more than 15% in excess of their annual export quota in
any nitrate year. Each Spanish quintal of excess production over this threshold will be fined with
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six pennies sterling.
Any production above the export quota of the plant will be exported in the following nitrate year
and deducted from that nitrate year’s export quota. The nitrate used to manufacture gunpowder
and other uses related to production will not be counted as part of said 15% margin.
Article 16: Any producer who exports in excess of his annual export quota will pay a fine of
eighteen pennies sterling for each Spanish quintal of excess, and the excess exports will be deducted
from the quota of the following nitrate year.
However, if the excess is not greater than 2 1/2% of the export quota, this situation may be settled
without incurring a fine if a second plant that has not yet completed its export quota yields a
fraction of it, of equal amount as the excess exports, to the first plant. This transaction shall be
communicated to the management of the association.
The fines described in the current and the previous articles will be imposed by the board and will
enter the common funds of the cartel.
Article 17: The board will appoint commissions that will verify nitrate stocks in the plants,
roads, and ports at the end of each nitrate year.
The NPA board of directors is authorized to hire inspectors when it deems necessary and to assign
them the salaries it deems appropriate.
The signatories of this agreement will be bound to give both commissions and inspectors free access
to their plants and to provide any additional information they require for the proper fulfillment of
their mission.
The inspectors will perform their duties according to the regulations issues by the board of directors.
Article 18: All the decisions made during a general meeting and the suggestions the NPA
board submits for the producers’ approval will be mandatory for all cartel members, as long as
they are accepted by a number of members equivalent to, at least, 80% of total market shares
according to the table mentioned in articles 6 and 7.
Article 19: For the expenses caused by this agreement, the associates commit to pay a special
fee, which will not exceed a quarter of a cent per Spanish quintal exported and will be charged
month by month by the Nitrate Propaganda Association.
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Article 20: In the event of transferring for any reason or in any form their rights in the
land they own or operate, or plants in which they produce, or to give them in lease, use, loan, or
to celebrate any other similar contract, the signatories of this agreement are expressly obligated
to clearly stipulate with the new owner that he will inherit all the obligations originated on this
agreement; and in order for this clause to have all the legal effects and bind third parties, even
if such conditions are not stated in said contracts, the signatories authorize that this clause be
transmitted to the corresponding Real Estate Conservators and Mines Conservators as a limitation
to their domain.
Article 21: Any disagreement over any potential infringements of the clauses of this agreement
and any other conflicts over issues not explicitly contained within this agreements will be resolved in
friendly arbitration by mediators appointed from the members of the cartel, one by the NPA board
and another by the disaffected producer. These two mediators will designate of common agreement
a third arbitrator so that, in case of disagreement among each other, this third arbitrator will make
a last instance decision without ulterior appeal of any class.
Transitory Article:
A. The board of the Nitrate Propaganda Association will measure the nitrate stocks of every
plant on December 31, 1900. These stocks can be freely exported during the months between
January to March of 1901.
The nitrate stocks that have not been exported before March 31, 1901, will be deducted from
the respective plant quota during the first nitrate year of this agreement. (It is estimated
that if the exports between June and December of 1900 reach 21,000,000 of Spanish quintals,
there will be total stocks in the Nitrate Coast of about 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 to be freely
exported from January to March 1901, according to the previous clause.)
B. The same board will decide the maximum amount to be exported in addition to the stocks
enumerated in the previous subsection during the months of January to March, 1901. This
quantity will be determined based on current market conditions.
The decision regarding the additional amount to be exported will be communicated by the
board in the second half of January of 1901, once the stocks measured on December 31, 1900
154
are known, and will be allocated among all the plants in proportion to their export quotas as
expressed on the table mentioned in article 6 of this agreement.
C. The nitrate produced by the plants in the months of January to March of 1901 will not be
exported until after April 1 of that same year and will be deducted from the cartel quotas,
except as prescribed in subsection B above.
D. Nitrate stocks stored in any form at the plants of the Nitrate Coast on March 31, 1901, with
the exception of those on board of ships that have cleared customs but not yet sailed, will
be deducted from the export quota corresponding to each plant from on April 1 of that same
year.
Appendix 2.G Fifth Cartel Contract
Escrituras Pu´blicas de la Combinacio´n Salitrera de 1906 a 190956
Art´ıculo 1: Los que suscriben convienen en no exportar ni elaborar salitre de los terrenos
que actualmente poseen o´ explotan i [sic] de los que poseyeren i esplotaren [sic] de esta fecha
i durante la vijencia [sic] de este Convenio, sino en la cantidad i cuota anual que con sujecion
a las reglas que se espresara´n [sic] a continuacio´n, fijara´ el Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera
de Propaganda. El Directorio de la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda lo sera´ a´ la vez de la
Combinacio´n Salitrera establecida por el presente Convenio en virtud de lo autorizado en el inciso
cuarto del art´ıculo segundo de los Estatutos de esa Asociacion [sic]. Dicho Directorio debera´ ser
nombrado anualmente, procedie´ndose a´ su eleccio´n conforme al art´ıculo noveno de los Estatutos
mencionados.
Art´ıculo 2: El presente convenio rejira´ [sic] por tres an˜os forzosos desde el 1◦ de Abril de 1906
hasta el 31 de Marzo de 1909, salvo lo dispuesto en el inciso 2◦ del art´ıculo 7◦.
Art´ıculo 3: La esportacion [sic] total en cada uno de los an˜os salitreros sera´ fijada provision-
almente por el Directorio i avisada a los productores a mas [sic] tardar el 15 de Mayo. Esta cifra
podra´ ser aumentada a mas tardar en la primera semana de Julio de cada an˜o, si as´ı lo acuerda un
56Semper et al. (1908, p. 321).
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nu´mero de asociados que represente a lo menos el 65% del total de las cuotas de las Oficinas, segun
[sic] el cuadro mencionado en los art´ıculos 6◦, debiendo el Directorio convocar a Junta Jeneral [sic]
estraordinaria [sic] con ese fin. Si no hai [sic] la mayor´ıa requerida, quedara´ como definitiva la cifra
provisional.
Art´ıculo 4: La esportacion de cada an˜o salitrero no podra´ fijarla el Directorio en cantidad
menor que la del consumo total en los doce u´ltimos meses comprendidos entre el 1◦ de Mayo y 30
de Abril.
Art´ıculo 5: El Directorio tendra´ la facultad para fijar, a mas tardar el 15 de Mayo, la pro-
porcio´n de lo que convenga exportar en los nueve meses de abril a diciembre, pero no podra´ reducirla
a me´nos [sic] del 75% de la esportacion total del an˜o salitrero respectivo.
Los saldos a que se refiere el art´ıculo 14 no estara´n sujetos a esta restriccion [sic]. Para la liquidacion
[sic] de lo esportado por dicha proporcion se seguira´n las reglas establecidas en el art´ıculo 15 para
determinar las existencias a bordo.
Art´ıculo 6: Se formara´ un cuadro jeneral de las cuotas convenidas para sus oficinas con cada
productor, que se suscribira´ en escritura pu´blica adicional, la cual sera´ considerada como parte
integrante de este convenio.
Dichas cuotas iniciales servira´n de factor para la liquidacio´n de la cuota efectiva de cada Oficina
en cada uno de los an˜os de la Combinacio´n en esta forma:
Deducidas de la cifra jeneral de esportacion que se acuerde para el an˜o respectivo, las cantidades
necesarias, como provision para las cuotas que se calcule, se dara´n en el an˜o por la construccio´n
de nuevas Oficinas o por el ingreso de nuevos productores i tomados en consideracion los saldos
por esportar del an˜o anterior, i agregado lo que se estime dejara´n de elaborar o esportar algunas
Oficinas, se tendra´ el saldo realmente prorrateable.
La relacion [sic] entre esta cantidad i el total de las cuotas iniciales dara´ el porcentaje de rebaja o
aumento que correspondera´ en ese an˜o a todas i cada una de las Oficinas i aplicado ese porcentaje
a la cuota inicial se llegara´ a la cuota anual efectiva de cada una de ellas.
Ejemplo: supongamos que el total de las cuotas iniciales sea de 60.000.000 de quintales i que la cuota
jeneral de esportacion sea de 40.000.000 de quintales i se estime que hai que hacer provision para
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nuevas oficinas i para saldos sobrantes del an˜o anterior [de] 5.000.000 de quintales, quedarian [sic]
35.000.000 de quintales. Si se agrega a este saldo lo que se calcula que no alcanzara´n o no podra´n
elaborar o esportar algunas oficinas [de] un millon de quintales, quedar´ıan para ser prorrateados
36.000.000 de quintales.
Hecha la relacion entre esta cifra i los 60.000.000 de quintales, se ve que representa el 60%; luego
la rebaja jeneral es de 40%, que aplicada a una Oficina cuya cuota fuera, digamos de 1.200.000
quintales, su cuota efectiva resultaria [sic] ser de 720.000 quintales.
Queda el Directorio facultado para liquidar i distribuir las cuotas en conformidad a las disposiciones
de los incisos anteriores.
Art´ıculo 7: El Directorio queda ampliamente facultado para hacer arreglos con nuevos sal-
itreros para su adhesion [sic] a este Convenio.
Si el productor nuevo se niega a entrar en arreglo con el Directorio o [sic] adherirse por escritura
pu´blica a la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda i a la Combinacio´n Salitrera, el Directorio podra´
declarar desahuciado el presente Convenio por la mayor´ıa absoluta de todos sus miembros, previa
consulta de los asociados en Junta Jeneral convocada al efecto.
Art´ıculo 8: Toda nueva Oficina sufrira´ desde el primer an˜o de su elaboracio´n la misma rebaja
del tanto por ciento que corresponda en ese an˜o a las cuotas iniciales de las dema´s oficinas i la
cuota as´ı rebajada solo rejira´ por la parte proporcional de los meses que faltan del an˜o.
Las cuotas se asignan por an˜os salitreros, o sea desde el 1◦ de Abril al 31 de Marzo.
La cuota de toda oficina nueva comenzara´ a rejir desde el mes siguiente al en que se compruebe
por una comisio´n designada por el Directorio, que la ma´quina esta´ concluida definitivamente. El
salitre que [se] haya elaborado hasta entonces forma parte de la cuota.
Ejemplo: Una Oficina que recibe como cuota inicial 1.200.000 quintales espan˜oles i en ese an˜o la
reduccion [sic] jeneral es de 40%, su cuota [e]fectiva [sic] sera´ de 720.000 quintales, i en caso de
estar definitivamente instalada su ma´quina en el curso mayo [sic], rejira´ desde el 1◦ de junio [sic],
o sea por diez meses, lo que le daria [sic] derecho a esportar 600.000 quintales.
Art´ıculo 9: Si un productor asociado construye ma´quina en terreno no considerado en la cuota
de su oficina o de cualquier otra, la de la nueva oficina se fijara´ i rejira´ en la forma determinada en
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los art´ıculos 7◦ i 8◦.
Art´ıculo 10: No se concedera´ durante la vijencia de este Convenio aumento de cuotas por
mejoras o aumento de ma´quina, ni por mejora en la lei de los caliches, ni por la elaboracio´n de
nuevos terrenos en la ma´quina o´ ma´quinas existentes, ni por construccio´n de nuevas ma´quinas en
terrenos que sean propiedad de un productor al tiempo de firmar este Convenio i que hayan sido
considerados parte integrante de la Oficina al asignarse la cuota.
Durante la vijencia de este Convenio sera´ prohibido en absoluto disminuir el nu´mero y cubicaje de
los cachuchos, bateas i calderos de la ma´quina que existia al asignarse la cuota de la Oficina.
Art´ıculo 11: La Oficina que no elabora su cuota o´ parte de ella en el primer an˜o salitrero pierde
todo derecho de elaborar la cuota de ese an˜o o´ esa parte en el an˜o siguiente i as´ı sucesivamente.
Sin embargo, el productor propietario de varias Oficinas tendra´ la facultad de trabajar las cuotas
que correspondan a cada una de sus oficinas indistintamente en cualquiera de ellas.
Se esceptu´an de esta concesion las oficinas que adquiera por compra, traspaso o cualquiera otro
concepto, o tome en arriendo, uso o comodato, a partir del 1◦ de Julio de 1905 i durante la vijencia
de este Convenio, las que debera´n ser trabajadas i sus cuotas liquidadas separadamente.
Igualmente toda nueva Oficina que ingrese a la Combinacion debera´ trabajar i se le liquidara´
separadamente su cuota.
Las oficinas con cuotas iniciales de 300.000 quintales, o me´nos [sic], podra´n acumular sus cuotas de
esportacion de dos o mas an˜os.
Para hacer uso de esta concesion el productor debera´ declarar por escrito al Jerente de la Asociacion,
a mas tardar el 15◦ de Abril de cada an˜o, si opta por trabajar en el an˜o o acumular para el siguiente.
En los an˜os que tenga dos o mas cuotas acumuladas i que opte por trabajar, debera´ espresar ademas
el total de cuotas que elaborara´ en el an˜o salitrero respectivo.
No habra´ derecho a elaborar en el an˜o siguiente la parte de [la] cuota dejada de producir en el an˜o
que haya espresado esta declaracion.
La Oficina que acumule su cuota en la forma dispuesta en el inciso anterior debera´ trabajarla en la
misma Oficina, no siendo permitido traspasarla o hacerla en otra, aunque sea del mismo productor.
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Art´ıculo 12: Ningu´n productor podra´ elaborar en caso alguno en el an˜o salitrero ma´s del
quince por ciento en exceso de su cuota anual de esportacion, sin incurrir en multa de seis peniques
esterlinos por cada quintal de exceso.
Tanto dicho quince por ciento, como lo producido demas [sic] no podra esportarse en dicho an˜o i
se computara´n como parte de la cuota del an˜o salitrero siguiente.
El salitre usado para po´lvora i consumo propio de la Oficina no forma parte de dicho quince por
ciento.
Art´ıculo 13: Cualquier productor que esporte en exceso de la cuota anual que le corresponde
pagara´ una multa de diez i ocho peniques esterlinos por cada quintal espan˜ol de exceso, i la cantidad
exportada de mas se le descontara´ de la cuota del an˜o salitrero siguiente.
Igual multa pagara´ el que esporte el exceso de la cantidad fijada a su Oficina como ma´ximum [sic]
de esportacion en los meses de abril a diciembre de cada an˜o.
Sin embargo, si el exceso no es mayor del dos i medio por ciento de la cuota de esportacion, podra´
saldarse sin incurrir en multa por traspaso de otra Oficina que haya producido el salitre dentro de
su propia cuota i no lo haya esportado, debiendo dicho transpaso ser indicado a la Jerencia de la
Asociacion de comun acuerdo entre los interesados.
Las multas expresadas en este art´ıculo i el anterior sera´n impuestas por el Directorio i sus valores
ingresara´n a los fondos comunes de la Combinacio´n.
Art´ıculo 14: La Oficina que no esporte ı´ntegramente su cuota en el an˜o salitrero podra´
embarcar el saldo en el an˜o siguiente, pero so´lo en el caso de que lo haya elaborado en el an˜o
anterior.
Art´ıculo 15: El Directorio nombrara´ comisiones que verificara´n las existencia de salitre tanto
en las Oficinas como en camino i en los puertos al fin de cada an˜o salitrero.
Para esta operacion se considerara´ como existencias las cantidades que este´n a bordo de vapores
o buques que no hayan salido definitivamente de los puertos de la Zona Salitrera por no haber
completado su cargamento, pero si dichas naves han contemplado su cargamento i tienen el despacho
de aduana, se considerara´ este salitre como esportado, aunque el buque no haya zarpado.
En el caso de no ponerse de acuerdo la comision con el productor con respecto al monto de las
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existencias, el Directorio tendra´ la facultad de nombrar una nueva comision cuyo fallo sera´ definitivo.
Art´ıculo 16: Queda autorizado el Directorio para nombrar inspectores cuando lo creyera
necesario i asignarles los sueldos que estime conveniente. Los inspectores ejercera´n sus funciones
de acuerdo con el reglamento que dictara´ el Directorio.
Art´ıculo 17: Los firmantes de este Convenio tendra´n la obligacion de dar a las comisiones e
inspectores de que hablan los dos art´ıculos anteriores libre acceso a´ sus Oficinas i bodegas, donde
tengan depositado su salitre, con todas las facilidades posibles para el debido cumplimiento de su
misio´n.
Art´ıculo 18: Tanto los acuerdos de las Juntas Jenerales como las proposiciones que el Di-
rectorio someta a la aprobacio´n de los productores, o la modificacion de cualquiera parte de este
Convenio, sera´n obligatorios para todos los miembros de la Combinacion, siempre que sean acep-
tados por un nu´mero de Asociados que represente, a lo me´nos, el 85% del total de las cuotas de las
Oficinas, segu´n el cuadro mencionado en el art´ıculos 6◦.
Art´ıculo 19: Para los gastos que orijine este Convenio los Asociados se comprometen a pagar
una contribucion especial que no excedera´ de un cuarto de centavo por quintal espan˜ol exportado
i sera´ cobrada mes a´ mes por la Asociacio´n Salitrera de Propaganda.
Art´ıculo 20: Los firmantes de este Convenio se obligan espresamente en el evento de transferir
por cualquier motivo o en cualquier forma sus derechos en los terrenos que poseen o explotan, u
oficinas en que elaboran, o en caso de darlos en arrendamiento, uso, comodato, o de celebrar otro
contrato semejante, a estipular claramente con el nuevo adquirente que e´ste tomara´ a´ su cargo
todas las obligaciones del presente Convenio, i para que esta clau´sula surta todos los efectos legales
i obligue a terceros, aun [sic] cuando no se estampe tal condicio´n en dichos contratos, los firmantes
facultan para que de esta clau´sula se tome razon en los Conservadores de Bienes Raices i de Minas
correspondientes, como una limitacion de su dominio.
Art´ıculo 21: Toda diverjencia sobre infraccion de las estipulaciones de este Convenio i toda
otra dificultad cuya resolucion no estuviese prevista en e´l, sera´ resuelta en arbitraje de amigable
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composicio´n de a´rbitros arbitradores nombrados de entre los miembros de la Combinacio´n, uno por
el Directorio i otro por el Productor divergente, i estos dos a´rbitros designara´n de comu´n acuerdo un
tercero de igual categor´ıa para que, en caso de discordia, e´ste falle en u´ltima instancia sin ulterior
recurso de ninguna clase.
En caso de negarse alguno de los a´rbitros a concurrir a las decisiones del Tribunal o a firmar la
sentencia, las decisiones i sentencia que pronuncien los otros dos sera´n va´lidas.
Public Deed Nitrate cartel from 1906 to 190957
Article 1: The subscribers agree not to export or produce nitrate from the grounds they cur-
rently own or exploit, and from those they will own and exploit after this date and during the term
of this agreement, but in the amount and annual quota that, subject to the rules detailed below,
will be set by the board of the Nitrate Propaganda Association.
The board of directors of the the Nitrate Propaganda Association [note: NPA] will serve simulta-
neously as the board of the nitrate cartel established by this agreement in virtue the authorization
in paragraph IV of article 2 of the statutes of that Association. Said board shall be appointed
annually, its election proceeding according to article 9 of said statutes.
Article 2: The present agreement will last for five years from April 1, 1906 to March 31, 1909,
except as provided in subsection 2 Article 7.
Article 3: Total exports on each nitrate year during the duration of this agreement will be
determined by the NPA board and notified to the producers no later than May 15 of each year.
The total exports quantity may be increased at the latest in the first week of July of each year, if
so agreed by a number of producers equivalent to at least sixty-five percent of total market shares
according to the table mentioned in article 6. The board will have to convene an extraordinary
general meeting for that end. If the required majority is not reached, the figure proposed by the
NPA board will remain as definitive.
Article 4: The total export on each nitrate year of the agreement will not be set by the board
in a smaller quantity than that of the total consumption in the last twelve months between May 1
57Translated by author from Semper et al. (1908).
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and April 30.
Article 5: The board of directors will have the power to set, at the latest on May 15 of each
year, the fraction of the output that will be exported in the nine months from April to December
of each year, but this fraction will not be smaller than 75% of the total exports of the respective
nitrate year. If a plant has not fully exported its quota during a nitrate year and decides to export
it in the following year (as described in article 14), the restriction on this article will not affect the
transferred amount from the previous nitrate year. The amount exported under this clause will be
determined following the rules in article 15.
Article 6: A table, summarizing all plant-level initial exports quotas will be published. This
table will be considered as an integral part of this agreement.
The table with the initial export quotas will be the basis to determine the export quotas in the
following years of the agreement in the following manner: By deducting from the total quantity
to be exported in each nitrate year, the quantities deemed likely to be allocated to new plants
and firms, and considering the amount that will be exported from unfulfilled quotas from previous
years and the quantities that probably will not be produced or exported by some plants, the total
exports quantity that can be in practice be allocated among the producers will be obtained.
The ratio between the sum of the initial export quotas and the quantity available to be allocated
among the producers each year will correspond to the discount that will be used to compute the
effective export quota of every plant.
Example: assuming that the total sum of initial quotas is 60,000,000 quintals, the industry quantity
to be exported corresponds to 40,000,0000 quintals, and it is estimated that 5,000,000 must be
reserved for quotas of new plants and unfulfilled quotas from the previous year, 35,000,000 quintals
would remain. If to this number we add one million quintals, which is the estimated quantity that
existing plants will not be able to produce during the current year, there are in total 36,000,000
quintals to be allocated among the producers in the current period.
Taking the ratio between this figure and the total sum of initial quotas, the quantity to allocate
corresponds to 60% of the initial quotas. Thus, a plant with an initial quota, for instance, of
1,200,000 quintals will have an effective quota of 720,000 quintals.
The NPA board will have the power to compute and allocate the quotas according to the previous
162
clauses.
Article 7: The NPA board will have broad powers to make agreements with new producers in
order to incorporate them to the cartel.
If the new producer refuses to negotiate with the NPA board, or to join by public deed to the Nitrate
Propaganda Association and to the nitrate cartel, the board may declare the present agreement
terminated by the absolute majority of its members, after consulting all signatories in a special
general meeting convened for that purpose.
Article 8: Every new plant will experience from its first year of operation the same discount
between initial and effective quotas that applies to all already existing plants, and during its first
year of operation will enjoy an effective export quota proportional to the remaining fraction of the
year at the moment it becomes fully operational.
Export quotas are allocated according to nitrate years, which go from April 1 to March 31.
The quota of every new plant will become active one month after the plant’s construction has been
verified as completed. The nitrate produced until that moment will be deducted from the plant’s
quota.
Example: A plant that obtains an export quota of 1,200,000 Spanish quintals and starts operation
in a year when the general discount is 40% will have an effective export quota will be 720,000. If
its construction is completed in the month of May its quota would become active in the month of
June, meaning that the plant will receive ten months of its effective quota, ending with a right to
export 600,000 quintals during its first year of operation.
Article 9: If an associated producer builds a plant on nitrate lands that have not been included
among the feeding grounds of any other of its plants, the export quota of the new plant will be
determined as explained in articles 7 and 8.
Article 10: During the term of this agreement, quota increases will not be granted for im-
provements or investments in a refining facility, nor for an increase in the nitrate content of the
nitrate ores, nor for the use of new lands in the existing plant or plants, nor for the construction of
new plants in lands that were already owned by the producer at the time of signing this agreement
and were accounted as a part of an existing plant when the quotas were determined.
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During the validity of this agreement it will be completely forbidden to reduce the number and
cubic capacity of the leaching tanks, crystallizing tanks and boilers of the refining facility that
existed when the plant’s quota was assigned.
Article 11: The plant that does not produce its quota, or part of it, in the first nitrate year of
the agreement will not have the right to produce the missing quantity in the following year. The
same will apply in the successive years of the agreement.
However, a producer who owns several plants will be able to produce their quotas in any of them.
This option will not be available for plants that were bought, loaned, or leased after July 1, 1905
and during the validity of this agreement. These plants will have to produce their effective quotas
individually.
Likewise, every new plant that enters the cartel will have to produce their effective quotas individ-
ually.
In addition, plants with initial quotas of 300,000 quintals or less may accumulate their quotas for
two or more years.
To make use of this clause the producer must communicate in writing to the manager of the as-
sociation, no later than April 15 of each year, if he chooses to work during the current year or to
accumulate for the next.
In the years a producer will produce two or more accumulated quotas, he must also express the
total number of quotas that will be used in current nitrate year.
If the producer declared that he would produce a given quota and he is unable to complete its
production, the remainder of the export quota cannot be produced in a different year.
The plant that saves its quota in the manner described above for a future nitrate year will not be
able to transfer in any way the production of the postponed quota to a different plant of the same
producer.
Article 12: Plants will not produce more than 15% in excess of their effective export quota in
any nitrate year. Each Spanish quintal of excess production over this threshold will be fined with
six pennies sterling.
Any production above the effective export quota of the plant will be exported in the following
nitrate year and deducted from that nitrate year’s export quota. The nitrate used to manufacture
164
gunpowder and other uses related to production will not be counted as part of said 15% margin.
Article 13: Any producer who exports in excess of his annual export quota will pay a fine of
eighteen pennies sterling for each Spanish quintal of excess, and the excess exports will be deducted
from the quota of the following nitrate year.
The same fine will be imposed on the producers that export in excess of the maximum fraction
allowed between the months of April and December.
However, if the excess is not greater than 2 1/2% of the export quota, this situation may be settled
without incurring a fine if a second plant that has not yet completed its export quota yields a
fraction of it, of equal amount as the excess exports, to the first plant. This transaction shall be
communicated to the management of the association.
The fines described in the current and the previous articles will be imposed by the board and will
enter the common funds of the cartel.
Article 14: The plant that does not fully export its quota in a nitrate year will be able to
export the balance in the following year, on the condition that the nitrate was produced in the
preceding year.
Article 15: The board will appoint commissions that will verify nitrate stocks in the plants,
roads, and ports at the end of each nitrate year.
For this purpose it will be considered as stocks the quantities of nitrate that are on board of ships
that have not yet sailed out of the Nitrate Region’s ports for still not being completely loaded.
However, if the ship has bee loaded and has cleared customs, its nitrate will be considered as
exported.
In case of disagreement between the commission and the producer regarding the precise quantity
of stocks, the NPA board will be able to name a new commission whose opinion will be definitive.
Article 16: The NPA board of directors is authorized to hire inspectors when it deems neces-
sary and to assign them the salaries it deems appropriate.The inspectors will perform their duties
according to the regulations issues by the board of directors.
Article 17: The signatories of this agreement will be bound to give both commissions and
inspectors free access to their plants and warehouses and to provide any additional information
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they may require for the proper fulfillment of their mission.
Article 18: All the decisions made during a general meeting and the suggestions the NPA
board submits for the producers’ approval will be mandatory for all cartel members, as long as
they are accepted by a number of members equivalent to, at least, 85% of total market shares
according to the table mentioned in article 6.
Article 19: For the expenses caused by this agreement, the associates commit to pay a special
fee, which will not exceed a quarter of a cent per Spanish quintal exported and will be charged
month by month by the Nitrate Propaganda Association.
Article 20: In the event of transferring for any reason or in any form their rights in the
land they own or operate, or plants in which they produce, or to give them in lease, use, loan, or
to celebrate any other similar contract, the signatories of this agreement are expressly obligated
to clearly stipulate with the new owner that he will inherit all the obligations originated on this
agreement; and in order for this clause to have all the legal effects and bind third parties, even
if such conditions are not stated in said contracts, the signatories authorize that this clause be
transmitted to the corresponding Real Estate Conservators and Mines Conservators as a limitation
to their domain.
Article 21: Any disagreement over any potential infringements of the clauses of this agreement
and any other conflicts over issues not explicitly contained within this agreements will be resolved in
friendly arbitration by mediators appointed from the members of the cartel, one by the NPA board
and another by the disaffected producer. These two mediators will designate of common agreement
a third arbitrator so that, in case of disagreement among each other, this third arbitrator will make
a last instance decision without ulterior appeal of any class.
In case that any of the mediators refuses to concur in the decisions of the panel or to sign the
judgement, the decisions and judgements made by the other two will be valid.
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Chapter 3
Sent Away: Long-Term Effects of
Forced Displacements
There is great interest in understanding the extent to which low-income neighborhoods have a
negative causal effect on the outcomes of families and, especially, on the future outcomes of children.
This paper describes a novel large data set that combines archival records and administrative data
regarding a natural experiment that occurred during the Chilean dictatorship between 1979 and
1985, when the government mandated the relocation of a large number of slums in the city of
Santiago, Chile. Three facts about the program’s implementation make it of unique interest to
study the broad effects of neighborhoods on social mobility and inequality: the unit of treatment
was the slum (not specific households); participation was mandatory and compliance was very
high, since the policy was implemented during a highly repressive dictatorial government; and
only some of the slums were removed from their original location, creating two groups of families:
movers and non-movers, which allows us to identify a causal displacement effect. Our data set
comprises data for more than 26,000 households that were part of this program (out of a total of
40,000 households) and more than 58,000 of their children, which allows us to perform a causal
estimation of the long-term and inter-generational effects of moving to a high-poverty neighborhood
on education, mortality, income and crime.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
A key question in the modern policy debate centers around the extent to which the environment
affects the outcomes of families and, particularly, children. For adults, living in a low-income
neighborhood could impact their access to labor market, expose them to higher levels of crime, and
increase their mortality. Meanwhile, growing up in a low-income neighborhood has the potential
to affect children’s future educational attainment, labor income, and incarceration rates. Chetty,
Hendren, Kline, et al. (2014) shows that neighborhood quality is associated to education, income
inequality, and social mobility in the United States.
The fundamental challenge to identify a causal effect of neighborhoods is a selection problem:
In most cases families decide where they live creating endogeneity between unobserved household
characteristics and their selected neighborhood.
In this project we contribute to this literature by exploiting a policy implemented during the
Chilean dictatorship between 1979 and 1985 that forced the displacement of entire slums from high-
and median-income districts to low-income districts on the periphery of the city, creating ghettos of
poverty in public housing. Moreover, the places where people moved where characterized by high
poverty rates, low provision of public goods, and in some cases political violence, exposing children
to worse neighborhoods on average.
A key aspect of our approach is that in our context families did not decide when and where
to move. Chile at the time was a dictatorship and planners at the central government determined
what and when each slum would be treated. An addition, most districts in low-income areas of
the city both received and expelled groups of families. This exogenous variation permit us to
estimate a causal displacement effect separate from the fixed effect of each destination. Moreover,
the characteristics of the dataset will allow for future work to match our sample to a large number
of administrative databases, allowing to pin down the specific mechanisms affecting the treated
families.
Our setting has other distinctive features with respect to the previous literature on neighbor-
hoods effects. First, the dataset we construct encompasses both parents and children. Hence, we
are able to estimate effects of the displacement policy on all family members and to understand the
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mediation mechanisms between the effects of parents and children (e.g., does the higher mortality
of the parents have a direct effect on the lower high-school graduation rates of their children?).
Second, since the program ended approximately 35 years ago, we can evaluate the long-term out-
comes of the policy. Third, as entire slums are displaced by the policy, the social networks within
the slums remained intact. Thus, we can clearly identify the mechanisms behind the observed out-
comes without worrying about the disruption to social networks (For instance, in our case children’s
social networks are not disrupted as they are forced to attend a worse school and exposed to more
criminal activity).
3.1.2 Related literature
The literature on neighborhoods effects has grown considerably in the last decade. A first strand
of the literature studies neighborhood effects using experimental data. Oreopoulos (2003) uses
variation in the quality of public housing in Toronto to estimate long-term effects in labor market
outcomes finding small effects. In the U.S. several works have used the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) experiment (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016), Pinto (2018)). In particular, Chetty,
Hendren, and Katz (2016) shows that when families move from high poverty to low poverty neigh-
borhoods the outcomes of children, such as education and income, improve linearly as a function of
the time spent in the new area, a result consistent with previous findings in the literature (Chetty
and Hendren (2018a), Chetty and Hendren (2018b)).
Displaced families in our sample were moved to higher poverty neighborhoods, located mainly
on the periphery of the city where access to public services such as schools, hospitals and public
transportation was of lower quality than in the original location. This pattern is similar to the
Indian experiment studied in Barnhardt, Field, and Pande (2017) which finds only positive effects
on housing quality fourteen years after participation in a housing lottery.
A second strand of the literature uses quasi-experimental data, particularly from demolitions
of housing projects (Jacob (2004), Chyn (2018)). In a very recent work, Chyn (2018) finds large
positive effects on the outcomes of children that moved to better neighborhoods due to demolitions
in Chicago. In this case, the large magnitude of the estimated effects corresponds to a smaller degree
of selection in the population treated by the program with respect to programs in the experimental
literature where families have to apply, inducing a positive sample selection.
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Figure 3.2.1: Example of slum (Nueva Habana) and destination neighborhoods
Finally, our project also speaks to the literature on the effects of re-settlements ( Damm and
Dustmann (2014), Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt (2018), Abel (2019)). The closest study to our
case is Damm and Dustmann (2014) that studies the case of refugees in Denmark and finds that
children of refugee families who were exposed to high-crime neighborhoods were more likely to
commit a crime in their adulthood.
3.2 Historical Background
By the late 1970s, out of the more than million inhabitants of the city of Santiago, capital of Chile,
more than 15% lived in slums (INE, 1970).1
Slums at the time were squatter settlements without access to drinking water, electricity, and
sewage. The median slum had between between 100-150 families, with an average size of 5.2 persons
per family, although there was a large dispersion in slum size. The vast majority had their origin
in a land seizure by a organized group of families. Hence, slum inhabitants lacked property rights
over the land they used. Figure 3.2.1 shows an example of a typical slum.
From 1979 to 1985, the central government of Chile implemented a set of policies with the
goal of eradicating poverty. One of the main programs of this effort was a large re-allocation
1Santiago at the time concentrated 34.8% of Chile’s population.
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Table 3.2.1: Urban Marginality Program (1979-1985)
Treatment Movers Non-movers Total
Number of families 26,291 14,200 40,491
Share % 65% 35% 100 %
Number of slums 211 67 278
Number of neighborhoods 63 67 130
Sources: Molina (1985, p. 53).
program to transform slums into neighborhoods.2 The central idea behind the program was to move
slum dwellers into newly built neighborhoods where they would become home-owners receiving a
government subsidized property title.
The costs of the program were low. The average housing unit cost was $7,000 and the average
total annual cost of the program was $34m, which was about 0.2% of Chilean GDP at the time.
The families had to pay 25% of the cost of their new property in installments.
At the program onset in 1979 the government chose 340 slums to be treated as part of the
program. There were two versions of the treatment: Some slums were kept at their original location
receiving property rights over their land. Families and slums from this treatment are called non-
movers. On the contrary, some slums were displaced from their original location, their inhabitants
receiving housing units in a new neighborhood located in the periphery of the city. The families
and slums from this treatment are called movers. More than 40,000 families participated in the
program and approximately a third were non-movers. Table 3.2.1 presents basic statistics about
both versions of the program, while Table 3.2.2 describes the main features of both versions of the
program.
The allocation of slums into these two groups was not random but a function of slums character-
istics. According to geographers and historians, the density of the slum and the potential difficulties
for the provision of sewage and electricity were good predictors of displacement. However, other
considerations were also important Rodr´ıguez and Icaza (1998) explain “. . . these other criteria in-
cluded the reputation of the district, especially in the of upper- and middle-income sectors, their
land values, and the speculation about future prices.”
2The program was known as Urban Marginality Program (Programa de Marginalidad Urbana), enacted under law
2552.
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Figure 3.2.2: Population movements from (left) and to (right) the Renca district of Santiago
Sources: Molina (1985).
Figure 3.2.3: Characteristics of origin and destination districts
(a) Years of schooling (1982) (b) Schools/1000 students (1982)
Sources: INE (1982). Chilean Ministry of Education.
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Figure 3.2.4: Location of treated population before and after the program
(a) Before 1979 (b) After 1985
Sources: Benavides, Morales, and Rojas (1982), Molina (1985).
Table 3.2.2: Characteristics of both program versions
Treatment Location Property Type of Public Cost
Right dwelling Services for family
Non-movers Same Yes Starting Kit (*) Yes 25%
Movers New Yes Apartment Yes 25%
(periphery) or house
Notes: (*) Starting kit includes a living room, a bathroom and a kitchen. Sources: Molina
(1985), Morales and Rojas (1986).
3.3 Data Collection
In order to study the causal effects of the program on the treated population’s outcomes it is
necessary to have a dataset that contains both parents and their children, their slum of origin and
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Figure 3.3.1: Example of archival record. Jose Miguel Infante neighborhood in Renca district
destination neighborhood. These records are then matched to administrative data from the Chilean
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development.
3.3.1 Archival Data: Parents sample
The initial source of data are the original lists of participants in the program, which are located
in the Santiago Region Urban Development and Housing Service section of the Chilean National
Administration Archives in Santiago, Chile.3 From this source, we construct a database with the
parents that were treated as part of the program.
The records are a detailed list of the people who were assigned property deeds by the Ministry of
Housing as part of this program. Each destination neighborhood has one or more lists, depending
on the number of stages on which its new residents arrived. Figure 3.3.1 shows an example of
the records. The lists contain information on the head of the household and the spouse, their full
names, national identification numbers (NID) and the address of their new house. Using the names
of the neighborhood of destination, we can classify people as movers and non-movers. We digitized
records that correspond to 26,283 families treated by the policy between 1979 and 1984, of which
18,690 families are movers and 7,593 are non-movers.
3Each region of Chile has a Urban Development and Housing Service, dependant of the National Ministry of
Housing and Urban Development to implement housing policies at the local level.
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Table 3.3.1: Archival Data 1976-1985
Treatment Movers Non-movers Total
Number of families 18,690 7,593 26,283
Share % 71.1% 28.9% 100%
Number of slums 98 50 145
Number of neighborhoods 69 50 114
3.3.2 Matching process: Children sample
The second stage in the construction of the full database consists in finding the children of each
family. Notice that the children that had already been born by the time of the displacement are
not included in the lists that conform the archival data. Moreover, we want to have not only the
children that had been already born but all the children these families eventually had. Figure 3.3.2
presents a simple diagram with the main steps of the process. The strategy to find the children is
based on three features of the Chilean case. First, each potential child of these families would have
as his/her last-names a combination of the last-names of their parents, which we know from the
parents sample originated in the archival records.4 Second, the ubiquitous use in Chile of a unique
national identification numbers (NID) to identify citizens in all official documents including birth,
marriage, and death certificates.5 Third, the electoral records in Chile are public and the country
has automatic voter registration.
The first step of the process is to construct a list of all the potential combinations of last-
names the potential children of the treated families would have, by combining the first last-names
of the spouses included in the archival records. The second step is to construct a second list
with all the citizens in the electoral records that have the same combination of last-names as the
potential children of the families in the parents sample. To do this step, we partner with Genealog
Chile, a group of nonprofit genealogists that work reconstructing family trees in Chile. They are
currently collecting administrative data for the Chilean population, including the electoral records,
and marriage, birth, and death certificates of the entire population. Finally, the third step consists
4In Spanish speaking countries people have two last-names. The first last-name of a child (in order from left to
right) corresponds to the first last-name of the father, while the second last-name is the first last-name of the mother.
Hence, both paternal last-names from the parents are transmitted to their children.
5Every citizen in the country is assigned, at the moment of birth, with an unique national identification number
(NID). In Spanish the name of the identification number is Rol Unico Nacional and is usually called by its acronym,
RUN. Importantly, this number is not considered as sensitive information and is used periodically by Chileans in
their daily life while, at the same time, being used by all government agencies to identify citizens.
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Figure 3.3.2: Diagram of process to match children to parents sample
Figure 3.3.3: Summary of results data collection process
on linking children to parents using the information on their birth certificates. As shown in Figure
3.3.2, Chilean birth certificates include the NID number of both of the parents. Hence, we search
among of potential children for a match with the NID numbers of the families in the parents sample.
Figure 3.3.3 shows the results of the matching process. From the initial sample of 26,309 families
we are able to link 58,857 children, which correspond to 19,104 of the initial families.
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Figure 3.3.4: Number of families by type and year of treatment in our sample
3.3.3 Locating slums and destination neighborhoods
Our archival records are based on the destination neighborhoods, so it is necessary to assign each
family also to a slum of origin in order to complete the database. For doing this, we use infor-
mation from three main sources sources. The housing programs of the Chilean dictatorship were
contemporaneously studied by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Santi-
ago. We draw intensively from two of their studies. Benavides, Morales, and Rojas (1982) compiled
a comprehensive list of existing slums in the year 1982, including characteristics such as surface,
number of families and location. Morales and Rojas (1986), describe the treatment of slums, iden-
tifying neighborhoods of destination and providing a list of non-mover slums. We complement
FLACSO sources with Molina (1985) that documents the treatment of slums that were moved
before the year 1984 and contemporaneous internal documents from the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Development.6
There are two main challenges in the allocation process of families to slums of origin. First,
6The identification of slums is challenging given their dynamic nature. Slums names often changed for a myriad
of reasons.For instance, after the military coup of 1973 several slums with left-wing related names were forced to
change their names.
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since the archival records are ordered by the date on which the families moved to the destination
neighborhoods. Thus, in same cases they include groups of families with more than one slum of
origin. Second, when a non-mover slum was treated, often the new neighborhood had a different
name from the original slum. Moreover, adjacent non-mover slums were sometimes treated in a
single new neighborhood of destination.
To solve the first challenge we use the number of mover families treated at every slum of origin,
which we obtain from the sources above, together with the Place of Registration variable included
in the archival records.7 In order to identify non-mover slums of origin we match the address of
the destination neighborhoods with the location of known non-mover slums and number of families
treated.
3.3.4 Measuring outcomes: matching to administrative data
The last step in the construction of the database consists on matching our sample of families to
administrative data of the Ministry of Education using the NID numbers of the children. Unfor-
tunately, the Ministry of Education data only covers the years 2002 to 2018, reducing the total
number of observations we are able to match. We obtain educational records for 13,181 children
that belong to approximately 8,500 families.
3.4 Summary Statistics
This section presents descriptive information about our dataset with a focus on examining the
balance of the sample between families that received different versions of the treatment.
Our basic empirical methodology is based on the estimation of the two following equations.
Yi =α+ βMovers{i} +X ′iθ + ψo + εi (3.1)
Yi =α+ β′Movers{i} +X ′iθ + ψo + ψd + εi (3.2)
where Yi is current outcome for individual i; o is district of origin and d is district of destination;
7Place of Registration is called as Gabinete on the records and corresponds to the Civil Registry and Identification
Service (CRIS) office where the person was first registered. Most districts of Santiago had at the time a CRIS office.
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Table 3.4.1: Summary Statistics: Families
Mover mean Non-mover mean Difference (within district)
Demographics at displacement
Head of Household age 35.29 36.51 -0.61
(0.51)
Wife age 33.63 34.90 -0.64
(0.50)
Husband age 35.23 36.54 -0.79
(0.48)
Female HH 0.32 0.31 0.02
(0.02)
Single 0.20 0.16 0.04***
(0.01)
Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.00)
# Children 2.23 2.28 -0.05
(0.05)
No children 0.11 0.11 0.01
(0.01)
Demographics after displacement
Total # children 2.80 2.72 0.03
(0.04)
Wife died 0.22 0.20 0.04**
(0.01)
Husband died 0.33 0.31 0.04**
(0.02)
Observations 15,679 5,869 21,548
Notes: Within difference corresponds to the coefficient of mover in equation (1) stratified by origin FE and without controls.
Clustered standard errors at the slum level. 10%*, 5%**, 1%***.
s(i) indexes the slum of origin for individual i; ψo and ψd are district of origin and district of
destination fixed effects; and Movers{i} takes the value of 1 if an individual’s family lived in a
displaced slum. Finally, Xi is a set of control variables: age, gender, family characteristics, and
year of treatment.
Table 3.4.1 presents summary statistics at the family level, while Table 3.4.1 shows summary
statistics for the children in our sample. Characteristics between the two sub-samples are very
balanced. Importantly, age of the parents at the time of displacement presents a statistically non-
significant difference of less than one year. The only characteristic on which there is a relevant
difference is marriage status, since movers are more likely to be single at the moment of displace-
ment.
Finally, Table 3.4.3 describes the correlation between characteristics of the families in the sub-
sample of movers and attributes of their destination district. We find no evidence that mover-
families were selected on observable characteristics when they were assigned a district of destination.
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Table 3.4.2: Summary Statistics: Children
All children Children with educ. records
Non-mover mean Difference (within district) Non-mover mean Difference (within district)
Demographics at displacement
Female 0.5 0.01 0.49 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 7.63 -0.66 -2.24 0.23
(0.41) (0.37)
Older than 18 yo 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
# Siblings 2.81 0.19*** 2.85 0.13
(0.06) (0.09)
Mother age 33.96 -0.81* 29.45 -0.91**
(0.43) (0.41)
Father age 36.23 -0.83* 32.23 -1.11**
(0.44) (0.44)
Mother is HH 0.28 0.01 0.26 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Single Parent 0.12 0.04*** 0.15 0.03*
(0.01) (0.02)
School Outcomes after displacement
Schooling (years) 11.21 -0.41***
(0.08)
HS graduate 0.73 -0.09***
(0.02)
Observations
Individuals 15,987 59,857 2,749 13,181
Families 5,214 19,104 1,938 8,587
Notes: Within difference corresponds to the coefficient of mover in equation (1) stratified by origin FE and without controls.
Clustered standard errors at the slum level. 10%*, 5%**, 1%***.
Table 3.4.3: Destination attributes and family characteristics at time of displacement (sub-sample of movers)
Location Av. Years Literacy Unempl. # Primary Care # Hospitals/ # schools/ # pub. schools/
Atributtes of Schooling rate rate Cent./1000 pers. 1000 pers. 1000 stud. 1000 stud.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HH’s age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Female HH -0.019 -0.000 0.002** 0.001** -0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007)
Single HH 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000** 0.012* 0.009*
(0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006)
Widowed HH -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.010 0.008
(0.043) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.010)
# children 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Test of joint significance of controls
F 0.281 0.527 1.708 2.395 0.855 0.683 0.596
p > F 0.922 0.755 0.140 0.043 0.514 0.637 0.702
Dependent variable mean 6.53 0.63 0.28 0.018 0.004 0.67 0.56
District of origin FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 15,679 15,679 15,679 15,679 15,679 15,679 15,679
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the slum level. 10%*, 5%**, 1%***. Attributes in columns 1-3 are measured at the district
level in 1982 when census data is available, while schools and hospitals are measured in 1985.
3.5 Final Remarks
This paper presents a novel large dataset that includes family members from two generations
affected by a disruptive housing policy implemented by the Chilean dictatorial government between
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1979 and 1985.
The program had two versions which differed regarding the location of the housing units the
families received: Some remained in the same location where they already lived, while others were
displaced to the periphery of the city where public services and labor market opportunities were
scarcer. An analysis of the observable characteristics of families under the two versions indicate
that both groups had similar characteristics at the moment of treatment.
Our dataset opens important opportunities to understand the mechanisms behind the neigh-
borhood effects described by the previous literature. In particular, the existence of a NID number
for every individual in our sample offers the potential to match it with existing administrative
databases from the Chilean government (in addition to the Ministry of Education data) on social
outcomes including incarceration rates, labor income, and causes of mortality.
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